wikileaks ico  Home papers ico  Cables mirror and Afghan War Diary privacy policy  Privacy
09AITTAIPEI226 2009-03-02 08:53:00 SECRET American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  


pdf how-to read a cable
P 020853Z MAR 09
					S E C R E T AIT TAIPEI 000226 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2019


REF: A. (A) 2005 TAIPEI 3201
B. (B) 2007 STATE 148330

Classified By: AIT Acting Director Robert S. Wang for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).

1. (S) Summary: On February 11-12, 2009, an interagency team
of U.S. officials discussed U.S.-Taiwan Gameplan
implementation with Taiwan authorities from the Ministry of
Economic Affairs (MOEA) Bureau of Foreign Trade (BOFT) and
other agencies. The discussions were positive and fruitful,
and focused on Taiwan's continuing progress using licensing
and enforcement tools to prevent transfers of sensitive items
to countries of proliferation concern, particularly Iran and
North Korea. The talks concluded with both sides agreeing to
a list of follow-up items and agreement to continue the
productive dialogue. End summary.



2. (S) U.S. and Taiwan delegations met at BOFT February
11-12 to continue a dialogue on the U.S.-Taiwan Gameplan,
which began in August 2005 with a series of near- and
long-term steps in an effort to improve Taiwan's export
control system (ref A). BOFT Deputy Director Chun-fang Hsu
and ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham led the respective
delegations. In addition to ISN/MTR, the U.S. delegation
comprised 13 representatives from ISN/ECC, DHS/ICE, DHS/CBP,
DOE, DOD, DOC/BIS, DOC/OEE, the U.S. Intelligence Community,
and AIT. The Taiwan side included delegates from BOFT; the
National Security Council (NSC); the National Science
Council; the Atomic Energy Council (AEC); the Ministry of
National Defense (MND) Armaments Bureau; the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Department of North American Affairs;
the MOFA National Immigration Agency; the National Police
Agency; the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB);
the Ministry of Finance (MOF) Directorate General of Customs;
and other agencies. A complete list of Taiwan,s participants
is located in paragraph 13. A complete list of U.S.
participants is located in paragraph 14.

Taiwan to Consider End-use Checks, Interagency Process



3. (S) The discussions were substantive, with active
participation from both sides. The U.S. side was impressed
with Taiwan,s progress on export control systems development
and appreciated that Taiwan has taken steps to incorporate
U.S. suggestions from the September 2007 Gameplan talks into
its export licensing procedures. During the meetings, Taiwan
stated that it adopted the single EU control list, rather
than lists from each regime, and is beginning to implement
pre-license and post-shipment checks for exports to certain
destinations. As does the U.S., Taiwan plans to seek
cooperation from its overseas posts to conduct the checks.
Dennis Krepp, DOC/BIS, gave a presentation on the U.S.
licensing process, including interagency license review
process. Taiwan stated that it is continuing to review
implementing an interagency review process for export
licenses that could include reviews by economic, military,
and foreign policy agencies.

SCL Reductions


4. (S) During the run-up to the meetings, the Taiwan side
proposed deleting 90 items from its Sensitive Commodity List
(SCL), a list of lower-technology items destined for Iran
and North Korea. The U.S. side agreed to remove ten items
from the SCL. The U.S. had additional technical questions on
19 items. BOFT agreed to keep two of these items on the
SCL, and both sides agreed to exchange further information on
the remaining 17 items. The remaining 63 items (of the 90
SCL items BOFT recommended for removal) will remain on the
SCL. As agreed in 2005, both the U.S. and Taiwan will
continue to review the SCL periodically to determine if any
additional items should be removed from or added to the SCL.

More Information on Licenses Requested


5. (C) During discussion of the license review process,
Taiwan asked for more detailed information on cases in which
the U.S. either recommends denial or indicates that there is
a proliferation risk. Having this information in a timely
manner will facilitate Taiwan,s adjudication of these cases.
The U.S. side undertook to provide such information, when
available. The U.S. also said it would try to provide the
information as quickly as possible, but noted that obtaining
releasable information usually takes several weeks. The U.S.
also encouraged Taiwan to offer its preliminary assessment of
licenses when submitting them to the U.S. for review. This
information will be helpful to U.S. reviewers.

Applications Up, Violations Down


6. (S) Taiwan statistics show a dramatic increase in the
number of export license applications, but a drop in
violations. According to BOFT, the main reason for the
changes is an increase in export control awareness among
Taiwan,s industries, which BOFT attributed in turn to the
number and quality of EXBS programs in Taiwan. Additionally,
Taiwan is requiring applicants to submit more supporting
documentation with their applications. In particular, Taiwan
is seeking supporting documents that will help confirm the
bona-fides of the exporting firms and the end-users.

Continued Commitment to Investigate Proliferation Cases



7. (S) Taiwan,s BOFT opened the review of open cases with a
presentation on the results of its investigations into
transactions raised by the United States since the September
2007 Gameplan meeting (Ref B). Taiwan noted that in each
case, the companies involved in export activities that posed
potential proliferation concern were added to BOFT,s Watch
List and subjected to increased export control scrutiny.
BOFT also provided an overview of its process of adding firms
to the Watch List and described how it works with Taiwan,s
Customs Service to investigate suspected export control
violations. Both sides agreed to take steps to improve our
dialogue on proliferation cases, including Taiwan pledging to
create an internal file to ensure it has responded to all
cases raised by the United States within three months, and
proposing that U.S. demarches be concurrently delivered in
Taipei and in Washington. For its part, the United States
agreed to sharpen the focus of its demarches to clarify why
certain activities pose proliferation concerns, and help
Taiwan better target its investigations.

8. (S) During the review of open cases, both sides expressed
appreciation for the two-way flow of information on exports
to certain entities of proliferation concern. However,
Taiwan authorities requested more detailed information from
the U.S. side on our export control-related demarches, and
Show-ning Huang, Section Chief of the Ministry of Justice
Investigation Bureau (MJIB), complained that Taiwan
investigations regularly find that intelligence forwarded to
Taiwan by the U.S. is either inaccurate or incomplete. Huang
also pointed out individuals and companies in Taiwan are well
aware of ways to avoid export-controls, and that Taiwan
companies transship items through third and even fourth
countries, including many countries that do not share
information with Taiwan. The United States responded that
this feedback was helpful, and agreed to try to provide as
detailed information as possible to assist Taiwan,s
investigations into these cases.

Intangible Technology Transfers: Difficult but Important



8. (S) The second day began with a discussion of controlling
transfers of intangible technology. The Taiwan side said
such transfers, which can leave Taiwan through emails,
telephone calls, and the repatriation of foreign students,
are difficult to control. The U.S. responded that the key to
preventing intangible violations is outreach to and education
of industries and universities and other research centers,
and said the U.S. would provide follow-up examples and case
studies for Taiwan to consult.

Taiwan Defers on Visa Review Process


9. (S) Taiwan deferred discussion on implementing a joint
visa review process with the U.S. for Iranian and North
Korean travelers to Taiwan. First Secretary Pingyang Su from
MOFA,s Bureau of Consular Affairs said his Ministry &was
not fully aware8 of the issue, and needed time for internal
discussions before discussing implementation of this part of
the Gameplan.

U.S. Invites Taiwan to EXBS Conference in Turkey



10. (S) The U.S. stated that it is planning to invite Taiwan
to participate in EXBS, international export control
conference in Turkey this summer, and hopes Taiwan will
consider joining the conference. Taiwan thanked the U.S.
side for the training provided thus far under the EXBS
program. Taiwan officials would welcome additional training
opportunities, especially with regard to commodity

EAR Seminar


11. (S) The Taiwan side requested that the U.S. (DOC/BIS)
provide training to Taiwan industry on complying with U.S.
re-export rules. The Taiwan side stated that it often hears
complaints from its companies on the complexity of the U.S.
rules and their inability to obtain U.S. re-export licenses.
The Taiwan side also stated that it would bear the cost of
organizing such a program if the U.S. agreed to send
speakers. The U.S. side stated that it would pass on the
request to appropriate officials when it returns to

Taiwan Side Gives Meeting High Score


12. (S) DDG Hsu gave the two-day meeting a &high score,8
and urged both sides to continue cooperation and progress
monitoring the trade in sensitive, high-tech commodities.
Hsu also requested, and the U.S. side agreed, to open another
channel at TECRO,s Economic division in Washington for
passing information on case specific investigations; i.e.,

13. (S) Hsu promised to deliver a document &within the
week8 that will summarize the content of the meetings and
specify follow-up steps for both sides. (Note: AIT received
a copy of a transmittal letter, but no attachment, forwarding
meeting minutes to TECRO for delivery to Pam Durham. End

Taiwan Delegation Members


14. (C) Franco Chih-peng Huang, Director General, Board of
Foreign Trade (BOFT), Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA)

Chun-fang Hsu, Deputy DG, BOFT, MOEA

Tajen Lee, Assistant Researcher, National Security Council

Chien-kuo Chuansun, Senior Staff, National Security Bureau

Show-chiuan Ni, Coordinator, Executive Yuan Office of
Homeland Security (OHS)

David Shen-ruay Chen, Section Chief, OHS

Li-chun Peng, Section Chief, National Science Council

Jo-yi Hsu, Officer, National Science Council

Hsin-sheng Liu, Section Chief, Atomic Energy Council (AEC)

Chien-kuo Chang, Technical Specialist, AEC

Yuan-yeu Jing, Deputy Director, Armaments Bureau, Ministry of
National Defense (MND)

Ping Hsu, Officer, Armaments Bureau, MND

Douglas Hsu, Section Chief, North American Office, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)

Pingyang Su, First Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs, MOFA

Simon Hsieh, Section Chief, National Immigration Agency (NIA)

Wenjui Chang, Section Chief, National Police Agency (NPA)

Weijung Chang, Staff Officer, NPA

Show-ning Huang, Section Chief, Ministry of Justice Bureau of
Investigation (MJIB)

Wilson Kao, Section Chief, MJIB

Sean Teng, Agent, MJIB

Ling-hwei Lin, Section Chief, Directorate General of Customs,
Ministry of Finance (MOF)

Billy Wen-hai Shyu, Section Chief, Directorate General of
Customs, MOF

Yi-sheng Ling, Editor, Directorate General of Customs, MOF

Jen-fu TU, Specialist, Directorate General of Customs, MOF

Ching Kuo, Technical Specialist, Department of Industrial
Technology, MOEA

Alex Fan, Director, Technology Transfer and Service Center,

Ching-chih Chen, Director , BOFT, MOEA

Ching-yuan Huang, Chief of Task Force, BOFT, MOEA

U.S. Delegation Members


Pamela K. Durham, Director, DOS/ISN/MTR

Dennis Krepp, Director, DOC/BIS/CB

Samantha Boyer, DOS/ISN/MTR

James Mayes, DOS/ISN/MTR

Nils Johanson, DOS/ISN/ECC

Drew Nickels, DOE

Taurus Brackett, DOD/DTSA

Elizabeth Boniface, U.S. Intelligence Community

Mi-Yong Kim, AIT, EXBS Advisor

Matthew O,Connor, AIT

Richard Powell, DHS/CBP

Tatum King, DHS/ICE

Phil Ankel, DOC/OEE

15. (SBU) The message has been reviewed by State/ISN/MTR.



End Cable Text