MEDIA REACTION: U.S. AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000031 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S. AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS Summary: Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused their January 9 news coverage on Legislator Diane Lee, who announced her resignation from the Legislative Yuan Thursday over the controversy arising from her dual U.S. and Taiwan citizenship; and on the Taiwan government's deliberations over whether to send military frigates to the Gulf of Aden to protect Taiwan's fishing boats in the piracy-plagued waters. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an editorial in the pro-independence "Liberty Times" analyzed Chinese President Hu Jintao's recent speech on Taiwan policy and concluded that Hu's strategy is to rope in KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan to restrict President Ma Ying-jeou, to restrain the Green camp via the Green, and to divide Taiwan. A separate "Liberty Times" op-ed piece said that Hu's six-point speech clearly rules out a U.S. role in cross-Strait relations and any decision on Taiwan's future. An editorial in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" said that "[w]hile the U.S. is quite right in wanting a peaceful settlement to the Taiwan issue, it is hard to believe that the country that for so long served as Taiwan's protector is prepared to turn its back on one of Asia's freest societies as it is slowly swallowed by its giant, authoritarian neighbor." A separate "Taipei Times" op-ed said Hu's speech is just more of the same as the previous "Messages to Compatriots in Taiwan." Another "Taipei Times" op-ed, however, said that Hu's remarks signal new approach to cross-Strait relations. End summary. A) "Hu's Strategy: Roping in Lien Chan to Restrict Ma Ying-jeou, Restraining the Green Camp via the Green and Dividing Taiwan" The pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 700,000] editorialized (1/9): "Following Hu Jintao's six-point policy speech toward Taiwan, the Chinese State Department's Taiwan Affairs Office was calling out to the DPP. Such a move by China is evidently a planned, purposeful new united front attack against Taiwan, a step that should keep the Taiwan people on their toes. Judging from China's separate strategies toward the KMT and the DPP, it appears that one can summarize the new united front attack currently being launched by China against Taiwan in the following words: 'roping in Lien Chan to restrict Ma Ying-jeou, restraining the Green Camp via the Green, and dividing Taiwan.' ... "In Taiwan, with the Blue camp as the ruling party and the Green camp the opposition party, they can at least work to restrain Ma's [push for] ultimate unification [with China]. Also, even though the KMT has returned to power again and the Ma Administration is proactively tilting toward China, the Taiwan people's determination to safeguard Taiwan's sovereign status remains. As long as the Ma Administration attempts to deviate from its campaign commitment to 'Taiwan first' and to usher in China, the Taiwan people will likely support the DPP to become the ruling party at any time, thereby nullifying all the previous efforts by Lien and Ma to 'facilitate unification.' ..." B) "From Co-Management to Gaining Control over the Taiwan Strait" Dr. Lin Cheng-yi, a research fellow at the Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, opined in the pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 700,000] (1/9): "Hu's six-point proposal has clearly excluded a United States role in cross-Strait relations and in [decisions on] Taiwan's future. ... In Beijing's latest policy toward Taiwan, there is no longer any need for the United States and China to 'co-manage the Taiwan Strait'; instead, both sides of the Taiwan Strait can manage the Taiwan Strait by themselves, or it can even be dictated by the Chinese Communist Party alone. ... "When compared with Hu's modification in his Taiwan policy, U.S. President-elect Barack Obama will demonstrate clear changes in his theory about Taiwan policy. ... In comparison with Hu's six-point speech, in which China will dictate cross-Strait relations, the Obama Administration will reiterate the Taiwan people's free right to choose, particularly, the consent of the Taiwan people [to the future direction of cross-Strait relations]. ..." C) "Is the US Just a Little too Optimistic?" The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 30,000] editorialized (1/9): "... Over the last few weeks, a steady succession of US establishment figures and academics - most notably former US ambassador to the UN John Bolton - have landed in Taipei to file through the Presidential Office turnstiles and slap President Ma Ying-jeou on the back while commending him for the recent cross-strait detente. Ma, meanwhile, has taken every opportunity to detail how happy the world is with his management of relations with China. The reason, no doubt, for the US' glee is that the warming of cross-strait relations means it is less likely that war will break out in the Taiwan Strait, in which case US soldiers would likely have to put their lives on the line to defend Taiwan. In fact, the only dissenting voice of late has come from Pentagon officials, who have expressed worries that Taiwan's headlong tilt toward China could eventually see advanced US weapons technology falling into the 'wrong hands.' ... "Another consideration for those praising the new atmosphere in the Strait is that the closer democratic Taiwan gets to authoritarian Beijing, the bigger the threat China poses to the nation's democratic system and the rights of Taiwanese to determine their future. Washington must understand that the two are not mutually exclusive. Although the Taiwan Relations Act - the guiding principle on US-Taiwan relations - states that the future of Taiwan should be settled by peaceful means, any 'peace deal' between Taipei and Beijing, despite Beijing's best guarantees, would inevitably result in a deterioration in human rights, the rule of law and democracy in the same manner witnessed in Hong Kong since 1997. While the US is quite right in wanting a peaceful settlement to the Taiwan issue, it is hard to believe that the country that for so long served as Taiwan's protector is prepared to turn its back on one of Asia's freest societies as it is slowly swallowed by its giant, authoritarian neighbor." D) "Hu's Speech Just More of the Same" Paul Lin, a political commentator based in Taiwan, opined in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 30,000] (1/9): "On Dec. 31, Chinese President Hu Jintao gave a speech in Beijing to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the 'Message to Compatriots in Taiwan.' The basic spirit of the speech was the same as 30 years ago and was aimed at getting Taiwan to surrender to China. ... Hu is at his lying best again, using more despotic rhetoric than ever before. President Ma Ying-jeou, however, sees it as 'new thinking,' as if he were willing to convince the people of Taiwan into surrendering. Ma's behavior is more shameless than that of former dictator Chiang Kai-shek and former presidents Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian." E) Hu Remarks Signal New Approach to Taiwan Ties" Shaw Chong-hai, a professor and director of the Institute of Mainland China Studies at Chinese Cultural University, opined in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 30,000] (1/9): "In his speech on Dec. 31 marking the 30th anniversary of China's 'Message to Compatriots in Taiwan' of Jan. 1, 1979, Chinese President Hu Jintao offered six proposals to promote the peaceful development of cross-strait relations and revitalize the Chinese people. These proposals are indicative of the direction that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies will take toward Taiwan in the next few years and differ slightly from the party's past Taiwan policies. Although consistent with the overall direction of the Chinese government's previous Taiwan policies, the proposals suggest several breakthroughs and goodwill gestures that we have not seen, before from the CCP. First, China's discourse on the 'one China' principle has changed. ... Second there will be a new cross-strait discourse on the political status of Taiwan. ... Third, the CCP relaxed its conditions for communicating with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). ... Fourth, Beijing set a clear line on Taiwan participating in international organizations. ... Fifth, exchange mechanisms would be constructive. ..." YOUNG