USAU: STATUS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL PROJECT FOR

UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 000754


STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AND PM

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MOPS MARR SO UG BU
SUBJECT: USAU: STATUS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL PROJECT FOR
AFRICAN UNION

REF: 08 ADDIS ABABA 1718


1. Summary: USAU held a C3IS workshop on Feb. 25-27 to revive
the U.S. commitment to the African Union (AU) for a
communications package for the African continent's African
Standby Force (ASF) program. The meeting brought together
civilian and military communication experts from the AU, UN,
U.S. and the EU, as well as members from the AU's Peace and
Security Commission and Infrastructure and Communications
divisions. Among the key recommendations from the workshop
are to provide immediate relief for the current
communications challenge faced by the AU's mission in
Somalia, and to begin to create a 24-hour operation center
for the AU's Peace and Security Operations Division. End
Summary.

Background
--------------


2. As a result of a September 2005 G-8 meeting at the AU, the
USG and the AU entered into an historical agreement to
substantially upgrade the integration and communications
capacity of the AU in executing the AU's "Roadmap for the
Establishment of the African Standby Force." From this, the
U.S. Department of State agreed to support a Command,
Control, and Communication Information System to provide a
High Frequency (HF) radio voice network, with a follow-on
Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) capability, to facilitate
interoperability and information sharing between the AU, the
three Regional Economic Communities (RECs),and two Regional
Mechanisms (RMs) and the ASF Brigade headquarters. This
system would link, via voice, data, and fax: (i) the AU
headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; (ii) the five
headquarters of the regional ASF brigades; (iii) their
subordinate units; and (iv) the proposed depot facility. The
backdrop of this program was to support regional peacekeeping
and counter-narcotics efforts through Global Peace Operations
Initiative (GPOI) funding.


3. The AU C3IS project, originally envisioned as critical to
support the ASF, has languished for four years. As a result,
the AU still does not have the C3IS architecture in place.
Between contract award in 2005 and 2008 there have been many
missteps, miscalculations, misunderstandings, and a general
lack of effective communication between and among the USG,
its contractors and the AU. The workshop was held to review
the status of the existing project as well as the U.S.
commitment to the project.

Current Situation and Proposed Look Forward
--------------


4. Currently the AU does not have equipment to monitor data
and control access to sensitive data. It cannot communicate
in real time with deployed forces or effectively with
regional ASF headquarters. AU Peace and Security Operations
Division (PSOD)/ASF is not able to guarantee reliable
communications among ASF commanders during crisis situations.
An example of this is the recent Vehicle-born Improvised
Explosive Device in February 2009 at the AMISOM Burundi base
in Mogadishu which left 11 soldiers dead. The PSOD head was
not able to get real time information from his commander on
the ground due to lack of communications. Currently,
PSOD/ASF forces in Mogadishu use the open web and calling
cards on cell phones when coverage is available to
communicate. This allows anyone, including the enemy, to
obtain information about battlefield activity. Lastly, there
is no dedicated maintenance and support for any
communications gear.


5. The workshop's findings were as follows: First, C3IS
should be refocused to the PSOD. In crisis situations, PSOD
cannot compete with other entities for access to scarce
network resources. A dedicated network for operations
support is required. Second, PSOD needs a robust system with
increased availability, security, and quality of service.
PSOD must be able to trust, and rely on, system performance
during operational missions. Third, PSOD should have
ownership and discretionary access control of the network and
data. This is to ensure control over sensitive data
involving operations and to prevent others access to
information they do not need to know. Fourth, C3IS Node
locations should be at the PSOD level, which includes the ASF
headquarters and Continental Logistics Base; the three RECs
(including ECOWAS, ECCAS, and SADC),and the two RMs
(including NARC and EASBRICOM),along with their regional
planning elements and logistics depot in each of the five
regions mentioned; and brigade level headquarters and field
mission headquarters for civilian, police, and military.


6. In addition to the longer term recommendations outlined in
para 5, participants made the following recommendations for
immediate relief for the current communication challenges:
First, complete the current VSAT installation in Mogadishu.
VSAT is designed to create a direct, reliable, and secure
connection, through satellite links, between personnel in the
field and the AU's 24-hour situation room. It is capable of
linking field officers to AU staff both by e-mail and Voice
Over Internet Protocol, expanding and increasing the speed of
real-time communication, coordination, and reporting.
Second, establish a basic PSOD operations center which could
be as simple as a dedicated small office or container with
electrical, internet, phone, and fax capability. Third,
utilize the computers and associated non-ITAR restricted
equipment from the already provided C3IS equipment that was
procured from the initial program. Fourth, leverage existing
AU capabilities for RECs, RMs, and AMISOM. Fifth, acquire at
least one satellite phone so that the PSOD can have some
reliable communications going forward with the AMISOM
commander.


7. Finally, it was agreed that the way forward includes:
Presenting the recommendations to the USAU Ambassador and the
AU hierarchy for understanding and agreement; revising the
MOU between the U.S. and the AU; developing a network policy
for PSOD/ASF system; obtaining dedicated resources, including
personnel for operations, maintenance, and training;
establishing a dedicated PSOD Network Operations Center with
basic initial capability and enhancing it to full capability
(i.e. secure voice, internet, fax); establishing a PSOD C3I
Network Operations Center with full capability; extending the
capability of the PSOD C3IS to the RECs and the RMs.


YAMAMOTO