SOMALIA: PM SHARMARKE VISITS ADDIS ABABA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000907 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2019 TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO PINR SO ET SUBJECT: SOMALIA: PM SHARMARKE VISITS ADDIS ABABA REF: NAIROBI 773 Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C/NF) Summary. Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, during his first visit to Ethiopia since assuming office, told the Ambassador on April 17 that his message to the Ethiopian government was that he wanted to work with them, and that he intended to ask for their political and security support. PM Sharmarke was joined by Deputy Prime Minister Sharif Hassan. Sharmarke also planned to ask Ethiopia to cease its military support to non-TFG groups in Somalia, and instead channel that support through the TFG. Sharmarke argued that U.S. air strikes inside Somalia were not a deterrent to the extremists, but instead created more enemies. He asked for direct support from Washington for the TFG's Joint Security Forces, noting that Washington's support had been too indirect. Sharmarke expected that the nominal adoption of Shari'a Law by the TFG would improve domestic support for his government and undermine the extremists. He thought that reconciliation with Muktar Robow and Hassan Dahir Aweys would be useful in fighting the extremists, but both Sharmarke and Sharif Hassan were skeptical that Aweys could be accommodated while he remained "controlled" by Asmara. Hassan respectfully disagreed with Sharmarke on the broader question of negotiating now, and said it was too soon to reconcile with Robow and Aweys, rather the TFG should wait until it was in a position of strength or the negotiations would be too difficult. Sharmarke advised that it would be easier for the TFG if the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) kept a lower profile and did not publicly advertise its force strength, and he suggested that AMISOM adopt some humanitarian activities to make the force more appealing to the Somali public. Lastly, Sharmarke said the TFG was ready to fight piracy if given the resources by the international community. End Summary. Sharmarke's Message to Ethiopia -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) Sharmarke, who was visiting Addis Ababa at the official invitation of the Ethiopian government, said he recognized that the security of Ethiopia and Somalia were intertwined, and that he wanted to establish an "understanding" on the issue with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles. Specifically, he wanted to ask Meles for political and security support for the TFG. As part of the political support, Sharmarke intended to ask Meles, as current chairman of the InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD),to mobilize IGAD to provide real political and security support to the TFG, and Sharmarke was looking for an IGAD-led initiative to form a regional strategy to combat piracy. ¶3. (C/NF) Sharmarke also intended to raise the issue of Ethiopia's military support to other groups in Somalia, including Al-Sunnah Wal Jama (ASWJ),who Sharmarke feared might become a challenger to the TFG. Sharmarke's position was that any support to Somalia from Ethiopia, should be channeled to the TFG, and to no one else. He said he planned to ask "the Sufis" (i.e. ASWJ) to support the TFG. Sharmarke: "U.S. Air Strikes Not a Deterrent" -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) On the question of whether U.S. air strikes in Somalia were a help or hindrance to the TFG, Sharmarke responded that the air strikes were not a deterrent, and that "those who died in the strikes produced a thousand more (fighters)." He said foreign fighters keep coming to Somalia regardless of U.S. actions. Rather, Sharmarke noted, Somalia needs to come up with its own solution to Somalia's "homegrown" problems with support from international community directly to the TFG. Plea for Support for TFG Security Forces -------------- ¶5. (C/NF) Time was not on the TFG's side, Sharmarke insisted, stating that Washington's support to move forward and stand up the Joint Security Force was needed now. He admitted that formation of the JSF was lagging, but insisted his government was ready to act now by mobilizing the necessary forces. He said "everyone" in Somalia wanted to ADDIS ABAB 00000907 002 OF 003 see the TFG collapse so they could take power. He predicted that the TFG could deal with the opposition with more direct support from Washington. He said Washington had been too indirect in its financial support. Sharmarke complained that many countries were training Somali security forces, and then "dumping" them in Somalia without weapons or salary, prompting the forces to desert. He said direct support from Washington would help rectify this issue. On the Adoption of Shari'a Law -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) Sharmarke predicted that the TFG parliament would approve the adoption of Shari'a law within a few days, and that this act would "turn the table" on the opposition. He said the opposition would no longer have justification to continue to oppose the TFG, and he expected that the TFG would gain public support as a result. He noted that the type of Shari'a to be instituted had yet to be determined, but he pledged that it would be a moderate form acceptable to the international community. (Note: The parliament adopted Shari'a law on April 18, see Reftel. End Note) Reconciliation with Muktar Robow and Hassan Dahir Aweys? -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) When queried whether it was advisable for the TFG to reconcile with Muktar Robow and Hassan Dahir Aweys, Sharkmarke and Sharif Hassan had different perspectives. Sharmarke thought that "it might be wise" if they were "lured into accommodation," where they would serve as a useful source of information to use against the opposition. Sharmarke added, however, that at present there was no direct official communication between the TFG and the two leaders. Hassan, speaking through an interpreter, thought that it was too early for reconciliation. He said that the TFG should wait until it built up its security forces when it could negotiate from a position of strength. Otherwise, he said, the demands from the opposition leaders would be too great and negotiations would be too difficult. Hassan said it was clear that Robow's and Aweys' true desires were "to rule" and "to overtake us." Hassan noted that Aweys was controlled by Asmara and not free to talk. He said if Aweys became independent talks might be possible, but he still believed that Aweys would never stop maneuvering until Aweys became president. Sharmarke: "AMISOM Should Keep a Low Profile" -------------- ¶8. (C/NF) Sharmarke and Hassan affirmed their continued support to the deployment of AMISOM peacekeepers to Mogadishu, but Sharmarke advised that it would be better if AMISOM did not publicly announce its deployment activity. He criticized the AU for making public statements apparently "to please the donors." He said AMISOM was welcome to come into Somalia and increase the number of its forces, but said no one in Somalia needs to know the exact number of troops. He explained that the situation in Mogadishu right now regarding AMISOM was "boiling," and it would better if AMISOM kept a low profile. ¶9. (C/NF) Both Sharmarke and Hassan thought that AMISOM's standing in Somalia would improve if the force also engaged in some type of humanitarian activity such as building hospitals or schools to show the people that there was a direct benefit to AMISOM's presence in Mogadishu. Sharmarke acknowledged that AMISOM did not have the budget for such activity, but suggested that the international community could provide the funding. ¶10. (C/NF) Sharmarke revealed that he was having a difficult time managing the AMISOM issue, and advised Washington to not read too much into his public statements to Somalis regarding AMISOM's future. He said he was having to parse his words in public to calm the controversy raised when the TFG foreign minister told the UN Security Council on March 20 that the TFG wanted additional AMISOM troops. (Note: The foreign minister's March 20 statement was controversial because it appeared to contravene the declaration by the Somali Islamic Clerics Council, not a part of the TFG, that AMISOM should leave Somalia within 120 days from March 1. End Note.) Sharmarke asserted that he could manage the declaration by the Council. He said he had ADDIS ABAB 00000907 003 OF 003 explained to the Council, and to the Somali public, that the government would decide AMISOM's fate, and no one else. TFG Ready to Combat Piracy With Support -------------- ¶11. (C/NF) The TFG was ready to fight piracy, if the international community were to provide the funding to build up the TFG's security forces, Sharmarke said. He estimated that with 10 percent of the cost of one of the warships now patrolling off Somalia, the TFG could disrupt piracy from the land (Note: This is an argument we've also heard from senior Somaliland and Puntland officials. End Note). He said the TFG was working on a concept paper on a plan to fight piracy that he intended to submit to Washington when it is ready. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C/NF) Our conversations with senior Ethiopian government officials suggest that they have little confidence in the ability of PM Sharmarke to right Somalia's wrongs; nevertheless, by all indications they are making a good-faith effort not to directly undermine the TFG. Prime Minister Meles appears willing to provide political and material support to the TFG as long as the TFG does not cross Ethiopia's redlines, the foremost of which would be TFG support to Ethiopia's enemies. Post also recognizes that Ethiopia's support to ASWJ and other anti-extremist militias risks undercutting the TFG, and will continue to raise the issue with senior Ethiopian officials as appropriate. TFG reconciliation with Aweys appears to be another redline for Meles. Ethiopian MFA officials at multiple levels continue to press EmbOffs for Washington's view on the issue, and they fear that Washington will give TFG President Sheikh Sharif a green light for reconciliation. End Comment. YAMAMOTO