ALGIERS: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE

S E C R E T ALGIERS 000224 NOFORN DEPT FOR DS/IP/ITA; DA/IP/NEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2029 TAGS: ASEC PTER AG SUBJECT: ALGIERS: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE REF: STATE 13023 Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton; reason 1.4 (g). -------------- POLITICAL VIOLENCE -------------- ¶1. DEMONSTRATIONS ¶A. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT SIGNIFICANT ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS? (SBU) Algeria is a nominally secular state with a 99-percent Muslim population. There are no identifiable ethnic or religious communities that harbor anti-American sentiments atypical of usual public opinion. Discord among the general population is palpable, owing to the increasing cost of living, scarce opportunities for employment or upward mobility, distrust of the political process and the government, limited access to decent health care, dissatisfaction with the educational system and the lack of affordable housing. The resultant frustration has led to frequent protests, demonstrations and civil disobedience throughout the country. ¶B. HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS? (SBU) The Algerian government (GOA) prohibits demonstrations anywhere, under the state of emergency in place since 1992. GOA enforcement of this ban is especially rigid in major cities such as the capital, Algiers. Despite this prohibition, there have been a few authorized demonstrations in the city since the last SEPQ. ¶C. HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES? (U) No. Generally, the Algerian authorities do not permit demonstrations within the proximity of diplomatic facilities. ¶D. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATION? (U) Pro-Palestinian demonstrations of December 2008 and January 2009 featured an anti-American sentiment, demonstrators numbered around 10,000. ¶E. ARE ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS USUALLY TRIGGERED BY U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES, MILITARY ACTIONS, OR BY DOMESTIC ISSUES? (U) Foreign policy initiatives, particularly with regard to the U.S. relationship with Israel and U.S. Middle East policies. ¶F. ARE DEMONSTRATORS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL? (U) Demonstrations are heavily policed and are generally peaceful. ¶G. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO USG PROPERTY OR INJURIES TO USG EMPLOYEES? (U) No. ¶H. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS EVER PENETRATED OUR PERIMETER SECURITY LINE? (U) N/A ¶I. HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS? (U) Yes. 2008 was marked by an increase in demonstrations throughout Algeria that highlighted growing discontent with a host of quality-of-life issues such as public utilities and services, inadequate healthcare and education as well as inflated commodity prices. ¶J. HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES? (U) No. ¶K. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION? (U) Demonstrations have ranged from a few hundred to several thousand. ¶L. ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL? (U) Most demonstrations are organized peacefully but tend to end with some degree of violence when demonstrators clash with security forces. ¶M. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO USG PROPERTY? (U) No. ¶2. (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS ¶A. IS THE HOST COUNTRY ENGAGED IN AN INTERSTATE OR INTRASTATE CONFLICT? (THIS MAY INCLUDE BATTLES BETWEEN ORGANIZED AND VIOLENT DRUG CARTELS) (U) Algeria has been engaged in a conflict with indigenous Islamist terrorist groups for nearly 20 years. By 2005, the dominant remaining terrorist organization was the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). In September 2006, elements of the GSPC announced a formal alliance with Al Qa'ida. In January 2007, the group formally changed its name to Al Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). ¶B. IF AN INTRASTATE CONFLICT, IS IT AN INSURGENCY LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION OR IS IT A COUNTRYWIDE CIVIL WAR? (U) The majority of terrorist attacks are concentrated in the mountainous regions, or "maquis," east and southeast of Algiers. The regions of Boumerdes, Tizi Ouzou, Skikda, Ain Delfa and Tebessa are recurring centers of terror activity. The following are examples of the higher-profile attacks and activities that occurred in 2008: JANUARY: A suicide vehicle bomber targeted a police station in Lakhdaria, 75 km east of Algiers, killing four. A VBIED blew up outside the central police station in Thenia, 35 miles east of Algiers. Police outside the station opened fire on the attacker before he could reach the facility but attacker was able to detonate on the street, killing 2 police officers. JUNE: A double suicide bomb attack occurred several days before the Algiers International Trade Fair. The attackers both carried explosives-laden backpacks. The bomber targeted a cafe several kilometers from the Hilton Hotel and Safex Exposition Palace, where the fair was taking place. The second bomber targeted a military barracks across the street from the cafe. The cafe was frequented by members of the Republican Guard, an elite unit of the national Gendarmerie. Three days later, a second double suicide attack using VBIEDs killed 13 people in Lakhdaria, including a French national working for French engineering company Razel. The company was contracted on a railway upgrade project. A number of the victims killed were emergency first responders. JULY: The Tizi Ouzou communal guard detachment office was attacked by a group of 60 armed terrorists. The clash left one communal guard dead and several injured. A VBIED attack using an explosives-laden motorcycle against a military patrol near Lakhdaria injured 13 soldiers. The attack marked the first motorcycle suicide attack. AUGUST: A VBIED exploded in front of a Tizi Ouzou police station, wounding 25 people including four policemen. Two VBIEDs exploded in Bouira, killing 12 and wounding 31. The second attack targeted a bus of the Canadian company, SNC Lavalin. At least 43 people were killed in a VBIED attack on the Gendarmerie academy at Les Issers (Boumerdes),45 others were wounded. SEPTEMBER: AQIM publicly called for killing Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during her visit to Algiers. Algerian authorities foiled a plot to attack Hassi Messaoud international airport, reportedly acting on information received from an Al Qa'ida cell operating in Europe. The alleged attack plan involved the hijacking of an aircraft and a car bomb at the airport. ¶C. IF LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION, ARE ANY U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THIS REGION? (C) The U.S. Embassy in Algiers is the only U.S. diplomatic facility in Algeria. ¶D. HAVE ANY OF THE FACTIONS INVOLVED IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS SIGNALED OR DEMONSTRATED AN ANTI-AMERICAN ORIENTATION? (C) Yes. AQIM has been vociferous and unrelenting in its call for jihad and attacks against American and western interests in the Maghreb. ¶3. (SBU) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES ¶A. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES PROFESSIONAL AND WELL-TRAINED? (C) Algerian law enforcement is average, markedly so at the mid-management and lower level ranks. Law enforcement agencies are perceived to be better at reactive than proactive activity. ¶B. HAVE THEY BEEN TRAINED BY U.S. AGENCIES? IF SO, PLEASE ELABORATE ON EFFECTIVENESS OF TRAINING. (SBU) Prior to 2005, the GOA participated in several training programs sponsored by DS Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA). In the past, courses were offered in a range of areas such as Police Academy Consultation, Chem/Bio Countermeasures, Weapons of Mass Destruction/First Responder Awareness and Airport Security Management. Embassy security officials have routinely sought (without much success) to re-engage in similar training initiatives. Currently, however, there is renewed interest in restarting these training initiatives. RSO is working with host government law enforcement to renew ATA and start ICITAP programs. ¶C. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONFRONTED WITH SERIOUS WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION INSIDE THEIR AGENCIES? (C) Perceived widespread corruption exists at various levels of the Algerian police forces. The presence of this corruption does not appear to diminish the level of support received or response. Bribes, small pay-offs and cronyism are most common problems at the lower levels of the local police force. ¶D. ARE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES PROFESSIONAL AND CAPABLE OF DETERRING TERRORIST ACTIONS? (S/NF) The Algerian intelligence services are professional and modestly capable at deterring terrorist actions. ¶E. HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BEEN COOPERATIVE WITH U.S. EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION AND SUPPORT. (S/NF) The Embassy maintains a good cooperative relationship with the Algerian intelligence services. There have been supportive relationships specifically in the area of intelligence exchange directed at tracking and stemming the flow of foreign fighters from Algeria to Iraq. However, Algerian intelligence services have not always been forthcoming with intelligence concerning AQIM and other terrorist cells operating within Algerian territory. The UN bombing remains the starkest example of this, as an announcement by the Interior Ministry indicated the GOA had possessed information developed by Algerian intelligence services that revealed they were aware the UN was a target. This intelligence was not shared with the UN or other diplomatic missions. After the bombings, a number of diplomatic missions in Algiers requested higher levels of cooperation with the intelligence services. ¶F. ASSUMING THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST THREATS IN RECENT YEARS, HAVE HOST COUNTRY SECURITY SERVICES BEEN ABLE TO SCORE ANY MAJOR ANTI-TERRORISM SUCCESSES? (S/NF) There were several notable arrests and significant success throughout 2008: JANUARY: Security forces killed the AQIM emir for Algiers Said Salem AIT. The support cell responsible for facilitating the December 11 bombings was dismantled in Algiers and Corso, a town within the wilaya of Boumerdes just east of Algiers. During this operation, the emir of the El Farouk Brigade, Abderrahmane Bouzegza, was killed by security forces. JUNE: Abu Muthana, the alleged mastermind of a terrorist recruitment network, was arrested. Ali Djemaa, aka Touhami, aka "Emir" of the Bordj Menaiel group and alleged treasurer of the El-Ansar Brigade was killed by security forces. JULY: Terrorist group leader Abou Houythama was captured by security forces in the Boumerdes region. Houythama was alleged to have participated in the killing of more than 100 civilians and 5 soldiers between 1995-2005, while part of an Armed Islamic Group (GIA) arm led by Antar Zouabri and Nour El Dine Boudiafi. July, Koula Mourad, aka Abou Talha, a 14 year veteran of the GSPC and considered a key regional leader in Thenia, was killed during a security operation. AUGUST: Armed Islamic Group (GIA) leader, Mourad Seghir, aka "Mourad El Pompier (the fireman)," was killed in Boumerdes province. AQIM operative Abdelkahar Ben Hadj and 11 other cell members were killed in an operation in Tizi Ouzou. SEPTEMBER: An army special forces unit foiled an arms smuggling operation in the region of Tamanrasset, near the Algeria/Niger border. A 4x4 laden with explosives, weapons and munitions was seized. NOVEMBER: Authorities foiled an attempted plot to attack the Hassi Messaoud and Algiers International airports. Security forces in the Boumerdes region recovered a large cache of Kalashnikov rifles, ammunitions, RPGs, IEDs, explosives and communications equipment in a hideout. ¶G. HAS HOST COUNTRY BEEN RESPONSIVE (RE: TIMELINESS AND ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES) TO EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR PROTECTIVE SECURITY. (SBU) Protective security response to the Embassy is outstanding. The GOA details a mobile response unit specifically to the Embassy. The unit is expeditious in its response and initiates field interviews and arrests suspicious personnel. There are also static police checkpoints at both roadway approaches to the Embassy. ¶H. HOW DOES THE EMBASSY ASSESS THE OVERALL SECURITY AT MAJOR AIRPORTS IN THE COUNTRY? (EXCELLENT; VERY GOOD; GOOD/AVERAGE; POOR) (SBU) Good/Average. Algiers' Houari Boumediene International Airport is the main hub for international flights to Algeria. A few international flights depart from other regional airports such as Oran, Tlemcen, Chlef, Setif, Bejaia and Hassi Messaoud. National carrier Air Algerie has been expanding its international gateways, adding direct service to Montreal in 2007 and Beijing in 2009. Overall perimeter security at the airport is good. There are several vehicle check points manned by the Algerian police (DGSN) at the entrances, exits and parking areas. Parking in the area immediately in front of the terminal is prohibited except for VIPs. Passengers and visitors are screened before being allowed access to the terminals. ¶I. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION CONTROLS AGENCIES? (EFFECTIVE; AVERAGE; INEFFECTIVE) (SBU) Average. Beginning in the summer of 2009, Algeria will launch its gradual conversion to a biometric passport system. The Algerian passport will also be converted to the international machine-readable standard. ¶J. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE BORDER PATROL FORCES? (EFFECTIVE; AVERAGE; INEFFECTIVE) (C) Ineffective. Algeria is the second-largest country on the African continent by land mass, an inherent liability in terms of being able to effectively monitor and control so vast a border. A border that spans thousands of kilometers, shared with Tunisia, Libya, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and Morocco, makes effective border control an arduous challenge at best. -------------- INDIGENOUS TERRORISM -------------- ¶4. (SBU) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS ¶A. ARE THERE INDIGENOUS, ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS IN COUNTRY? (U) Yes. ¶B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS. (S) There are three recognized terrorist groups: -- Al Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): Formerly known as the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC; Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat). The group formed in the late 1990's as a result of a split with the parent group, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA),in spite of successes by the government's anti-terrorism campaign. -- Djamaat Houmat Eddawa Essalafia (DHDS; Group of the Protectors of Salafist Preaching) was founded in 1995 following a split with the GIA. The DHDS upholds a rather strict and narrow view of Islam. The group, led by Slim Abbassi, suffered a series of losses in 2008 with some of its membership killed or arrested by security forces. Membership is estimated at less than 100. The regions of Relizane, Tipaza and Chlef are said to be DHDS strongholds. -- Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA; Armed Islamic Group) is reported to have a depleted membership of fewer than 50 members. The GIA was a formidable entity during the 1990s when it allegedly killed a number of foreigners. French, Russian and Polish nationals were among their victims. The group has been minimized by the presence of AQIM and is said to be afflicted by lack of recruitment, financing and other logistical concerns. As a result, attacks against civilians, kidnappings and other forms of banditry to augment their coffers are among the devices utilized to sustain their existence. GIA members are concentrated primarily in the region of Medea/Blida. ¶C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACKS WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS? (U) While not specifically anti-American, groups have successfully carried out attacks against Western targets. AQIM had declared its intent to direct attacks at American as well as Western targets. ¶D. WERE ANY OF THESE LETHAL ATTACKS? (U) Yes. The bombing of the UN offices in December 2007 killed 18 people and wounded over 40 others. The attack at the Razel work site claimed the life of a French national, with 11 victims and several injured. The SNC Lavalin bus bombing in August killed at least six people, though all were Algerian. ¶E. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. DIPLOMATIC TARGETS? (U) No. ¶F. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. BUSINESS, U.S. MILITARY, OR U.S. RELATED TARGETS? (U) Yes. In December 2006 a shuttle van transporting contractors for U.S. company Brown and Root Condor was targeted utilizing a roadside IED. The driver of the vehicle and a Lebanese passenger were killed and several passengers, including Americans and other foreign nationals, sustained injuries. ¶G. HAVE GROUPS LIMITED THEIR ATTACKS TO SPECIFIC REGIONS OR DO THEY OPERATE COUNTRY-WIDE? (U) Attacks continue to occur occasionally in most areas of the country, although the Kabylie region, particularly Boumerdes and Tizi Ouzou provinces, has seen a higher concentration of activity over the past two years. ¶H. IF ATTACKS ARE LIMITED TO REGIONS, ARE THERE ANY U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THESE REGIONS? (S/NF) There are no U.S. diplomatic entities located outside of Algiers. U.S. diplomatic residences are clustered in the neighborhoods of Hydra and El Biar, within a two-mile radius of the Embassy. The UN building destroyed in the December 11, 2007 AQIM attack was located within 300m of some U.S. diplomatic residences. ¶5. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS ¶A. ARE THERE OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS (NOT ANTI-AMERICAN) IN COUNTRY? (U) No. ¶B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS. (U) N/A ¶C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ATTACKS IN THE CAPITAL OR IN AREAS WHERE US. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES ARE LOCATED? (U) N/A ¶D. WERE ATTACKS LETHAL AND/OR INDISCRIMINATE? (U) N/A ¶E. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY AMERICANS KILLED OR INJURED IN THESE ATTACKS? (U) N/A -------------- TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM -------------- ¶6. (SBU) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS ¶A. ARE THERE ANY FOREIGN TERRORIST GROUPS THAT HAVE A PRESENCE IN COUNTRY? PROVIDE NAMES. (U) Yes. AQIM is both indigenous and transnational (being part of the wider Al Qa'ida network). ¶B. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THIS PRESENCE? IS IT AN OPERATIONAL CELL? FINANCIAL CELL? SUPPORT CELL? PROPAGANDA CELL? (S/NF) Post views the AQIM presence in Algeria as a viable terrorist threat. AQIM is fully functional and fully operational, though it faces logistical, coordination and financing challenges. The addition of the Al Qa'ida brand to indigenous terrorist groups in Algeria has been helpful in boosting recruitment and fund-raising. The type of small-scale attacks against government and military facilities that were the modus operandi of the GSPC have given way to a diversified array of tactics including the use of roadside vehicle bombs, simultaneous and coordinated VBIED attacks, suicide vests, female suicide bombers and kamikaze motorcycle IED attacks. A suicide vest was utilized to attempt an assassination of Algerian President Bouteflika in September 2007. ¶C. IS THE HOST GOVERNMENT SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS? (C) The GOA is not sympathetic to terrorist groups operating in Algeria and considers itself a victim of terrorism. However, while muted, broad-based support exists for designated terrorist groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine in their conflict with Israel. ¶D. ARE THERE SUSPECT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) IN THE COUNTRY THAT HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY OF THESE GROUPS? (U) No. ¶E. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY THAT ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS? (C) While fringes of the Algerian populace remain sympathetic to radical Islamic groups, their numbers are very small relative to the general population, who reject extremist agendas. However, Algerian society has become more conservative in recent years, and a high level of socio-economic frustration dominates the restless public mood. ¶F. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE LEVEL, INTENT, AND SCOPE OF HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, SERBIA, SUDAN, ET. AL.) IN COUNTRY RELATIVE TO POTENTIAL ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST ACTS? (S) Post assesses the hostile intelligence threat as viable but believes the GOA has a vested interest in deterring the use of hostile intelligence by Iranian, Iraqi, Serbian, Sudanese or Syrian intelligence services in the planning of any potential terrorist act against U.S. interests on its soil. ¶G. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES IN COUNTRY OR FROM NEARBY COUNTRIES FOR HOSTILE TERRORIST ELEMENTS? (S) Weapons and explosives are tightly controlled within Algeria, but the vast, porous borders allow access to illicit arms and munitions from Libya, Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Morocco. In 2008, security forces as well as media sources reported a marked rise in seizures and arrests related to illegal weapons trafficking. ¶7. (U) POC for this cable is Regional Security Office, Embassy Algiers. PEARCE