ALGIERS: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE

S E C R E T ALGIERS 000224


NOFORN

DEPT FOR DS/IP/ITA; DA/IP/NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2029
TAGS: ASEC PTER AG
SUBJECT: ALGIERS: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE

REF: STATE 13023

Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton; reason 1.4 (g).

--------------
POLITICAL VIOLENCE
--------------


1. DEMONSTRATIONS


A. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY
CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT SIGNIFICANT ANTI-AMERICAN
DEMONSTRATIONS?

(SBU) Algeria is a nominally secular state with a 99-percent
Muslim population. There are no identifiable ethnic or
religious communities that harbor anti-American sentiments
atypical of usual public opinion. Discord among the general
population is palpable, owing to the increasing cost of
living, scarce opportunities for employment or upward
mobility, distrust of the political process and the
government, limited access to decent health care,
dissatisfaction with the educational system and the lack of
affordable housing. The resultant frustration has led to
frequent protests, demonstrations and civil disobedience
throughout the country.


B. HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE
COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS?

(SBU) The Algerian government (GOA) prohibits demonstrations
anywhere, under the state of emergency in place since 1992.
GOA enforcement of this ban is especially rigid in major
cities such as the capital, Algiers. Despite this
prohibition, there have been a few authorized demonstrations
in the city since the last SEPQ.


C. HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S.
DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES?

(U) No. Generally, the Algerian authorities do not permit
demonstrations within the proximity of diplomatic facilities.


D. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATION?

(U) Pro-Palestinian demonstrations of December 2008 and
January 2009 featured an anti-American sentiment,
demonstrators numbered around 10,000.


E. ARE ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS USUALLY TRIGGERED BY U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES, MILITARY ACTIONS, OR BY DOMESTIC
ISSUES?

(U) Foreign policy initiatives, particularly with regard to
the U.S. relationship with Israel and U.S. Middle East
policies.


F. ARE DEMONSTRATORS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL?

(U) Demonstrations are heavily policed and are generally
peaceful.


G. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO
USG PROPERTY OR INJURIES TO USG EMPLOYEES?

(U) No.


H. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS EVER PENETRATED OUR
PERIMETER SECURITY LINE?

(U) N/A


I. HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE
COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS?

(U) Yes. 2008 was marked by an increase in demonstrations
throughout Algeria that highlighted growing discontent with a
host of quality-of-life issues such as public utilities and
services, inadequate healthcare and education as well as
inflated commodity prices.


J. HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S.
DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES?

(U) No.


K. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT
DEMONSTRATION?

(U) Demonstrations have ranged from a few hundred to several
thousand.


L. ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL?

(U) Most demonstrations are organized peacefully but tend to
end with some degree of violence when demonstrators clash
with security forces.


M. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO
USG PROPERTY?

(U) No.


2. (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS


A. IS THE HOST COUNTRY ENGAGED IN AN INTERSTATE OR INTRASTATE
CONFLICT? (THIS MAY INCLUDE BATTLES BETWEEN ORGANIZED AND
VIOLENT DRUG CARTELS)

(U) Algeria has been engaged in a conflict with indigenous
Islamist terrorist groups for nearly 20 years. By 2005, the
dominant remaining terrorist organization was the Salafist
Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). In September 2006,
elements of the GSPC announced a formal alliance with Al
Qa'ida. In January 2007, the group formally changed its name
to Al Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).


B. IF AN INTRASTATE CONFLICT, IS IT AN INSURGENCY LIMITED TO
A SPECIFIC REGION OR IS IT A COUNTRYWIDE CIVIL WAR?

(U) The majority of terrorist attacks are concentrated in the
mountainous regions, or "maquis," east and southeast of
Algiers. The regions of Boumerdes, Tizi Ouzou, Skikda, Ain
Delfa and Tebessa are recurring centers of terror activity.
The following are examples of the higher-profile attacks and
activities that occurred in 2008:

JANUARY: A suicide vehicle bomber targeted a police station
in Lakhdaria, 75 km east of Algiers, killing four. A VBIED
blew up outside the central police station in Thenia, 35
miles east of Algiers. Police outside the station opened
fire on the attacker before he could reach the facility but
attacker was able to detonate on the street, killing 2 police
officers.

JUNE: A double suicide bomb attack occurred several days
before the Algiers International Trade Fair. The attackers
both carried explosives-laden backpacks. The bomber targeted
a cafe several kilometers from the Hilton Hotel and Safex
Exposition Palace, where the fair was taking place. The
second bomber targeted a military barracks across the street
from the cafe. The cafe was frequented by members of the
Republican Guard, an elite unit of the national Gendarmerie.
Three days later, a second double suicide attack using VBIEDs
killed 13 people in Lakhdaria, including a French national
working for French engineering company Razel. The company
was contracted on a railway upgrade project. A number of the
victims killed were emergency first responders.

JULY: The Tizi Ouzou communal guard detachment office was
attacked by a group of 60 armed terrorists. The clash left
one communal guard dead and several injured. A VBIED attack
using an explosives-laden motorcycle against a military
patrol near Lakhdaria injured 13 soldiers. The attack marked
the first motorcycle suicide attack.

AUGUST: A VBIED exploded in front of a Tizi Ouzou police
station, wounding 25 people including four policemen. Two
VBIEDs exploded in Bouira, killing 12 and wounding 31. The
second attack targeted a bus of the Canadian company, SNC
Lavalin. At least 43 people were killed in a VBIED attack on
the Gendarmerie academy at Les Issers (Boumerdes),45 others
were wounded.

SEPTEMBER: AQIM publicly called for killing Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice during her visit to Algiers. Algerian
authorities foiled a plot to attack Hassi Messaoud
international airport, reportedly acting on information
received from an Al Qa'ida cell operating in Europe. The
alleged attack plan involved the hijacking of an aircraft
and a car bomb at the airport.


C. IF LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION, ARE ANY U.S. DIPLOMATIC
FACILITIES LOCATED IN THIS REGION?

(C) The U.S. Embassy in Algiers is the only U.S. diplomatic
facility in Algeria.


D. HAVE ANY OF THE FACTIONS INVOLVED IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS
SIGNALED OR DEMONSTRATED AN ANTI-AMERICAN
ORIENTATION?

(C) Yes. AQIM has been vociferous and unrelenting in its

call for jihad and attacks against American and western
interests in the Maghreb.


3. (SBU) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES


A. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES PROFESSIONAL AND WELL-TRAINED?

(C) Algerian law enforcement is average, markedly so at the
mid-management and lower level ranks. Law enforcement
agencies are perceived to be better at reactive than
proactive activity.


B. HAVE THEY BEEN TRAINED BY U.S. AGENCIES? IF SO, PLEASE
ELABORATE ON EFFECTIVENESS OF TRAINING.

(SBU) Prior to 2005, the GOA participated in several training
programs sponsored by DS Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA). In
the past, courses were offered in a range of areas such as
Police Academy Consultation, Chem/Bio Countermeasures,
Weapons of Mass Destruction/First Responder Awareness and
Airport Security Management. Embassy security officials have
routinely sought (without much success) to re-engage in
similar training initiatives. Currently, however, there is
renewed interest in restarting these training initiatives.
RSO is working with host government law enforcement to renew
ATA and start ICITAP programs.


C. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONFRONTED WITH SERIOUS
WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION INSIDE THEIR AGENCIES?

(C) Perceived widespread corruption exists at various levels
of the Algerian police forces. The presence of this
corruption does not appear to diminish the level of support
received or response. Bribes, small pay-offs and cronyism
are most common problems at the lower levels of the local
police force.


D. ARE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES PROFESSIONAL AND CAPABLE OF
DETERRING TERRORIST ACTIONS?

(S/NF) The Algerian intelligence services are professional
and modestly capable at deterring terrorist actions.


E. HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BEEN COOPERATIVE WITH U.S.
EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION AND SUPPORT.

(S/NF) The Embassy maintains a good cooperative relationship
with the Algerian intelligence services. There have been
supportive relationships specifically in the area of
intelligence exchange directed at tracking and stemming the
flow of foreign fighters from Algeria to Iraq. However,
Algerian intelligence services have not always been
forthcoming with intelligence concerning AQIM and other
terrorist cells operating within Algerian territory. The UN
bombing remains the starkest example of this, as an
announcement by the Interior Ministry indicated the GOA had
possessed information developed by Algerian intelligence
services that revealed they were aware the UN was a target.
This intelligence was not shared with the UN or other
diplomatic missions. After the bombings, a number of
diplomatic missions in Algiers requested higher levels of
cooperation with the intelligence services.


F. ASSUMING THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST THREATS IN
RECENT YEARS, HAVE HOST COUNTRY SECURITY SERVICES BEEN ABLE
TO SCORE ANY MAJOR ANTI-TERRORISM SUCCESSES?

(S/NF) There were several notable arrests and significant
success throughout 2008:

JANUARY: Security forces killed the AQIM emir for Algiers
Said Salem AIT. The support cell responsible for
facilitating the December 11 bombings was dismantled in
Algiers and Corso, a town within the wilaya of Boumerdes just
east of Algiers. During this operation, the emir of the El
Farouk Brigade, Abderrahmane Bouzegza, was killed by security
forces.

JUNE: Abu Muthana, the alleged mastermind of a terrorist
recruitment network, was arrested. Ali Djemaa, aka Touhami,
aka "Emir" of the Bordj Menaiel group and alleged treasurer
of the El-Ansar Brigade was killed by security forces.

JULY: Terrorist group leader Abou Houythama was captured by
security forces in the Boumerdes region. Houythama was
alleged to have participated in the killing of more than 100
civilians and 5 soldiers between 1995-2005, while part of an
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) arm led by Antar Zouabri and Nour
El Dine Boudiafi. July, Koula Mourad, aka Abou Talha, a 14
year veteran of the GSPC and considered a key regional leader
in Thenia, was killed during a security operation.

AUGUST: Armed Islamic Group (GIA) leader, Mourad Seghir, aka
"Mourad El Pompier (the fireman)," was killed in Boumerdes
province. AQIM operative Abdelkahar Ben Hadj and 11 other
cell members were killed in an operation in Tizi Ouzou.

SEPTEMBER: An army special forces unit foiled an arms
smuggling operation in the region of Tamanrasset, near the
Algeria/Niger border. A 4x4 laden with explosives, weapons
and munitions was seized.

NOVEMBER: Authorities foiled an attempted plot to attack the
Hassi Messaoud and Algiers International airports. Security
forces in the Boumerdes region recovered a large cache of
Kalashnikov rifles, ammunitions, RPGs, IEDs, explosives and
communications equipment in a hideout.


G. HAS HOST COUNTRY BEEN RESPONSIVE (RE: TIMELINESS AND
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES) TO EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR PROTECTIVE
SECURITY.

(SBU) Protective security response to the Embassy is
outstanding. The GOA details a mobile response unit
specifically to the Embassy. The unit is expeditious in its
response and initiates field interviews and arrests
suspicious personnel. There are also static police
checkpoints at both roadway approaches to the Embassy.


H. HOW DOES THE EMBASSY ASSESS THE OVERALL SECURITY AT MAJOR
AIRPORTS IN THE COUNTRY? (EXCELLENT; VERY GOOD; GOOD/AVERAGE;
POOR)

(SBU) Good/Average. Algiers' Houari Boumediene International
Airport is the main hub for international flights to Algeria.
A few international flights depart from other regional
airports such as Oran, Tlemcen, Chlef, Setif, Bejaia and
Hassi Messaoud. National carrier Air Algerie has been
expanding its international gateways, adding direct service
to Montreal in 2007 and Beijing in 2009. Overall perimeter
security at the airport is good. There are several vehicle
check points manned by the Algerian police (DGSN) at the
entrances, exits and parking areas. Parking in the area
immediately in front of the terminal is prohibited except for
VIPs. Passengers and visitors are screened before being
allowed access to the terminals.


I. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION CONTROLS
AGENCIES? (EFFECTIVE; AVERAGE; INEFFECTIVE)

(SBU) Average. Beginning in the summer of 2009, Algeria will
launch its gradual conversion to a biometric passport system.
The Algerian passport will also be converted to the
international machine-readable standard.


J. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE BORDER PATROL FORCES? (EFFECTIVE;
AVERAGE; INEFFECTIVE)

(C) Ineffective. Algeria is the second-largest country on
the African continent by land mass, an inherent liability in
terms of being able to effectively monitor and control so
vast a border. A border that spans thousands of kilometers,
shared with Tunisia, Libya, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and
Morocco, makes effective border control an arduous challenge
at best.

--------------
INDIGENOUS TERRORISM
--------------


4. (SBU) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS


A. ARE THERE INDIGENOUS, ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS IN
COUNTRY?

(U) Yes.


B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS.

(S) There are three recognized terrorist groups:

-- Al Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM):
Formerly known as the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et
le Combat (GSPC; Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat).
The group formed in the late 1990's as a result of a split
with the parent group, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA),in
spite of successes by the government's anti-terrorism
campaign.

-- Djamaat Houmat Eddawa Essalafia (DHDS; Group of the
Protectors of Salafist Preaching) was founded in 1995
following a split with the GIA. The DHDS upholds a rather
strict and narrow view of Islam. The group, led by Slim
Abbassi, suffered a series of losses in 2008 with some of its
membership killed or arrested by security forces. Membership
is estimated at less than 100. The regions of Relizane,
Tipaza and Chlef are said to be DHDS strongholds.

-- Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA; Armed Islamic Group) is
reported to have a depleted membership of fewer than 50
members. The GIA was a formidable entity during the 1990s
when it allegedly killed a number of foreigners. French,
Russian and Polish nationals were among their victims. The
group has been minimized by the presence of AQIM and is said
to be afflicted by lack of recruitment, financing and other
logistical concerns. As a result, attacks against civilians,
kidnappings and other forms of banditry to augment their
coffers are among the devices utilized to sustain their
existence. GIA members are concentrated primarily in the
region of Medea/Blida.


C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACKS WITHIN THE
LAST 12 MONTHS?

(U) While not specifically anti-American, groups have
successfully carried out attacks against Western targets.
AQIM had declared its intent to direct attacks at American as
well as Western targets.


D. WERE ANY OF THESE LETHAL ATTACKS?

(U) Yes. The bombing of the UN offices in December 2007
killed 18 people and wounded over 40 others. The attack at
the Razel work site claimed the life of a French national,
with 11 victims and several injured. The SNC Lavalin bus
bombing in August killed at least six people, though all were
Algerian.


E. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. DIPLOMATIC TARGETS?

(U) No.


F. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. BUSINESS, U.S. MILITARY, OR U.S.
RELATED TARGETS?

(U) Yes. In December 2006 a shuttle van transporting
contractors for U.S. company Brown and Root Condor was
targeted utilizing a roadside IED. The driver of the vehicle
and a Lebanese passenger were killed and several passengers,
including Americans and other foreign nationals, sustained
injuries.


G. HAVE GROUPS LIMITED THEIR ATTACKS TO SPECIFIC REGIONS OR
DO THEY OPERATE COUNTRY-WIDE?

(U) Attacks continue to occur occasionally in most areas of
the country, although the Kabylie region, particularly
Boumerdes and Tizi Ouzou provinces, has seen a higher
concentration of activity over the past two years.


H. IF ATTACKS ARE LIMITED TO REGIONS, ARE THERE ANY U.S.
DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THESE REGIONS?

(S/NF) There are no U.S. diplomatic entities located outside
of Algiers. U.S. diplomatic residences are clustered in the
neighborhoods of Hydra and El Biar, within a two-mile radius
of the Embassy. The UN building destroyed in the December
11, 2007 AQIM attack was located within 300m of some U.S.
diplomatic residences.


5. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS


A. ARE THERE OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS (NOT
ANTI-AMERICAN) IN COUNTRY?

(U) No.


B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS.

(U) N/A


C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ATTACKS IN THE CAPITAL OR IN AREAS
WHERE US. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES ARE LOCATED?

(U) N/A


D. WERE ATTACKS LETHAL AND/OR INDISCRIMINATE?

(U) N/A


E. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY AMERICANS KILLED OR INJURED IN THESE
ATTACKS?

(U) N/A

--------------

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM
--------------


6. (SBU) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS


A. ARE THERE ANY FOREIGN TERRORIST GROUPS THAT HAVE A
PRESENCE IN COUNTRY? PROVIDE NAMES.

(U) Yes. AQIM is both indigenous and transnational (being
part of the wider Al Qa'ida network).


B. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THIS PRESENCE? IS IT AN OPERATIONAL
CELL? FINANCIAL CELL? SUPPORT CELL? PROPAGANDA CELL?

(S/NF) Post views the AQIM presence in Algeria as a viable
terrorist threat. AQIM is fully functional and fully
operational, though it faces logistical, coordination and
financing challenges. The addition of the Al Qa'ida brand to
indigenous terrorist groups in Algeria has been helpful in
boosting recruitment and fund-raising. The type of
small-scale attacks against government and military
facilities that were the modus operandi of the GSPC have
given way to a diversified array of tactics including the use
of roadside vehicle bombs, simultaneous and coordinated VBIED
attacks, suicide vests, female suicide bombers and kamikaze
motorcycle IED attacks. A suicide vest was utilized to
attempt an assassination of Algerian President Bouteflika in
September 2007.


C. IS THE HOST GOVERNMENT SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS?

(C) The GOA is not sympathetic to terrorist groups operating
in Algeria and considers itself a victim of terrorism.
However, while muted, broad-based support exists for
designated terrorist groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and
Hamas in Palestine in their conflict with Israel.


D. ARE THERE SUSPECT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) IN
THE COUNTRY THAT HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY OF THESE
GROUPS?

(U) No.


E. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY
THAT ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS?

(C) While fringes of the Algerian populace remain sympathetic
to radical Islamic groups, their numbers are very small
relative to the general population, who reject extremist
agendas. However, Algerian society has become more
conservative in recent years, and a high level of
socio-economic frustration dominates the restless public
mood.


F. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE LEVEL, INTENT, AND SCOPE OF
HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, SERBIA,
SUDAN, ET. AL.) IN COUNTRY RELATIVE TO POTENTIAL
ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST ACTS?

(S) Post assesses the hostile intelligence threat as viable
but believes the GOA has a vested interest in deterring the
use of hostile intelligence by Iranian, Iraqi, Serbian,
Sudanese or Syrian intelligence services in the planning of
any potential terrorist act against U.S. interests on its
soil.


G. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS AND
EXPLOSIVES IN COUNTRY OR FROM NEARBY COUNTRIES FOR HOSTILE
TERRORIST ELEMENTS?

(S) Weapons and explosives are tightly controlled within
Algeria, but the vast, porous borders allow access to illicit
arms and munitions from Libya, Mali, Niger, Mauritania and
Morocco. In 2008, security forces as well as media sources
reported a marked rise in seizures and arrests related to
illegal weapons trafficking.


7. (U) POC for this cable is Regional Security Office,
Embassy Algiers.


PEARCE