TIME TO BEGIN EXTRADITION TALKS WITH TAIWAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L AIT TAIPEI 001188 SIPDIS FROM THE DIRECTOR FOR EAP A/S CAMPBELL E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2019 TAGS: PREL KCRM KJUS TW SUBJECT: TIME TO BEGIN EXTRADITION TALKS WITH TAIWAN REF: A. TAIPEI 651 ¶B. TAIPEI 277 ¶C. TAIPEI 1043 ¶D. TAIPEI 1029 Classified By: the Director for reasons 1.4(b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Starting extradition agreement negotiations as soon as possible would advance key U.S. law enforcement interests and, perhaps just as important, would serve as a low-risk way to underscore our commitment to strong ties with Taiwan. People of all political persuasions on Taiwan have endorsed the idea, as have the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and noted U.S. academics and experts on Taiwan's judicial system. Our goal should be to inform Taiwan in October of our intention to begin formal talks. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Over the past year, AIT has worked to identify the challenges and potential pitfalls of negotiating an extradition agreement with Taiwan. (Technically, given our unofficial relations with Taiwan, an agreement would be between AIT and its counterpart organization, TECRO.) In doing so, we looked at several separate questions: - Would an agreement advance U.S. interests? - Is Taiwan's judicial system fair and impartial? - How would the PRC react? - Would pursuing an agreement embroil the United States in domestic Taiwan politics? - Would the U.S. Congress support an agreement? U.S. Interests -------------- ¶3. (C) At an operational level, an extradition agreement would close the loophole that has made the United States the top destination for Taiwan fugitives (ref A). Over the past decade, we have been unable to return any of the more than 130 criminal suspects from Taiwan at large in the United States. Meanwhile, over the past two years, Taiwan has returned at least five criminal suspects to the United States, including murderers, a child molester and one featured on "America's Most Wanted." This lack of reciprocity is causing friction in what has been a very cooperative law enforcement relationship (ref B) and could spill over into other aspects of the bilateral relationship as the public exerts more pressure on the Taiwan government to demonstrate a more equitable relationship. ¶4. (C) More broadly, pursuing an extradition agreement will also advance U.S. interests in promoting regional stability. President Ma has made clear that a stronger U.S.-Taiwan relationship is an essential part of his effort to reduce tensions with China. He believes an "unbalanced" approach of strengthened relations only with the mainland will be unsustainable domestically and ultimately could make Taiwan vulnerable to Chinese coercion. While an extradition agreement might seem to have little connection to cross-Strait dialogue, Ma has identified it as one of a very small handful of steps the United States can take to demonstrate concrete support for his policy. The other items on Ma's "short list" -- acquiring F-16 C/Ds, negotiating an FTA and gaining entry to the Visa Waiver Program -- may be more difficult to achieve in the near future. Judicial System Fundamentally Sound -------------- ¶5. (C) In the region, the United States has extradition treaties with Singapore, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, the Philippines, the ROK, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, but not with Burma, Laos, Cambodia, the DPRK, and the PRC. AIT reporting and recent Human Rights Reports, as well as non-USG assessments of Taiwan's judicial and legal systems put it squarely in the former group, and we would argue at the top end of that list. Noted foreign scholars such as Jerome Cohen of the NYU School of Law and Wang Jaw-perng, Taiwan,s leading criminal law expert, also view Taiwan's judicial system as fundamentally sound. Opposition party accusations notwithstanding, there is no credible evidence that the central government is using the legal system to target DPP officials. ¶6. (C) Scholars and opposition politicians believe negotiating an extradition agreement could also serve as a necessary catalyst for continued reforms (ref C). We share these scholars' views that aspects of Taiwan,s judicial system would benefit from reform. Taiwan faces problems found in the United States and elsewhere (e.g., leaks by prosecutors, defense attorneys and legislators, and individual prosecutors pursuing cases based on personal ambition) and offers similar remedies to address them (e.g., disciplinary committees, random assignment of judges and multiple levels of appeals). Taiwan has shown a clear commitment to improving the system by ratifying in April the two UN Human Rights Covenants (UNCCPR, UNESCR) and ordering a review of all laws to ensure compliance with these Covenants. Indeed, the process of negotiating an extradition agreement will allow us to encourage continued reform and give cover to authorities to institute personnel and procedural reforms. Extradition Not a Domestic Political Issue -------------- ¶7. (C) While almost any issue is liable to become fodder for an inter-party dispute in Taiwan's highly-politicized environment, political party officials and others indicate broad support for establishing a mechanism to return criminal suspects (ref C). Bikhim Hsiao, the International Affairs Director of Taiwan's main opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and DPP Central Standing Committee member Tuan I-kang have both endorsed an extradition agreement as a means to secure the return of the many high-profile, primarily white-collar, fugitives now at large in the United States. In an October 1 conversation with the Director (septel),former Vice President Annette Lu offered a similar view, noting that it was DPP President Chen Shui-bian's government that first proposed pursuing an extradition agreement, and said she would support such an agreement now. ¶8. (C) Likewise, there has been little media or popular opposition to the President Ma's well-publicized interest in an agreement with the United States. Indeed, Ma has been criticized for returning criminal suspects to the United States without demanding reciprocal treatment. A telling barometer of public sentiment has been the response to the Taiwan-PRC Mutual Judicial Assistance Agreement, which includes extradition-type provisions, signed in April. Polling conducted by the DPP showed 88.4 percent of the public supported the repatriation agreement. Since any kind of cross-Strait interaction is controversial here, this high level of support indicates that a U.S.-Taiwan agreement will face little opposition. Signs of Strong Congressional Support -------------- ¶9. (SBU) We understand that EAP, H and L have given preliminary briefings to Hill staffers on an extradition agreement with Taiwan. Similarly, extradition has been a major subject of discussion during recent CODELs. President Ma and other Taiwan officials have raised the idea with every visiting delegation of members and staffers. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Berman's comment to President Ma in August that he "could not understand why the United States would not want such an agreement" (ref D) succinctly encapsulated the views of most legislative branch visitors to Taipei. Predicting and Handling a PRC Response -------------- ¶10. (C) Although we can keep the initial decision to proceed with talks low-profile, at some point the fact that we are discussing an extradition agreement with Taiwan will become a matter of public record. Beijing may then protest, as it does over most U.S. interactions with Taiwan, particularly in light of the PRC's longstanding interest in its own extradition agreement with the United States. Beyond the general principle (and the spirit of the TRA) that we should not constrain our interactions with Taiwan based on an assumed Chinese response, there is good reason to expect that, in the case of extradition, any PRC reaction would be more rhetorical than substantive. Iluustrating the relatively non-controversial nature of law enforcement cooperation, China has already concluded its own extradition agreement with Taiwan, eliminating a major logical basis for protesting our decision to do so. The test case is the 2001 AIT-TECRO Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement, which has functioned smoothly and -- to our knowledge -- without protest from the PRC. Next Steps -------------- ¶11. (C) We have spent more than a year internally discussing the possibility of beginning extradition talks with Taiwan. If there are remaining questions, we should commit to identifying them and resolving them as soon as possible. If it would expedite the process, AIT Taipei's action officer is prepared to travel to Washington to answer specific questions and participate in Hill briefings as needed. We see no reason why we cannot set and meet goals of informing Taiwan in October of our commitment to negotiate an agreement and to initiate formal discussions before the end of the year. STANTON