USAU: AFRICA COMMAND DEPUTY MEETS ETHIOPIAN PRIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000732 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E, AF/SPG, AF/S, AF/W AND AF/C E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL AU SUBJECT: USAU: AFRICA COMMAND DEPUTY MEETS ETHIOPIAN PRIME MINISTER Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Mary Yates, Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA) at Africa Command, met on March 25 with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Their discussions covered a range of security issues including Somalia, Sudan, and Eritrea, as well as the command's fledgling military relationship with Libya. Yates was accompanied by Ambassador Yamamoto and the RDML Kurta, Commander of CJTF-HOA. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Following an exchange of pleasantries, DCMA Yates thanked Prime Minister Meles for Ethiopia's support to US Africa Command and its partnership in the war on terror. She stated that the command is maturing, but that it remains committed to listening and learning from its African partners. Meles responded with accolades for US military cooperation in general, noting specifically that relations with Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) are excellent. DCMA Yates informed Meles that policy reviews within the new Administration are under way. Meles responded that he assumes USG policy vis-a-vis Ethiopia will remain unchanged. Somalia: A Tale of Two Regions -------------- ¶3. (C) Meles then embarked on a tour d'horizon of Africa's horn, beginning with the "key challenge" of Somalia. He explained to DCMA Yates that when assessing the current situation it is helpful to divide Somalia in half. The northern half is largely stable and development is ongoing. Puntland has an "open-minded leadership," and the "older generation of leaders is out of circulation." The new leadership is eager to stabilize, but its main challenge is piracy which threatens to negatively effect the political balance of power in Puntland. Meles reported that the Puntland government seeks to partner with others in the region to address piracy. (Note: Per Meles, Puntlanders generally appreciate international counter-piracy efforts, but remain skeptical of some Asian navies who may be more focused on the protection of illegal fishing, which was essentially the root cause of Puntland's piracy challenge. Meles reported that Puntland would like to see more balance in naval operations, with coalition partners addressing illegal fishing as well as piracy.) ¶4. (C) Meles characterized Somaliland as generally stable for over a decade. He noted that while upcoming elections may cause tension, they probably would not destabilize Somaliland. The Prime Minister claimed that the Somaliland government is "scaling back its expectations" for international recognition, and is now seeking status as a civil administration authority vice an independent state. ¶5. (C) Meles described the situation in southern Somalia as "mixed." Baidoa is now less stable, with al-Shabaab in control of towns in this area. He reported that the "middle Somalia group" and some Baidoa clans are fighting Shabaab in this region, but with limited effectiveness. Mogadishu is less stable than Ethiopia would like. He also said that he was worried by the new government's overtures to some Islamist elements, saying that it "is not making as clear a distinction as we'd like." ¶6. (C) The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is likely to experience increased "polarization," Meles predicted. The big threat to the TFG is not ideological, but rather financial. Some of the warlords in Sheikh Sharif's government are trying to recover airports and sea ports. Per Meles, Sharif has no prospect of imposing central control over Somaliland and Puntland, but if he can maintain the cohesion of his clan in Mogadishu then the best case scenario is that Sharif will confine al-Shabaab to the southern fringes of Somalia. ¶7. (C) Meles opined that central governance will eschew Somalia for at least the next decade or two, suggesting that the international community must learn to deal with the de facto states within Somalia. "There is lots of room for pragmatism here," said Meles. Failure to acknowledge the de facto divisions puts the stable parts of Somalia at risk. ADDIS ABAB 00000732 002 OF 003 Somaliland in not sovereign but it is a self-administrating region and should be able to engage in business. The Prime Minister noted the challenges to development and stability in this region if foreign investors are unable to get insurance. Meles argued that Somaliland deserves some credit for 18 years of stability, for its efforts in fighting terrorism, and for the fact that it has avoided the piracy problem that is plaguing the rest of Somalia. ¶8. (C) On the extremists in Mogadishu, Meles estimated that there are no more than a few hundred "hard core Shabaabs," but warned that he has indications that foreign fighters are beginning to take leadership positions within the group. Meles believes that Osama bin Laden's recent declaration encourages the extremist elements within al-Shabaab. ¶9. (C) The African Union's Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) "has held on better than we feared," said Meles. He stated that while the peacekeepers had not been challenged like the Ethiopians anticipated, AMISOM might need to be reinforced at some point. Meles noted that al-Shabaab is currently focused on fighting clansmen in Somalia's middle belt, but may eventually reorganize and shift its effort to AMISOM. Somber on Sudan -------------- ¶10. (C) Shifting gears, Meles painted a pessimistic picture of Sudan. He characterized the 2009 elections as a "sideshow" and "irrelevant," and said that all sides are preparing for the referendum on secession in 2011. Meles said the 2009 elections were to have "cemented marginalized areas of Sudan, but this vision died even before Garang." The elections are now redundant and the focus of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement is no longer on rebuilding Sudan, but rather on the establishment of an independent South Sudan. In West-Central Sudan, the defining issue is the arrest warrant of President Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC). ¶11. (C) Given current trends, and absent a major transforming event, Meles predicted "generalized conflict" in Sudan. Khartoum is preparing to rekindle tribal conflict in the south using the southern militia. Oil revenues will fuel the fighting. Darfur will not be resolved by 2011, and therefore the North-South conflict will find its way to Western Sudan and may eventually engulf the entire country. Evoking memories of the Mahdi, Meles suggested that Sudan may eventually be worse than Somalia. On Eritrea -------------- ¶12. (C) Meles stated that the Sudan-Eritrea relationship has changed over the past three years. Initially, it was Prime Minister Isaias "blackmailing" Bashir, but Eritrea is now much more dependent on Khartoum. Meles claimed that Bashir is "feeding Eritrea's army" and transmitted reports of famine, desertion, and population displacement from the highlands. Meles admitted his sources might be prone to exaggeration, but said that only the scope of these problems remain in question. Eritrea, Meles warned, may catch us by surprise. ¶13. (C) When queried about Bashir's recent visit to Eritrea, Meles stated that it was a matter of Isaias trying to show Bashir that he was the most strident in defying the ICC, and Bashir being generous in response. Meles suggested that Bashir miscalculated in his first foreign travel since the ICC warrant, and said it would have been wiser for Bashir to travel to Cairo first. The Guide, and AFRICOM's Overtures to Libya -------------- ¶14. (C) After being informed by DCMA Yates of the Africa Command's fledgling military cooperation with Libya, Meles congratulated the command's efforts and indicated that there was great potential in pursuing this relationship. Meles said that only the US could have a military relationship with Libya that would meet Qadhafi's expectations. Working at a lower level may be more effective, however, given the Guide's ADDIS ABAB 00000732 003 OF 003 idiosyncrasies. ¶15. (C) Qadhafi, in Meles' estimation, is no longer a terrorist or prone to adventurism. His idiosyncrasies include his belief that Saudi Arabia should be divided into three states and his penchant to involve himself in all of Africa's conflicts usually with negative results. That said, Meles suggested that the USG might be able to help Qadhafi outgrow his idiosyncrasies. ¶16. (C) Ambassador Yates has cleared this message. YAMAMOTO