Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ALGIERS355
2009-04-08 18:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

AUTHOR OF RECONCILIATION CHARTER SAYS BOUTEFLIKA

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL AG 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 000355 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AG
SUBJECT: AUTHOR OF RECONCILIATION CHARTER SAYS BOUTEFLIKA
ONLY MAN FOR THE JOB

Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b and d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 000355 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AG SUBJECT: AUTHOR OF RECONCILIATION CHARTER SAYS BOUTEFLIKA ONLY MAN FOR THE JOB Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Algeria's de facto human rights ombudsman, Farouk Ksentini, told the Ambassador during an April 4 meeting that Algeria's relationship with the United States is "essential." The Ambassador raised the need to decriminalize defamation, which was intimidating the press. Ksentini agreed. He echoed the enthusiasm we have heard from other Algerian officials concerning the U.S election and President Barack Obama. "We need to make that dream a reality in Algeria," he said. Ksentini underscored Algeria's determination to continue along a path of democracy and development. He argued that terrorism still threatens Algeria and that the army and President Bouteflika are the only two main bulwarks against Islamist terrorism. He called the November 2007 revision of the constitution secondary in the context of Algeria's priority need to return society to a state of civil order. "Bouteflika is the only one who can accomplish the task," he said. As to national reconciliation, Ksentini explained that the government had accepted responsibility for the disappeared, and indemnified 95 percent of the concerned families. While 5 percent continue to press their cases, it was neither practical, nor realistic in Algeria to hold years of South Africa-style hearings on thousands of cases. Despite his earlier public criticism of this year's Human Rights Report on Algeria, Ksentini notably made no effort to discuss his concerns with the Ambassador. END SUMMARY. U.S. RELATIONSHIP ESSENTIAL -------------- ¶2. (C) The president of the National Consultative Commission for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights (CNCPPDH), Farouk Ksentini, told the Ambassador during an April 4 meeting that Algeria wants to strengthen its economic and political relationship with the United States. "Our relationship with the U.S. is essential," he asserted. Ksentini explained that broader cooperation with the U.S. would give more balance to Algeria's international relations as well as help distance Algeria from France and the colonial past. Ksentini stressed the importance of having a diverse economic partnership with the U.S. "Globalization has shown us that there are many opportunities to work with the United States." Ksentini acknowledged that expanding economic ties be
yond the hydrocarbons sector will be a challenge, requiring Algeria to "relaunch" its economic program. He believed it was not an insurmountable obstacle, however, and pointed to Algeria's success in erasing its external debt as a concrete result of the country's economic cooperation with the U.S. so far. ¶3. (C) Ksentini said that Algeria's political relationship with the U.S. is as important as its economic ties. He noted that on many issues of mutual interest Algeria and the U.S. already have a strong record of cooperation. "We want to do more," he said. Ksentini admitted that there were many areas in which we do not agree, but differences could be discussed "amicably" by friends. The Ambassador told Ksentini that Algeria needed to decriminalize press defamation to promote a robust, independent press and encourage transparency. Ksentini agreed, and said he supported doing away with laws that make defamation a criminal offense. "It should be a civil matter," he said. Algeria, he continued, was determined to continue along a path toward building a democracy based on the rule of law. "Without democratic laws, there can be no development." Ksentini argued that Algeria needs outside encouragement from other countries, and complained that Algeria's policies are often misunderstood by the outside world. "We have had a difficult history; democratic space in Algeria only began to appear in the late 90s." ¶4. (C) Ksentini was enthusiastic about the election of President Barack Obama and said, "We need to make that dream a reality in Algeria." Ksentini echoed what many Algeria officials have told us, noting that the government and Algerian citizens alike observed the U.S. election with great interest and view the Obama Administration as a harbinger of a more constructive dialogue between the U.S. and Algeria and the Middle East region as a whole. Ksentini added, "Leaders like President Obama are rare; he is like having President ALGIERS 00000355 002 OF 003 Kennedy and Dr. King at the same time." BUT SO IS BOUTEFLIKA -------------- ¶5. (C) Turning to Algerian politics, Ksentini asserted that Islamic terrorism continues to threaten Algeria. President Bouteflika has largely succeeded in dealing with the problem, he said, but the risk of explosion still exists. "It's not quite the Taliban, but there is a cadre of Islamists that wants to turn Algeria away from progress and development in the name of creating an Islamic state," he said. Ksentini noted that this radical trend had been imported from the Middle East, and was not a part of Algeria's traditionally tolerant brand of Islam. He lamented the fact that some Islamist extremists were holding their ground and told the Ambassador that there are only two forces in Algeria capable of neutralizing this risk: the Algerian People's National Army and President Bouteflika. ¶6. (C) Bouteflika's challenge for his third term, Ksentini predicted, will be to eliminate the last "ten percent" of terrorists in Algeria that have refused to accept the terms of national reconciliation. Ksentini estimated there were still approximately 800 terrorists active in Algeria: "Bouteflika is the only one who can complete the task." Algerian society, he underscored, needs to return to a state of civil order, no matter what the price. "The revision of the constitution is a secondary issue," he said. As to the choice for terrorists still operating in the maquis, Ksentini said the decision is simple: "reconcile or be eradicated." ¶7. (C) Assuming terrorists would choose to repent, Ksentini believed that the government needs to do more to create jobs, offer housing and reintegrate the reconciled. He viewed programs to develop small and medium-size businesses and promote entrepreneurship as the most viable solutions. Asked whether Algeria's bureaucracy was up to the task, Ksentini admitted that the country's complex, legalistic system of government makes it too difficult for average Algerians to accomplish routine tasks, such as registering a business. He said the government and the parliament both have a role in simplifying the bureaucracy. ¶8. (C) The Ambassador noted that Bouteflika had said he would continue the national reconciliation process in a third term, and asked whether this portended additional steps with regard to the issue of the disappeared. Ksentini defended the 2005 Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation as the only feasible way for Algerians to put the violence of the 1990s behind them. He acknowledged that the charter was not perfect, but the government had accepted responsibility and 95 percent of the concerned families had accepted indemnification as resolution. While 5 percent continued to press their cases, it was neither practical nor realistic in Algeria to hold years of South Africa-style hearings for Algeria's 7,000 officially recognized enforced disappearances. Ksentini told us that the government has no archives, records or testimony concerning the alleged role of the security services in disappearances. "There was an atmosphere of complete chaos in those times," he emphasized. Furthermore, Ksentini argued that Algeria does not have enough judges to process such a high number of cases, which would go on for years without resolution. ¶9. (C) Because of these circumstances, it was better and more realistic to adopt a middle-of-the-road approach, Ksentini said. "The government officially accepted responsibility for what happened; the state failed to provide for the security of its citizens. But the state cannot accept culpability," he asserted. "We can't do anything more; we can't undermine the state, especially in this situation." Ksentini called Amnesty International's figure for the disappeared "grossly exaggerated" and concluded that, "We have to be realistic about the situation; it's a bad history, but we have to face it." ¶10. (C) COMMENT: It's noteworthy that Ksentini appeared to agree with us on the need to decriminalize press defamation. This will be something to watch in the post-election period. His remarks on terrorism are likely an accurate reflection of how Bouteflika will approach the issue in his third term. A ALGIERS 00000355 003 OF 003 key drafter of the reconciliation charter and a close associate of the president, Ksentini has a stake in portraying Bouteflika's reconciliation and counter-terrorism strategy as the only viable option for Algeria. He has consistently defended the president's right to extend amnesty on a case-by-case basis since the August 2006 expiration of the formal surrender period, and given that reconciliation remains a prominent fixture in Bouteflika's reelection campaign, this trend will likely continue. The charter is not perfect, and some vocal opposition groups continue to press the government to revisit its principles and terms, which they argue grant official impunity without justice for the disappeared. Nevertheless, the reconciliation charter was adopted overwhelmingly in a 2005 popular referendum and broad public opinion reflects an acceptance of the charter's approach. Ksentini clearly conveyed the official message: Bouteflika will not change course on either reconciliation or his "surrender or die" approach to confronting Islamist extremism. PEARCE

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