BOUTEFLIKA: SERIOUS WESTERN SAHARA AUTONOMY IS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000514 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2034 TAGS: PREL PBTS OREP PGOV PINR PTER PINS KNNP AG SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA: SERIOUS WESTERN SAHARA AUTONOMY IS MORE THAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER GARBAGE COLLECTION Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d) . ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: President Bouteflika told Codel Burr Algeria would consider modifying its position on Western Sahara, and engaging the Sahrawis, if Morocco seriously implemented UN resolutions on self-determination. While Algeria would respect whatever outcome the Saharans chose, including autonomy, any such autonomy would have to involve more than the right of the Sahrawis to "collect their own garbage." Real autonomy would entail a serious discussion of what aspects of sovereign power an autonomous region would actually have. Bouteflika cited Puerto Rico and Monaco as models of real autonomy without independence. He criticized the State Department for recently supporting what he called false autonomy, and urged the U.S. to take a leadership role in advancing the cause of self-determination with the same zeal it had displayed for effort to counter nuclear weapons proliferation. He said Algeria's border with Morocco will remain closed until the Western Sahara issue is resolved. Bouteflika told the Codel that Algeria remains committed to defending the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT),but as an NPT signatory it also supports a country's right -- including Iran's -- to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes. He said Algeria would review any requests to accept non-dual national Algerian Guantanamo detainees case by case. He described U.S.-Algeria counterterrorism cooperation as excellent, and said he saw signs of improvement in what has been a dormant mil-mil relationship. He declared that he was in favor of concluding an Open Skies agreement. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) President Abdelaziz Bouteflika met Codel Burr on May ¶27. He was joined by Algerian Senate President Bensalah, as well as a notetaker and interpreter. On the U.S. side were the Ambassador, Senators Richard Burr, Lindsey Graham, Saxby Chambliss and John Thune, and Representative John Kline. A photo-op with members of the Algerian press followed the meeting, and a front-page story reporting the meeting was published in the May 28 edition of el-Moudjahid newspaper with photos. WE HAVE NO BORDER PROBLEM -------------- ¶3. (C) Responding to a question from Senator Graham about Algeria's border dispute with Morocco, Bouteflika quickly responded, "There is no border problem." He said the border is recognized by both countries, but Algeria must keep it closed because of the issue of Western Sahara, even though the 1994 closure had nothing to do with the disputed territory. He said the border was closed after Morocco claimed terrorists from Algeria had struck Marrakech and imposed a visa requirement. Algeria reciprocated, and then closed the border "to help protect the Moroccans from the Algerians," the president said wryly. The visa requirements were eventually lifted, but the border has remained closed. He complained that Algeria had attempted to open the border on several occasions, but each time Morocco took steps that scuttled the plans. "It's hard for us, too," he said, acknowledging that others, like members of the European Union (EU),would also like to see the border reopened. ¶4. (C) Bouteflika described what he clearly saw as the heart of the issue: "We could open the border," he said, "but that would not solve the Western Sahara problem." "We are in Africa," the president said, and because a number of African countries have recognized the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, which he described as a founding member of the African Union, any move by Algeria regarding the border with Morocco would be interpreted by other Africans as a shift away from support for the Sahrawis' drive for self-determination. SHIFTING SANDS ON WESTERN SAHARA POLICY -------------- ¶5. (C) The president told the members of Congress that "decolonization" of the Western Sahara remains a matter for the UN, and that Algeria cannot take on the burden of resolving the matter if the UN does not find a way forward. He added, however, that if he hears at least ONE voice defending the right of self-determination, as he said the United States had done in the past, he would support that ALGIERS 00000514 002 OF 004 effort because Algeria itself became independent through self-determination. But he also chided the State Department for changing course from its previously "noteworthy" stand on the Western Sahara to pursuing a policy he described as a "false" plan for internal autonomy." He described the plan as merely allowing the Sahrawis to "run their own garbage collection." ¶6. (C) Bouteflika said that he hoped Special Envoy Christopher Ross could find a solution to the Western Sahara dispute based on self-determination for the Sahrawis. Asked if the dispute would still be unsettled ten years from now, the president said he hoped not, and urged the United States to take a leadership role in finding a resolution. He described the U.S. as a world decisionmaker. As such, if the USG were to become as adamant about the global right of self-determination as it has been on North Korea's nuclear ambitions, results would follow on the Western Sahara issue. Without the efforts of the United States, he opined, there would be no international consensus on North Korea today. "There must be a few minimum rules for the world," he said, suggesting that, like non-proliferation, self-determination for regions like Western Sahara should be a policy goal for the USG. ¶7. (C) Bouteflika told the Codel that Algeria's position regarding the Western Sahara was well known, and that it would not change. Referring to Morocco's takeover of the Sahara following the Spanish withdrawal from the territory, he leaned toward the Senators and instructed his translator to use his precise words when saying, "We cannot accept a policy of Anschluss." But he then offered that if Morocco were to make a serious effort to implement UN resolutions on self-determination in the Western Sahara, "we could amend our position." He lamented that an acceptable solution had been close before, and likely would have already been reached if for the death of Moroccan King Hassan II. He repeated several times that the U.S. example of Puerto Rico offers a good model for true autonomy that does not necessarily result in independence. He pointed more generally to Puerto Rico, Monaco and San Marino as examples of autonomous regions that are not independent, but that can exercise authority "beyond garbage collection." "Autonomy," Bouteflika said, "means discussing what kinds of sovereign powers (a region) will have." He added that Algeria does not care if the Sahrawis choose to be Moroccan, as long as they have the power to choose. "We have no territorial claim," he said. "Bring me a solution like Puerto Rico, and I would be very happy," he said, "and we could talk to the Sahrawis." ACCEPTING GTMO DETAINEES: TRUE ALGERIANS ONLY -------------- ¶8. (C) Senator Graham also raised the issue of Guantanamo Bay detainees. Graham told Bouteflika that, although all the members of the Codel were Republicans, they wanted to help President Obama resolve the legal status of detainees and find places for them to go in order to improve the global image of the United States. He noted that some were Algerians, and asked the president if Algeria would accept those that were, and any others that were not. Bouteflika reiterated what he has said before, namely, that Algeria would consider on a case-by-case basis any request to accept an Algerian citizen. He clarified, however, that they must be "100 percent" Algerian; Algeria would not accept, for example, French-Algerians or other dual-nationals. GOOD C/T COOPERATION, WAKING THE MIL-MIL RELATIONSHIP -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) President Bouteflika told the Codel that he believed our bilateral counterterrorism cooperation was "excellent," at least as far as he knew from what the Algerian intelligence and military services tell him. "Please correct me if I am misinformed," he added. He suggested that certain "sophisticated equipment" provided to the Algerians has helped them fight terrorists here. By contrast, he described the military-to-military relationship as having been "fast asleep" for many years. He added, though, that it seemed to be waking, and felt that there were encouraging signs that the relationship is improving. Looking backward, he noted that Algeria was the first Arab or Muslim country to express solidarity with the United States in the wake of the September 11 attacks, and quoted former President Clinton as ALGIERS 00000514 003 OF 004 first acknowledging the global threat of al-Qa'ida when he said, "Now we know we are fighting the same kind of terror." He also admitted the influence al-Qa'ida has in Algeria, saying that whether ONE refers to Algerians traveling to fight in Iraq, Somalia or even Pakistan and parts of Asia, "we must admit they are part of the nebulous movement called al-Qa'ida." He said Algeria, among North African countries, is particularly targeted by al-Qa'ida for a greater operational presence. SAME-OLD, SAME-OLD ON IRAN -------------- ¶10. (C) Responding to a question posed by Congressman Kline, President Bouteflika reiterated his long-standing position that while Algeria remains committed to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT),it also supports the right of nations to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Referring to Iran and North Korea, Bouteflika said that even Algeria considered acquiring nuclear weapons in the 1970s, but is now a signatory and defender of the NPT. He observed that Iran was in an "antagonistic" position vis-a-vis its Arab neighbors, and that it might be most useful to speak of de-nuclearization as a goal for the region. He pointed to the Egyptians, who, he said, do not want to see Iran develop a nuclear weapons capability. But because they believe Israel has nuclear bombs, the Egyptians are in the ironic situation of opposing Iran's nuclear ambition while contemplating whether they need ONE of their own. Likewise, Bouteflika said, the international community is closely watching how the U.S. deals with North Korea's recent provocations. "Algeria is opposed to proliferation," the president said, "but all Arab countries will tell Iran that they have no objection to the peaceful and non-military use of nuclear technology." BOUTEF WANTS OPEN SKIES -------------- ¶11. (C) Senator Chambliss told the president that his home state of Georgia was home to Delta Airlines, which would consider opening a route to Algeria if there was an Open Skies agreement in place. Bouteflika affirmed that Algeria is in favor of the agreement, but offered no opinion as to how to overcome the final technical and legislative hurdles that have kept the accord in limbo. HOW I GOT HERE, FOR THE THIRD TIME -------------- ¶12. (C) The members of the Codel congratulated Bouteflika on his "landslide" re-election victory, to which Bouteflika responded that, as the Ambassador was surely aware, he had only "lightweight" opposition that any incumbent could have beaten. He described how the years of violence and terrorism in the 1990s left the Algerian government hobbled by a political, social and economic crisis externally, and a lack of problem-solving skills internally. The government didn't know how to deal with contentious issues. Bouteflika cited the problem of language and national identity, as deeply rooted Arab and Berber identities clashed. He said it had been important for him to bridge that gap by means of fostering a debate focused on national unity. A referendum would have failed, but by casting it as an executive and parliamentary initiative on national unity, no ONE objected and Berber was accepted as a national language. ¶13. (C) Bouteflika said that his work to bring security back to Algeria had started with an effort to restore a sense of hope among people. The years of terrorism, he said, had left many people without shelter, jobs or hope. Violence stemmed from hopelessness. He then described the Algerian political milieu in terms of four trends: the independents, the patriots, the ultra-nationalists and the Islamists. Bouteflika further described the Islamists as belonging to three camps: those who accept violence and are not supportive of the government, those who neither use nor condemn violence and participate in parliament, and those who condemn violence but want an Islamic state, whom he likened to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. He said he remains flexible regarding the notion of a date-certain for national reconciliation if terrorists are willing to surrender. Delinquents, he said, can be pardoned, but not terrorists. He added that while Algerian law still allows for the possibility of death ALGIERS 00000514 004 OF 004 sentences, no execution has occurred since the early 1990s, and said none will again, as far as he is concerned. Ultimately, Bouteflika said, terrorism will be defeated with a multifaceted approach involving security forces, political will and economic assistance. Reintegration of repentant terrorists, he said, is a challenging but necessary component of the process. COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (C) Bouteflika appeared healthy and very engaged with the codel. His grip was firm, and he was animated throughout the meeting, especially on Western Sahara, when he leaned forward in his seat and coached the translator on key points. On Guantanamo detainees, he was clear in stating that Algeria would not accept dual nationals nor non-Algerians. As to the rest, he was carefully noncommittal, ruling nothing in or out, and restating the position he took last fall with Secretary Rice, i.e. that such requests would be examined case by case. In contrast, his comments on Western Sahara revealed more of his thinking on the possible contours of a final settlement that we have heard heretofore. On ONE level, the mere fact that he is even thinking beyond the current stalemate might be counted as progress of a sort. More concretely, while he at no point attempted to defend independence as a realistic outcome, he did speak of autonomy as such, even if predicated on an authentic process of self-determination. He first cited specifics on process, e.g. the need to engage seriously on what aspects of sovereignty would be on the table. In terms of substance, he said it must be more than local administration, e.g. the Saharans being allowed to pick up their own trash. In terms of outcomes, he pointed to Puerto Rico. And, in terms of how to get there, he explicitly said that if Algeria perceives a serious effort, it will be prepared not only to modify its own position but also to engage (and presumably help deliver) the Sahrawis. All this suggests the GOA is taking the Ross initiative seriously -- the optimists will say Bouteflika and company are considering how to engage constructively; the pessimists will rejoin that they are probably considering what they can say and do in order not to be seen as an obstacle to progress. In any case, it suggests the parties are thinking seriously about how to deal with the impending UN initiative, and angling for position, which hopefully will start to provide Chris Ross with some space for maneuver. End Comment. ¶15. (U) Codel Burr did not clear on this message. PEARCE