SOMALIA: TFG SECURITY OFFICIALS VISIT ADDIS ABABA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000653 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019 TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET SUBJECT: SOMALIA: TFG SECURITY OFFICIALS VISIT ADDIS ABABA REF: NAIROBI 479 Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary. Somalia unity Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Minister of Internal Security Affairs Omar Hashi Aden, National Police Chief Abdi Qeybdiid, and General Mohamed Sheikh Hassan, likely to be the next TFG National Intelligence Chief, told the Ambassador on March 6 that the TFG needed financial assistance from Washington as soon as possible, particularly for the Joint Security Force. The three officials also said that President Sheikh Sharif's government was fully committed to the continued deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping force. In a separate meeting on March 7, General Mohamed told PolOff that a council of non-Somali clerics who had recently visited Mogadishu were pressuring Sharif to adopt a true cleric-led Islamic state, but that Sharif was doing his best to resist their pressure. Mohamed said Sharif was using Qeybdiid and his forces for now because Sharif needed them, but Sharif planned to replace Qeybdiid as soon as Sharif was strong enough to stand on his own. Mohamed disclosed that the three officials met with Ethiopian Military Chief of Defense (CHOD) General Samora on March 5, and that Samora promised not to take action against Sharif as long as Sharif did not support anti-Ethiopian activities within his government. Finally, Mohamed pleaded again for U.S. assistance to the TFG's security forces to defeat al-Shabaab and Hisb Islam. The three Somali officials were in Addis Ababa at the invitation of the InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to attend a graduation ceremony for Somali police cadets who had just completed an IGAD training course. End Summary. Hashi: "We need American Support" -------------- ¶2. (C) Hashi began the meeting by providing a highly optimistic assessment of conditions within Somalia, but then noted that it was critical that the international community, and most importantly the United States, provide resources to sustain the government. Hashi queried about the USD 5 million he said he had been promised, noting that the money was long overdue (Reftel). The Ambassador responded that Washington needed more information from the officials, including force structure and commander's names, so that the Joint Security Force could be vetted in accordance with U.S. requirements. Hashi and Qeybdiid said that providing the information was not a problem, but Hashi suggested that Washington talk to the Gulf states about providing funding that "did not have strings attached." Hashi joked that if he waited for Washington's vetting, "the commanders will all have died before they were cleared." Officials: "We Support AMISOM" -------------- ¶3. (C) At the Ambassador's urging, the three officials said that they were in full support of AMISOM, and that they wanted the force to remain in Somalia. Hashi said that the reason Sharif was going to visit Burundi and other regional capitals was to convince those governments that Sharif wanted AMISOM to continue and to request additional troops. The Ambassador recommended that TFG officials show more public support for the peacekeepers inside Somalia to the Somali population. He emphasized that AMISOM's purpose was to support the TFG, and that it was in their interest to back the deployment. International Clerics Pressuring Sharif -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) In a separate and somewhat more candid meeting on March 7, General Mohamed told PolOff that the committee of non-Somali international clerics who were attempting to negotiate between the unity TFG and the opposition were also pressuring Sheikh Sharif to establish what the clerics considered to be a true Islamic state ruled only by Sharia law which would replace the TFG. According to Mohamed, the clerics told Sharif that he should take the following steps. First, the Islamic Courts should be restored. Second, a committee of Somali clerics should be established to oversee the implementation of Sharia law. Third, a committee should ADDIS ABAB 00000653 002 OF 003 be established to draft a new charter and constitution that would comply with Sharia and replace the TFG Charter. Fourth, the TFG parliament should be dissolved within six months. Fifth, Sharif should call for an election to approve the new government. Sixth, AMISOM should be withdrawn from Somalia as soon as possible. ¶5. (S/NF) Mohamed said Sharif was attempting to resist this pressure, but it was a "tug of war," and these were people Sharif could not simply ignore. Mohamed criticized the non-Somali international clerics, commenting that "who were these foreigners to tell us, the Somalis, what to do in our country?" He said if these clerics wanted to form such an Islamic state, then they should do so in their own countries like Qatar, Yemen, and U.A.E." He said Somalia would not be the "lab rat" for Islamic experiments. He noted that the Union of Islamic Courts tried that in 2006, and it failed. Mohamed: "Qeybdiid Useful for Now" -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) Mohamed, commenting on the previous day's meeting between the Ambassador, Omar Hashi, and Qeybdiid, said Sharif needed Qeybdiid's forces for now to counter al-Shabaab and Hisb Islam in Mogadishu. Mohammed said that during the early March fighting in Mogadishu, it was Qeybdiid's troops who did most of the fighting against the opposition. Mohammed said Sharif instructed his allied ARS and Islamic Courts militias to stay out of the fight because some of those militias were already hesitant to fight their former allies in al-Shabaab and Hisb Islam. Mohamed predicted that Sharif would remove Qeybdiid when Sharif was strong enough to stand on his own. Readout of First Meeting with ENDF General Samora -------------- -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) Mohamed said that he, Hashi, and Qeybdiid met with Ethiopian CHOD General Samora on March 5 for the first time, but that the meeting was an uneasy one. He said Samora took a hard line with them, criticizing them for confiscating equipment Ethiopia left behind in Mogadishu intended for the non-ARS wing of the unity TFG. Samora's message to the Somalis was that Ethiopia would not take action against Sharif's government as long as Sharif did not tolerate anti-Ethiopian activities within his government, according to Mohamed. In response, Hashi told Samora that Sharif wanted good relations with all his neighbors, and in particular with Ethiopia, and promised to take no action against Ethiopia, Mohammed said. (Note: According to TFG Ambassador Abdi Karin Farah, the Ethiopian government was initially opposed to meeting with the officials because they were in Ethiopia at IGAD's invitation rather than at Ethiopia's request. End Note.) Another Plea for Washington's Assistance -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) Mohamed, in anticipation of being named by Sharif to replace Mohamed Warsame Darwish as head of the National Intelligence Service, raised the issue of support from Washington for the TFG's security services, emphasizing that support was critical to establish an effective government. PolOff responded that Washington was looking at providing some level of support to the Joint Security Force, but emphasized the importance of transparency within the TFG's security structure. PolOff explained U.S. vetting requirements, and reiterated that the TFG needed to provide details, including names, before assistance could be approved. Mohamed said he understood, and promised to convey to Sharif that Sharif needed to appoint "clean" commanders to the security services. Comment -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) It is notable that Hashi and Mohamed were traveling with Qeybdiid, their former enemy, and it is probably an indicator of Sharif's weakness that he needs to rely on Qeybdiid, who stands for everything Sharif has been fighting against for the last several years. Hashi and Mohammed are close advisors to Sharif, and former leaders in the Union of Islamic Courts. Qeybdiid served in Siad Barre's government, the Transitional National Government (TNG),and ADDIS ABAB 00000653 003 OF 003 the TFG under former President Abdullahi Yusuf. He is also an infamous warlord accused of corruption and gross human rights violations who was captured and held by U.S. forces for several months in 1993 while he was a key lieutenant of Mohammed Farah Aideed. End Comment. YAMAMOTO