Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ALGIERS115
2009-02-01 19:00:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

ALGIERS SCANDAL UPDATE: REACTIONS CALM AS EAC MEETS

Tags:  PREL PINR KPAO MARR ASEC AMGT KMSG AG 
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VZCZCXRO0273
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHAS #0115/01 0321900
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011900Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6981
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0850
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 6642
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 1831
RUEHMRE/AMCONSUL MARSEILLE PRIORITY 1713
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000115 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA, NEA/EX AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2019
TAGS: PREL PINR KPAO MARR ASEC AMGT KMSG AG
SUBJECT: ALGIERS SCANDAL UPDATE: REACTIONS CALM AS EAC MEETS

REF: A. ALGIERS 113

B. ALGIERS 107

C. ALGIERS 106

ALGIERS 00000115 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce, for reasons 1.4 (b),(d) and
(g).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000115 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA, NEA/EX AND NEA/MAG E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2019 TAGS: PREL PINR KPAO MARR ASEC AMGT KMSG AG SUBJECT: ALGIERS SCANDAL UPDATE: REACTIONS CALM AS EAC MEETS REF: A. ALGIERS 113 ¶B. ALGIERS 107 ¶C. ALGIERS 106 ALGIERS 00000115 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce, for reasons 1.4 (b),(d) and (g). ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Ambassador Pearce chaired an EAC meeting on January 31 to review the fallout from the ABC news story related to a former Embassy officer who allegedly drugged and raped two Algerian nationals (reftels). Because of the Algerian weekend, the story did not break in the local press until January 31, at which point it was the leading front-page story in most daily papers (ref A). GOA reactions have been restrained, with most contacts telling us this would not have a significant impact on the bilateral relationship. The Ambassador provided the EAC with cleared guidance and instructed it be disseminated to all staff. The RSO reported no threat information, but the EAC agreed American staff should limit their movements to essential life and work needs for 48 hours to allow time to assess any public backlash. Ambassador also met with the FSN Committee to provide guidance and to solicit employees' views regarding public reaction. One female FSN expressed personal discomfort dealing with questions expected from family regarding propriety in the Embassy workplace. By Sunday, February 1, the story had all but disappeared from the press, and although comments continued on Algerian web sites, we continued to detect no immediate public or government backlash. The almost complete absence of the story in government press outlets indicates the government prefers to see the story die down. END SUMMARY. GOA DOWNPLAYS IT -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Because the Algerian weekend fell on Thursday and Friday and Algerian newspapers do not publish on Fridays, most of the Algerian public first learned of the alleged assaults (reftels) in the press of Saturday morning, January ¶31. The Ambassador called an EAC to review the situation and threat levels. Nearly all newspapers, except government journals, carried the story on their front pages (ref A). The EAC agreed, however, that the information found in these news reports was largely factual, essentially retelling details from the ABC news report and court affidavit released on January 28. Surprisingly,
press coverage died down dramatically on February 1, and has been almost completely absent from government-controlled media outlets. Most of the second-day coverage focused on comments made by Interior Minister Nourreddine Yazid Zerhouni, who essentially admitted publicly that the CIA had worked with Algerian intelligence on counter-terrorism issues. Zerhouni said the case would be handled completely in the United States because neither woman had filed a complaint in Algeria and both reside in Europe. Zerhouni added that the accused officer had been covered by diplomatic immunity at the time of the alleged acts. ¶3. (S/NF) The EAC noted that the initial GOA response, in Washington and Algiers (refs B and C),had been restrained. The Ambassador was able to inform the GOA of the ABC News piece during a previously scheduled meeting on the morning of January 29 with Minister-Delegate of National Defense Abdelmalek Guenaizia and one of his top generals, Major General Ahmed Senhadji. The Ambassador had also called MFA Director General for the Americas Fatiha Selmane later that morning. These officials said they appreciated being informed personally and in advance of the Algerian press. Algerian Ambassador to Washington Abdellah Baali made positive public statements to the U.S. press indicating that while the alleged incidents were unfortunate, he trusted that the American justice system would handle the matter appropriately and according to the rule of law, and that the situation would not damage bilateral relations. Baali's comments were widely reported in the January 31 Algerian press, which helped frame the official Algerian message of playing down the scandal in favor of the positive larger bilateral relationship. MFA's protocol office called us on January 31, seeking the identities of the two alleged victims, but our Management Officer used Department guidance to politely deflect the query. EAC RESPONSE -------------- ALGIERS 00000115 002.2 OF 002 ¶4. (S/NF) RSO reported no threat information and no expected public reaction from meetings with local police on January 31 and February 1. No other threats were reported in relation to the story. We received no press or public inquiries on January 31 and only two on February 1, and no staff reported any particularly negative reaction from contacts, family or the public, only curiosity about some details of the reports. The EAC recommended nonetheless that American employees should maintain a low profile and refrain from non-essential movements in the city for an initial period of 48 hours. RSO advised that SMS alerts and the cascade notification system would be used to share news with the Embassy community as appropriate and needed. Both systems were employed on January 29 to inform staff to keep a low profile in the initial hours after the story broke in the United States. RSO also reminded EAC that personal security is the responsibility of the employee. RSO will continue monitoring threat information and public reaction in conjunction with other Embassy sections. The EAC agreed, under advice from the Embassy Consul, that a warden message would not be appropriate because no new threat information had been received, and that the existing travel warning remained sufficient. Intra-country travel scheduled for the coming week would be reviewed by the RSO and Front Office. No immediate TDY or other visits had been scheduled within five days, so action was deferred on inbound travel recommendations. ¶5. (S/NF) The Ambassador provided cleared guidance to EAC members, for use with the press and Algerian government officials. He requested that all personnel closely adhere to the guidance and that employees take care not to allow themselves to be drawn into any discussions or speculation about the CIA. He also noted that, while we were restricted in terms of what we could say about this specific case, we should make no apologies for the fact that we have a strong, ongoing bilateral security relationship with Algeria. This security cooperation made both countries safer. The Ambassador also met with the FSN Committee on January 31, to provide the same cleared guidance and listen to employee reactions and concerns. Most of our local staff thought the story would pass relatively quickly but the focus would shift from the reported incidents to questions of the CIA presence in Algeria. One female local employee confided to the Ambassador her concern that female FSNs might face difficult questions from family members and friends about the Embassy work environment. ¶6. (U) POC for this EAC Report is DRSO Miguel A. Eversley. PEARCE

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