ALGERIA: ASSESSING THE NEED FOR INCREASED LAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 000158 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/RSA - CPOMMERER, INL/AAE - AALTON, DS/T/ATA - TGONZALEZ E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2019 TAGS: PGOV SOCI KCRM ASEC SUBJECT: ALGERIA: ASSESSING THE NEED FOR INCREASED LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL TRAINING REF: A. STATE 5448 ¶B. 08 ALGIERS 1255 ALGIERS 00000158 001.14 OF 003 Classified By: Acting DCM Mark Schapiro; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) As Algeria is in the process of implementing an ambitious 2006-2010 increase in its police forces, Embassy Algiers' Mission Strategic Plan reflects priorities and associated training aimed at boosting ourlD J"QQQEQY7W&rganized crime cooperation with law enforcement entities. Such non-military law enforcement cooperation has become an integral part of our MSP goals, though a new and often delicate area for engagement. Our FY2011 projections include requests for resources to address NADR, S/CT, INL, trafficking in persons (TIP),Diplomatic Security, and ATA funding requirements. Our Regional Security Office has worked to build the necessary relationships with Algerian law enforcement authorities to permit the expansion of law enforcement cooperation and judicial training, which would build on previous Embassy engagement with the Ministry of Justice and the judiciary. Algeria is a strong partner of the U.S. in the war on terror, but the partnership could benefit from training and assistance aimed at improving the capacity of host government law enforcement to prosecute its ongoing fight against terrorism inside Algeria. Traditionally the domain of Algeria's military, the counter-terrorism effort is increasingly tasked to police forces, many of whom are new and inexperienced in this area. ¶2. (U) Post responses to action request (ref A) are as follows: -- (U) What are the key internal or regional challenges the host government's non-military security apparatus confronts? (ie: local/regional crime, trafficking of persons, narcotics, resource theft, smuggling, illicit small and light arms shipments, domestic and regional terrorism, etc.) (C) Elements of the Algerian non-military security apparatus confront the full range of challenges posed in the inquiry. First and foremost, police units at every level must be constantly vigilant to the threat posed by domestic terrorism; Algeria remains home to a steady pace of terrorist activity of which police and military units are primary targets. In a nation with high unemployment, particularly among the youth population, crime is also a significant challenge for the police, with rates increasing year-to-year. Given the vast desert and ocean borders of the country, smuggling of all kinds - narcotics, weapons, contraband and people - is a significant challenge for Algeria's police, border security, customs and immigration forces. -- (U) What are the host government's non-military capabilities to respond to these challenges? Where ability to address these issues is lacking, please provide details: what knowledge, skills/training, equipment, relationships, policies and/or procedures are responsible for the lack of capacity? (C) Algerian law enforcement encompasses an entire spectrum of unevenly distributed directorates with a disparate range of skills and capabilities. The capacity for combating the range of law enforcement challenges is retarded by a top-heavy authoritarian system that affords limited initiative to regional or municipal levels. This tends to limit host country effectiveness in addressing certain criminal enterprises like narcotics, arms and human trafficking or, in particular, non-traditional crimes for which a minimal base of experience exists. With the majority of law enforcement efforts dedicated to anti-terrorism efforts, advancement and innovation in the traditional fields of law enforcement have lagged behind. The absence of a national networked database poses a major obstacle to the law enforcement apparatus. Much of the law enforcement data and intelligence system is paper-driven and encumbered by bureaucratic red tape. (C) At the mid and supervisory echelons of leadership, it is *********************** * Missing Section 002 * *********************** *********************** * Missing Section 003 * ***********************