DALAI LAMA VISIT ROILS CROSS-STRAIT TIES, TAIWAN'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L AIT TAIPEI 001082 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2019 TAGS: PREL PINR AEMR PGOV PHUM XE CH TW SUBJECT: DALAI LAMA VISIT ROILS CROSS-STRAIT TIES, TAIWAN'S INTERNAL POLITICS REF: A. TAIPEI 1076 ¶B. TAIPEI 1064 Classified By: The Director for reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: While the initial fall-out from the Dalai Lama's visit to Taiwan should be manageable, the trip could damage Beijing's confidence in President Ma Ying-jeou in the longer term, according to the KMT official responsible for China affairs. The visit has been a major topic in Taiwan domestic politics and Ma's decision to approve the visit could steal thunder from critics who claim he is too willing to please Beijing. End Summary. "So Far, So Good" on Cross-Strait Blowback -------------- ¶2. (C) Managing the short-term impact of the Dalai Lama's visit to Taiwan on cross-Strait relations should be relatively easy, KMT Mainland Affairs Division Director Chang Jung-kung told PolOff on September 1. Chang described President Ma's handling of the issue as "so far, so good." In approving the visit of the exiled Tibetan leader, the President took pains to stress the humanitarian nature of the trip and to rule out meeting the Tibetan leader himself. In another nod to PRC sensitivities, the government convinced the Dalai Lama to cancel a scheduled news briefing on August 31, the second day of his visit. Noting that party-to-party contacts remained an essential cross-Strait communication channel, Chang confirmed that KMT spokesman Lee Chien-jung, representing party Chairman Wu Po-hsiung, had traveled to China to explain the Dalai Lama decision. ¶3. (C) Chang was unfazed by PRC leaders' expressions of "clear and firm" opposition to the visit which, they warned, would affect cross-Strait relations. Importantly, he observed, Beijing had put most of the blame on the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for having issued the invitation. In the event, although Taiwan media reported that China had cancelled or delayed several ceremonies and meetings in response to the visit, its actual short-term economic impact on Taiwan appeared to be limited (ref A). In particular, Chang dismissed as unlikely the suggestion made by some media sources (as well as by Vice President Siew - see ref B) that the proposed Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) would be affected. Too Soon to Assess Long-Term Impact -------------- ¶4. (C) For his part, in a September 2 interview with a Taiwan television station, the Dalai Lama said it would take six months to one year to assess the impact of his visit on cross-Strait ties. China was in a bind, Chang argued. While wanting to express displeasure, it did not want to harm Ma politically, given his aggressive promotion of improved cross-Strait ties since taking office last year. In the longer-term, however, Ma's decision would erode Beijing's trust in him, Chang suggested. He noted that Ma had irritated China's leaders before, citing his appointment of Lai Hsin-yuan, whose pro-independence views were no secret, as head of the Mainland Affairs Council. As these episodes accumulated, Chang said, Beijing would reevaluate Ma's reliability as a partner. ¶5. (C) This, in turn, could make China less inclined to accommodate Taiwan's wish for a higher profile on the global stage and in international organizations, Chang said. For example, he argued that Beijing would not have agreed to give Taiwan observer status at the World Health Assembly meeting in May had the Tibetan leader's trip occurred earlier. Local media reflected additional worries that China might insist on the downgrading of Taiwan's representation at the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum summit; former vice president and honorary KMT chairman Lien Chan attended the last one. ¶6. (C) To prevent this erosion of trust, the KMT's Chang said, the President should take steps to assuage Beijing's unease by, for example, reaffirming a 2005 KMT-CCP communique on cross-Strait ties or dispatching a personal emissary to Beijing to explain his decision. In a separate conversation, Spencer Yang, acting president of Chinese Culture University, said he expected Ma would move to placate China, perhaps by showing more flexibility in allowing Chinese investment on the island. ¶7. (C) Officials and analysts closer to the President offered a more upbeat assessment. In a September 3 meeting with the Director, Premier Liu Chao-hsiuan suggested that it had allowed Ma to finesse a difficult situation. (Septel covers other issues discussed in the meeting.) The President had been roundly criticized for putting off an earlier Dalai Lama request to visit and had to extend an invitation at some point in his tenure, Liu said. As long as the Dalai Lama avoided politics while on Taiwan, Liu said, Beijing should be content to blame the DPP and get back to business with Ma. China Council of Advanced Politics Secretary General Andrew Yang offered PolOff a similar assessment, noting that the Dalai Lama had no reason to get sucked too deeply into Taiwan's internal politics. Domestic Politics Loom Large -------------- ¶8. (C) Initially, when Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu and other DPP officials invited the Dalai Lama to visit after he expressed interest in consoling victims of Typhoon Morakot, some commentators called the move a master political stroke. Some in Taiwan's opposition thought that Ma would not allow the visit out of concern it would disrupt cross-Strait relations. This, in turn, would cause Ma's popularity -- already reeling from the botched typhoon recovery effort -- to plummet further yet. Instead, the DPP has been criticized by the media for using the Dalai Lama and the typhoon victims to advance its own political fortunes. A September 1 editorial in the KMT-leaning United Daily News said the DPP had "fallen into the political trap it had constructed" for Ma. ¶9. (C) DPP International Affairs Director Bikhim Hsiao told PolOff on September 2 that the party's polling indicated a strong majority on Taiwan supported the Tibetan leader's visit. Two-thirds of respondents said the visit was religious and not political in nature; half said the opposition was not attempting to embarrass Ma in issuing the invitation. Although the KMT's Chang said many here scoffed at inviting a Tibetan Buddhist who did not speak Chinese to comfort the largely Christian population in the disaster area, the Dalai Lama clearly struck a chord with many during his visit. More than 10,000 people attended the memorial service he presided over on September 1 in Kaoshiung, and television showed emotional images of him hugging villagers in the worst hit regions. ¶10. (C) Comment: Cross-Strait relations for now appear to be weathering the storm created by the Dalai Lama's visit to Taiwan. Although Chang Jung-kung's concern that Beijing could lose trust in Ma over his handling of the visit bears watching, he may be overstating the danger given his close relationship to Lien Chan, who is a longtime rival of Ma's within the KMT. Indeed, continuous opposition accusations that Ma has been a Chinese puppet may be less convincing after he approved the Dalai Lama's visit over Beijing's strong objections. He may now have some additional space to push forward improved ties with China, which remain the cornerstone of his administration's policies. Last but not least, Ma's approval of the visit may in fact be helpful in underscoring to Beijing the domestic political constraints within which Ma has to operate. STANTON