NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR: F-16S A TEST OF U.S.

S E C R E T AIT TAIPEI 001075 STATE FOR EAP AND D; NSC FOR BADER E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2019 TAGS: PREL MARR MASS ECON TW CH SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR: F-16S A TEST OF U.S. COMMITMENT Classified By: The Director for reasons 1.4(b/d) ¶1. (S) Summary: Taiwan will approach POLITICAL discussions with China with great caution, National Security Advisor Su Chi stressed to the Director during their September 1 introductory call. The Director in turn highlighted the need for close U.S.-Taiwan dialogue as this process goes forward. The sale of F-16 C/Ds, which both sides of the Strait see as a key sign of U.S. commitment, would be an important factor in Taiwan's ability to pursue CBMs with China, Su suggested. The visit of the Dalai Lama, Su said, highlighted the lack of formal cross-Strait crisis management mechanisms. End Summary. Cross-Strait: Engage, but Cautiously -------------- ¶2. (S) Following his introductory meeting with President Ma (septel),the Director continued discussions of bilateral issues and cross-Strait RELATIONS with National Security Council Secretary General Su Chi. Su, who also took part in the Ma meeting, repeatedly underscored the need for Taiwan to be cautious as it engaged China. Taiwan's electorate was deeply uneasy about its neighbor, Su said, making rapid progress politically difficult. More fundamentally, however, the Ma administration knew a misstep might have disastrous consequences for Taiwan. A small island surrounded by big powers, Su said, Taiwan could not afford to set in motion events it might not be able to control in the future. ¶3. (S) The Director expressed understanding for the challenges facing the Ma administration and for Taiwan's need to control the pace of progress in its RELATIONS with the PRC. Washington wanted to be supportive in any way possible, he said, and therefore needed to know more about the Ma administration's plans and contacts with Beijing. He noted that A/S Campbell hoped to have regular contact with Su, beginning with a telephone call scheduled for September 3. Su welcomed the idea, noting only that he was very careful in conversations over open lines. F-16s a Test of U.S. Commitment -------------- ¶4. (S) Continuing a discussion of cross-Strait CBMs from the meeting with President Ma, the Director more directly asked why Taiwan was not engaging with China on CBMs. Su responded that it would be extremely difficult to engage China on political or military issues if the United States turned down Taiwan's request for F-16 C/Ds. The need for the F-16s was one of the few issues that all of Taiwan's POLITICAL parties supported, Su said. While the military value of these planes was clear, they were even more important as a POLITICAL symbol of American commitment to Taiwan and the TRA. PRC TAO head Wang Yi's energetic lobbying against the deal demonstrated that the PRC believed this too, Su argued, since adding "a few planes" to Taiwan's air force would do little to alter the military balance already greatly in Beijing's favor. ¶5. (S) Su noted that a particularly disheartening sign for him of waning U.S. support for Taiwan was the report issued by Randy Schriver's 2049 Institute, which had indicated that Taiwan defense planners should count on little American assistance. While Su agreed that Taiwan had to have the primary responsibility for defending itself, it was a bad sign when even long-time pro-Taiwan voices offered such a downbeat assessment of the U.S. commitment. Dalai Lama Visit Shows Limits of Crisis Management Capability -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) The visit of the Dalai Lama to Taiwan illustrated perfectly the need for cross-Strait mechanisms and structures that could prevent problems from becoming crises, Su observed. The invitation, issued by the opposition DPP party for purely POLITICAL reasons, came from out of the blue, he said. After deciding for humanitarian reasons to approve the trip (which Ma made, Su confided, over his objections),the President had only indirect channels to tell Beijing about the visit. Ma had to count on his own judgment, which had so far proven accurate, that Beijing would react with restraint, based on the goodwill built up over the past year. Such goodwill and good judgment were not a sufficient long-term basis, however, for handling cross-Strait problems, Su added. Emphasizing the vulnerability of Taiwan, Su said no matter how careful President Ma was, almost anything -- including mainland tourists getting into a bar brawl in Taiwan -- could lead to a crisis. STANTON