ALGERIA: PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT ON IRAQ

S E C R E T ALGIERS 000476 SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/RA - JYAPHE E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL AG SUBJECT: ALGERIA: PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT ON IRAQ REF: STATE 48144 Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) In response to reftel, Algeria has been reluctant to re-engage fully with Iraq ever since two of its diplomats were killed there in 2005. We have found that until recently, the Algerians lacked direct and reliable sources of information on political and security developments in Iraq, often receiving this information from us. Algeria can be relied upon to align itself with Arab League positions on a wide variety of regional issues, including support for Iraq. As a respected and highly credible voice in the Arab League, Algeria is a critical lever for influence in the Arab world, capable of swaying others. ¶2. (S) Throughout the past two years, we have lobbied Algeria repeatedly at high levels within the MFA, with other ministries and with the security forces to support Iraq by reopening an Embassy in Baghdad, particularly to bolster Sunni Arab efforts within Iraq and not abandon the Iraqi playing field entirely to Iran. This argument seems to have gained currency with time. Algerian Ambassador Baali in Washington has expressed support for this view, and recently we were told that the decision has been taken to reopen an Embassy in principle, though we have not yet heard a specific timeline. Until the Algerians feel they have received more complete information on the Algerian diplomats who were killed, they will be in no hurry to rush back to Baghdad. This view was emphatically re-stated to Ambassador in recent months by senior MFA and security officials. ¶3. (S) As head of OPEC throughout 2008, Algeria already participates actively in one energy working group with Iraq. On the political side, Algeria reliably aligns its regional stance with Arab League positions, even using the AL to channel financial assistance to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Algerian non-governmental and civil society contact with Iraq is extremely limited at best; we do not know of Algerian NGOs who have actively participated in projects in Iraq. Journalists who have visited Iraq are also a rarity. By contrast, Algerian governmental, media and civil society contact with Syria is robust, making Algeria an effective channel for communication with the Syrian regime, as well as with Hamas. ¶4. (S) Ambassador most recently raised the normalization issue May 16 with Cherif Rahmani, Algeria's Minister of Urban Development, Environment and Tourism, who also chairs the Council of Arab Ministers of the Environment. Rahmani - an influential minister in the Bouteflika government - agreed with the Ambassador on the need to reintegrate Iraq and bolster its Arab ties, and said he always accorded prominent attention to his Iraqi colleagues at council meetings. He added, however, that a full accounting of the 2005 Algerian diplomat deaths remained an important issue. ¶5. (S) Given Algeria's continued skittishness to re-engage directly in Iraq, the most effective vectors for engagement within Algeria are within the Directorate of Arab Affairs at the MFA, the MFA liaison to the Arab League, the military intelligence services, and the political parties of the ruling coalition, all of whom have contacts with counterparts in the countries surrounding Iraq, if not within Iraq itself in the context of regional meetings and liaison. Algeria would be wary of cooperation on Iraq that involved Iran, though this would not necessarily be a deal-breaker, but any cooperation involving Israel would be a likely non-starter absent an Arab League imprimatur. PEARCE