U.S. PARTNERSHIP MUST BALANCE CROSS-STRAIT TIES,

S E C R E T AIT TAIPEI 001074 STATE FOR D, EAP AND IO/TC; NSC FOR BADER E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV ETRD ECON EAIR SENV MARR MASS UNGA TW, CH, US SUBJECT: U.S. PARTNERSHIP MUST BALANCE CROSS-STRAIT TIES, PRESIDENT MA TELLS DIRECTOR IN INTRODUCTORY CALL REF: TAIPEI 1065 Classified By: The Director for reasons 1.4(b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Taiwan needed to balance improving cross-Strait ties with strengthened bilateral relations with the United States, President Ma told the Director on September 1. The United States also wanted to make progress on bilateral trade and other issues, the Director said, and hoped to consult closely as Taiwan engaged China. Ma confirmed the importance of U.S. arms sales, including 60 UH-1 helicopters, as originally requested. For political and practical commercial reasons, Ma said, Taipei would remain focused on economic issues in its engagement with China. Ma urged the United States to offer public support at this year's UNGA for Taiwan's non-confrontational efforts to secure meaningful participation in ICAO and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). End Summary. Taiwan Seeks Broad, "Balanced" Engagement -------------- ¶2. (C) Improvements in cross-Strait relations needed to be matched with concrete progress in U.S.-Taiwan ties, Ma Ying-jeou told the Director during his September 1 introductory call on the President. Ma briefly reviewed the status of his efforts to foster rapprochement with the PRC, noting that after 60 years regularly scheduled flights between Taiwan and the mainland had begun that same day (see septel for details)and were booked to near full capacity. ¶3. (C) Taiwan needed to balance this expansion of cross-Strait ties with improved relations with the United States, Japan, the EU and other major partners, Ma emphasized. His administration had already taken the essential first step, restoring mutual trust with the United States, he said. Ma expressed appreciation for U.S. assistance in the aftermath of Typhoon Morakot, citing it as an example of the kind of "balanced" engagement Taiwan hoped to achieve. The United States, Japan and other partners offered Taiwan a hand, as did China. All of this assistance was welcome and the robust U.S. contribution made it clear to everyone that America intended to remain engaged in the region. Both Sides Looking for Concrete Bilateral Progress -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Now, Ma said, Taiwan and the United States needed to 
focus on making concrete progress in substantive areas of the relationship. On the trade agenda, he asserted, the full reopening Taiwan's market to U.S. beef products was "essentially done." We NOW needed to make progress in areas such as extradition, visa waiver and resuming the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the longer-term goal of concluding an FTA. Taiwan also hoped to reestablish a tradition of high-level executive branch visits to Taiwan, Ma said. Beyond the substantive benefits that accrued from these contacts, they would help break Taiwan's isolation and reassure the people of Taiwan that the United States remained a committed partner. ¶5. (S) Based on his recent consultations in Washington, the Director said, it was clear that the United States also wanted to strengthen our relationship and advance the bilateral agenda with Taiwan. For example, he said, the U.S. interagency was actively reviewing the possibility of a bilateral extradition agreement. On beef, the Deputy Director noted that his meeting earlier in the day with Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs John Deng had made progress toward finally resolving U.S. concerns. On a possibly related issue, the Director said, U.S. policy allowed for visits to Taiwan by certain executive branch officials, including some at the cabinet-level, and Washington was considering if and when such a visit might be warranted. Ma: Taiwan Needs U.S. Arms, Including UH-1s -------------- ¶6. (S) Ma underscored the importance of the U.S.-Taiwan defense relationship, calling it the fundamental basis of Taiwan's security and of his engagement policy with China. Unfortunately, the President said, China's military build-up had eroded Taiwan's ability to defend itself. The U.S. government was well aware of its commitments under the TRA, the Director assured Ma, and had convened a small group of senior officials to consider carefully whether, how and when to approve the pending items left out of the October 2008 package. ¶7. (C) Ma noted that one of the pending items was a request for 60 UH-1 utility helicopters. In the wake of Typhoon Morakot, he had announced that Taiwan would only procure 45 of these helicopters and use the remaining funds to procure heavy lift helicopters for disaster relief. Subsequent research by the Ministry of National Defense had revealed, however, that the UH-1's lift capacity met Taiwan's requirements. In consequence, he said, Taiwan intended to acquire 60 UH-1s, as originally requested, of which 15 would be designated for civilian relief purposes unless required by the military. Cross-Strait: CBMs Take Back Seat to ECFA -------------- ¶8. (C) Turning to cross-Strait issues, the Director said the United States supported Ma's cross-Strait policy and welcomed his "no surprise" pledge. Going forward, however, Washington also wanted to better understand Taiwan's strategy, plans and ongoing contacts with the PRC, in order to be able to be more supportive of them. Washington had heard, for example, considerable public discussion of cross-Strait CBMs and was very interested in the prospects for progress in this area. ¶9. (C) Ma agreed that China was pushing to put political issues, including CBMs, on the cross-Strait agenda. For now, however, it was important to keep the focus on purely economic issues, the most urgent of which was the conclusion of an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Domestically, just engaging China economically was very divisive, he said, and it was far too early to discuss more sensitive military and political issues. From a practical economic perspective, Taiwan needed to conclude an ECFA with China before 2010, when a China-ASEAN FTA would otherwise make many Taiwan products unable to compete. His administration would be as transparent as possible during the negotiation process and would submit a final agreement for legislative approval, Ma said, to ensure that popular support would not falter. U.S. Role Key to ICAO, UNFCCC Participation -------------- ¶10. (C) China's best way to build political confidence would be to allow Taiwan to participate more meaningfully in international organizations, Ma said. As FM Ou had told the Director August 31 (reftel),Taiwan intended to use the upcoming UNGA to highlight its desire for increased access to ICAO and the UNFCCC. Unlike in the past, however, Taiwan would not have a motion introduced on its behalf. Instead, one or more of Taiwan's diplomatic allies would simply make a statement during a UNGA session. While the PRC would doubtless need to make a pro forma response, this approach was far less confrontational than seeking to have a Taiwan motion placed on the UNGA agenda. For domestic political reasons, Ma noted, his administration had to do something in New York or risk being accused by the opposition of sacrificing Taiwan's sovereignty. ¶11. (C) Last year, Ma continued, the USUN website statement supporting Taiwan's WHA observership bid played an important role in the breakthrough in that organization. Hopefully, Ma suggested, the United States would again issue a public response that would take into account Taiwan's less confrontational approach and play an equally helpful role in supporting ICAO and UNFCCC participation. The Director noted the key role these organizations played on issues of common importance and reaffirmed U.S. policy in support of Taiwan's ability to participate meaningfully in them. STANTON