Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ADDISABABA500
2009-03-03 04:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:
SOMALIA: ANECDOTES FROM A TFG INSIDER
how-toVZCZCXRO7421 PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO DE RUEHDS #0500/01 0620451 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 030451Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3933 INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 7760 RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEPADJ/CJTF HOA PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000500
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: ANECDOTES FROM A TFG INSIDER
Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000500
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: ANECDOTES FROM A TFG INSIDER
Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (C/NF) Summary. Former Somalia Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) Ambassador to Ethiopia Abdul Karin Farah
told PolOff on February 26 that TFG President Sheikh Sharif
Ahmed intended to reinstate Farah as the TFG's ambassador to
Ethiopia as soon as possible. (Note: Farah was the TFG
Ambassador to Ethiopia for several years before being
replaced by a relative of former President Yusuf in 2007.
End Note.) Farah, who was in Djibouti with Sharif during the
election for president, said Sharif's enemies were painting
Sharif as a U.S. puppet, and that the perception was
undermining Sharif's ability to gain support in Somalia. He
said Sharif had made a critical mistake when he returned to
Mogadishu after being elected president by facilitating an
assembly of Somali clerics who consequently issued a
declaration calling for the withdrawal of the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),and the establishment of Islamic
law. Farah claimed Sharif was boxed in by Islamic
hard-liners, and that if the international community did not
come to Sharif's aid, Sharif would have no choice but to
accommodate the hard-liners including possibly, Hassan Dahir
Aweys, Muktar Robow, and Hassan al-Turki who, Farah said,
were hoping eventually to takeover the TFG in order to appear
"legitimate" in the eyes of the international community.
Farah alleged that now Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Finance Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden was the "kingmaker" and was
manipulating Sharif for Hassan's own purposes. Farah noted
that Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles told Sharif in a meeting
on the margins of the early February AU Summit that Ethiopia
would not move against Sharif as long as Sharif did not
support anti-Ethiopian activities. Farah stated that Iranian
President Ahmadinejad, in a February 24 meeting in Djibouti
with TFG Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke,
invited Sharif to Tehran, in secret if necessary, for
consultations. End Summary.
Sharif Being Painted as a US Puppet
--------------
2. (C/NF) Farah said that Sharif's enemies were spreading
the notion that Sharif was a puppet of the United States as a
way to undermine his credibility within Somalia. As a result
it had become the general belief in Somalia that Washington
hand-picked Sharif. Farah insisted that this belief was
undermining Sharif's ability to build support. At the same
time, many Somalis were unsure of where PM Sharmarke stood
with the United States because it was the general view that
Sharmarke was rejected by Washington when former President
Yusuf tried to appoint Sharmarke to be the TFG Ambassador to
the United States.
3. (C/NF) In reality, Farah said, Sharif did not know where
he stood with Washington. He said that US officials had
given considerable advice to Sharif on what he should and
should not do, but Sharif did not understand whether he truly
had Washington's support. Farah said Sharmarke was in the
same position, and was unsure of where to go with the United
States.
Sharif's First Mistake as President?
--------------
4. (C/NF) Farah asserted that Sharif's first mistake as
President occurred when he returned to Mogadishu and called a
meeting of Somali clerics together with the hope that the
assembly would come out in support of Sharif's government,
but instead the group issued a declaration in mid-February
with elements that will be difficult for Sharif to implement.
The declaration covered a spectrum of issues, but included a
call that AMISOM withdraw from Somalia within 120 days, that
the country be governed by Islamic law, and that the
"anti-Islamic laws" within the TFG charter be changed.
Sharif Boxed in by Hard-liners?
--------------
5. (C/NF) Farah claimed that the "hard-liners" were
"sitting on Sharif's shoulder," and that if the international
community did not come quickly to assist the TFG Sharif would
have no choice but to succumb to the hard-liner's demands.
Farah expected a number of prominent opposition leaders to
come into the TFG in some form, including Muktar Robow,
ADDIS ABAB 00000500 002 OF 003
Hassan Dahir Aweys, and Hassan al-Turki. Farah believed that
it was the plan of the opposition members to seek
accommodation with the TFG in order to get out from under the
"terrorist" stigma, eventually take-over the TFG and then
stand in front of the international community as part of the
"legitimate" government of Somalia.
Sharif Hassan the Kingmaker?
--------------
6. (C/NF) Farah referred to Sharif Hassan as the
"kingmaker," and alleged that Hassan was manipulating Sharif,
who Farah considered to be "naive" and "inexperienced," for
Hassan's own purposes. Farah said that Sharif and Hassan had
already decided that Hassan would be deputy prime minister,
and therefore, Hassan did not want the prime minister to be
powerful enough to either exclude Hassan from decisionmaking
or access to Sharif. For example, Hassan was behind the pick
of Sharmarke as Prime Minister. Farah said that Sharif had
originally planned to name Dr. Abdirizak Osman Hassan
"Jurile," a Somali politician since the Siad Barre days, as
prime minister until Hassan made the case that Jurile would
be too hard to control and would run circles around Sharif.
Instead, Hassan picked Sharmarke who Hassan thought would be
easier to control, and who had the added benefit of being
acceptable to the international community. Farah said Hassan
was now putting Hassan's own people, including relatives,
around Sharmarke to keep him contained, and to monitor
Sharmarke's activities.
7. (C/NF) According to Farah, Hassan was also heavily
involved in the selection of the cabinet. In Sharif's first
meeting with Sharmarke in Djibouti, Farah said Sharif told
Sharmarke that he did not want problems between the president
and prime minister as had been the case with former President
Yusuf and former Prime Ministers Gedi and Nur Adde. Sharif
also told Sharmarke that Sharif did not want to be involved
in the selection of the cabinet because he did not want
Sharmarke to complain that people he did not trust had been
forced on him by Sharif. Sharmarke protested noting that
because he had never spent much time in Somalia, and did not
know the political landscape, particularly among the ARS,
that he would need help in the selection process. As a
result, Sharif brought Hassan in to assist Sharmarke in
picking the members, but eventually Sharif himself became
directly involved in the process.
Regarding Sharif's Cabinet
--------------
8. (C/NF) Sharif, who is a Hawiye/Abgal, did not name a
single Abgal to his cabinet, according to Farah, who said
that the Abgal clan was now increasingly unhappy, and asking
Sharif "are we nothing?" Instead Sharif gave the
Hawiye/Habir Gedir four positions to try to appease them.
Negotiations were ongoing to find a way to address the Abgal
concerns and to give them additional positions. Farah also
said that the Darood/Marehan were also angry with the their
representation in the cabinet, and that two Marehan
appointees refused to take their positions in protest.
9. (C/NF) Farah said Sharif appointed Abdulkadir Ali Omar,
a former Union of Islamic Courts leader, as Minister of the
Interior because he had one of the largest and most powerful
militias in Mogadishu upon which Sharif relied for
protection. Farah said Sharif did not trust Abdulkadir, but
really had no choice. Sharif hoped eventually to separate
Abdulkadir from his militia as the government became more
formalized. Farah also said that there was an internal
battle going on between Abdulkadir and the Minister of
Security Omar Hashi Aden over who would control the police.
Sharif did not want Abdulkadir to control the police because
it would put too much power in Abdulkadir's hands. Farah
expect this issue to take some weeks to be resolved.
Ethiopia's Message to Sheikh Sharif
--------------
10. (C/NF) Farah said he attended the meeting between
Sheikh Sharif and Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles during the
February 1-3 AU Summit, Sharif's first meeting with the
Ethiopian government since being elected president.
According to Farah, Meles told Sharif that Ethiopia would
ADDIS ABAB 00000500 003 OF 003
support him, and would not "send a single soldier or ship a
single bullet across the border intended for you (Sharif) as
long as you maintain the security of Somalia within Somalia,"
and did not support anti-Ethiopian activities. Farah said
Sharif agreed to this and that the meeting had gone well.
Privately, however, Farah said the Ethiopians were not happy
because they anticipate that Sharif will not be able to live
up to his promise, and that sooner or later, Sharif would
have no choice but to accommodate Ethiopia's enemies.
More Resistance to Sheikh Sharif
--------------
11. (C/NF) Farah noted that Mohammed Said Hersi Morgan, aka
"General Morgan" a son-in-law of former President Siad Barre,
and Meslah Mohammed Siad Barre, son of Siad Barre, were
currently in Addis Ababa conspiring to form a coalition
against Sheikh Sharif and the TFG. However, he said they
would be leaving soon at Prime Minister Meles' request
because, although Meles did not care about their anti-Sharif
activities, he did not want them conducting those activities
within Ethiopia.
Sharmarke's Conversation with Iranian President Ahmadinejad
-------------- --------------
12. (C/NF) Farah said that Ahmadinejad, in a February 24
meeting in Djibouti with PM Sharmarke, invited Sharif to
Tehran for consultations. Ahmadinejad offered to send a
plane to fly Sharif to Iran in secret if that was Sharif's
wish. Farah said Sharmarke agreed to relay the invitation to
Sharif, but privately Sharmarke intended to warn Sharif that
going to Tehran was a bad idea. PolOff reinforced that a
visit to Tehran by Sharif, secret or not, would not be viewed
well by Washington.
Comment
--------------
13. (C/NF) Farah's readout of the Meles-Sharif meeting is
consistent with other reports of the meeting, and we believe
it accurately reflects Ethiopia's position that as long as
Sharif does not support anti-Ethiopian activities, Meles will
tolerate Sharif. Our recent conversations with senior
Ethiopian officials also suggest that the Ethiopians are not
optimistic that Sharif will be able to deliver on his
promises. State Minister for Foreign Affairs Tekeda told
EmbOffs on February 19 that he feared Sharif would eventually
have no choice but to "go over to those on the other side of
the barricade." Post will make it clear to interlocutors we
meet in Addis Ababa that Washington does not want to see a
Union of Islamic Courts II under the banner of the TFG. End
Comment.
YAMAMOTO
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: ANECDOTES FROM A TFG INSIDER
Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (C/NF) Summary. Former Somalia Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) Ambassador to Ethiopia Abdul Karin Farah
told PolOff on February 26 that TFG President Sheikh Sharif
Ahmed intended to reinstate Farah as the TFG's ambassador to
Ethiopia as soon as possible. (Note: Farah was the TFG
Ambassador to Ethiopia for several years before being
replaced by a relative of former President Yusuf in 2007.
End Note.) Farah, who was in Djibouti with Sharif during the
election for president, said Sharif's enemies were painting
Sharif as a U.S. puppet, and that the perception was
undermining Sharif's ability to gain support in Somalia. He
said Sharif had made a critical mistake when he returned to
Mogadishu after being elected president by facilitating an
assembly of Somali clerics who consequently issued a
declaration calling for the withdrawal of the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),and the establishment of Islamic
law. Farah claimed Sharif was boxed in by Islamic
hard-liners, and that if the international community did not
come to Sharif's aid, Sharif would have no choice but to
accommodate the hard-liners including possibly, Hassan Dahir
Aweys, Muktar Robow, and Hassan al-Turki who, Farah said,
were hoping eventually to takeover the TFG in order to appear
"legitimate" in the eyes of the international community.
Farah alleged that now Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Finance Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden was the "kingmaker" and was
manipulating Sharif for Hassan's own purposes. Farah noted
that Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles told Sharif in a meeting
on the margins of the early February AU Summit that Ethiopia
would not move against Sharif as long as Sharif did not
support anti-Ethiopian activities. Farah stated that Iranian
President Ahmadinejad, in a February 24 meeting in Djibouti
with TFG Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke,
invited Sharif to Tehran, in secret if necessary, for
consultations. End Summary.
Sharif Being Painted as a US Puppet
--------------
2. (C/NF) Farah said that Sharif's enemies were spreading
the notion that Sharif was a puppet of the United States as a
way to undermine his credibility within Somalia. As a result
it had become the general belief in Somalia that Washington
hand-picked Sharif. Farah insisted that this belief was
undermining Sharif's ability to build support. At the same
time, many Somalis were unsure of where PM Sharmarke stood
with the United States because it was the general view that
Sharmarke was rejected by Washington when former President
Yusuf tried to appoint Sharmarke to be the TFG Ambassador to
the United States.
3. (C/NF) In reality, Farah said, Sharif did not know where
he stood with Washington. He said that US officials had
given considerable advice to Sharif on what he should and
should not do, but Sharif did not understand whether he truly
had Washington's support. Farah said Sharmarke was in the
same position, and was unsure of where to go with the United
States.
Sharif's First Mistake as President?
--------------
4. (C/NF) Farah asserted that Sharif's first mistake as
President occurred when he returned to Mogadishu and called a
meeting of Somali clerics together with the hope that the
assembly would come out in support of Sharif's government,
but instead the group issued a declaration in mid-February
with elements that will be difficult for Sharif to implement.
The declaration covered a spectrum of issues, but included a
call that AMISOM withdraw from Somalia within 120 days, that
the country be governed by Islamic law, and that the
"anti-Islamic laws" within the TFG charter be changed.
Sharif Boxed in by Hard-liners?
--------------
5. (C/NF) Farah claimed that the "hard-liners" were
"sitting on Sharif's shoulder," and that if the international
community did not come quickly to assist the TFG Sharif would
have no choice but to succumb to the hard-liner's demands.
Farah expected a number of prominent opposition leaders to
come into the TFG in some form, including Muktar Robow,
ADDIS ABAB 00000500 002 OF 003
Hassan Dahir Aweys, and Hassan al-Turki. Farah believed that
it was the plan of the opposition members to seek
accommodation with the TFG in order to get out from under the
"terrorist" stigma, eventually take-over the TFG and then
stand in front of the international community as part of the
"legitimate" government of Somalia.
Sharif Hassan the Kingmaker?
--------------
6. (C/NF) Farah referred to Sharif Hassan as the
"kingmaker," and alleged that Hassan was manipulating Sharif,
who Farah considered to be "naive" and "inexperienced," for
Hassan's own purposes. Farah said that Sharif and Hassan had
already decided that Hassan would be deputy prime minister,
and therefore, Hassan did not want the prime minister to be
powerful enough to either exclude Hassan from decisionmaking
or access to Sharif. For example, Hassan was behind the pick
of Sharmarke as Prime Minister. Farah said that Sharif had
originally planned to name Dr. Abdirizak Osman Hassan
"Jurile," a Somali politician since the Siad Barre days, as
prime minister until Hassan made the case that Jurile would
be too hard to control and would run circles around Sharif.
Instead, Hassan picked Sharmarke who Hassan thought would be
easier to control, and who had the added benefit of being
acceptable to the international community. Farah said Hassan
was now putting Hassan's own people, including relatives,
around Sharmarke to keep him contained, and to monitor
Sharmarke's activities.
7. (C/NF) According to Farah, Hassan was also heavily
involved in the selection of the cabinet. In Sharif's first
meeting with Sharmarke in Djibouti, Farah said Sharif told
Sharmarke that he did not want problems between the president
and prime minister as had been the case with former President
Yusuf and former Prime Ministers Gedi and Nur Adde. Sharif
also told Sharmarke that Sharif did not want to be involved
in the selection of the cabinet because he did not want
Sharmarke to complain that people he did not trust had been
forced on him by Sharif. Sharmarke protested noting that
because he had never spent much time in Somalia, and did not
know the political landscape, particularly among the ARS,
that he would need help in the selection process. As a
result, Sharif brought Hassan in to assist Sharmarke in
picking the members, but eventually Sharif himself became
directly involved in the process.
Regarding Sharif's Cabinet
--------------
8. (C/NF) Sharif, who is a Hawiye/Abgal, did not name a
single Abgal to his cabinet, according to Farah, who said
that the Abgal clan was now increasingly unhappy, and asking
Sharif "are we nothing?" Instead Sharif gave the
Hawiye/Habir Gedir four positions to try to appease them.
Negotiations were ongoing to find a way to address the Abgal
concerns and to give them additional positions. Farah also
said that the Darood/Marehan were also angry with the their
representation in the cabinet, and that two Marehan
appointees refused to take their positions in protest.
9. (C/NF) Farah said Sharif appointed Abdulkadir Ali Omar,
a former Union of Islamic Courts leader, as Minister of the
Interior because he had one of the largest and most powerful
militias in Mogadishu upon which Sharif relied for
protection. Farah said Sharif did not trust Abdulkadir, but
really had no choice. Sharif hoped eventually to separate
Abdulkadir from his militia as the government became more
formalized. Farah also said that there was an internal
battle going on between Abdulkadir and the Minister of
Security Omar Hashi Aden over who would control the police.
Sharif did not want Abdulkadir to control the police because
it would put too much power in Abdulkadir's hands. Farah
expect this issue to take some weeks to be resolved.
Ethiopia's Message to Sheikh Sharif
--------------
10. (C/NF) Farah said he attended the meeting between
Sheikh Sharif and Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles during the
February 1-3 AU Summit, Sharif's first meeting with the
Ethiopian government since being elected president.
According to Farah, Meles told Sharif that Ethiopia would
ADDIS ABAB 00000500 003 OF 003
support him, and would not "send a single soldier or ship a
single bullet across the border intended for you (Sharif) as
long as you maintain the security of Somalia within Somalia,"
and did not support anti-Ethiopian activities. Farah said
Sharif agreed to this and that the meeting had gone well.
Privately, however, Farah said the Ethiopians were not happy
because they anticipate that Sharif will not be able to live
up to his promise, and that sooner or later, Sharif would
have no choice but to accommodate Ethiopia's enemies.
More Resistance to Sheikh Sharif
--------------
11. (C/NF) Farah noted that Mohammed Said Hersi Morgan, aka
"General Morgan" a son-in-law of former President Siad Barre,
and Meslah Mohammed Siad Barre, son of Siad Barre, were
currently in Addis Ababa conspiring to form a coalition
against Sheikh Sharif and the TFG. However, he said they
would be leaving soon at Prime Minister Meles' request
because, although Meles did not care about their anti-Sharif
activities, he did not want them conducting those activities
within Ethiopia.
Sharmarke's Conversation with Iranian President Ahmadinejad
-------------- --------------
12. (C/NF) Farah said that Ahmadinejad, in a February 24
meeting in Djibouti with PM Sharmarke, invited Sharif to
Tehran for consultations. Ahmadinejad offered to send a
plane to fly Sharif to Iran in secret if that was Sharif's
wish. Farah said Sharmarke agreed to relay the invitation to
Sharif, but privately Sharmarke intended to warn Sharif that
going to Tehran was a bad idea. PolOff reinforced that a
visit to Tehran by Sharif, secret or not, would not be viewed
well by Washington.
Comment
--------------
13. (C/NF) Farah's readout of the Meles-Sharif meeting is
consistent with other reports of the meeting, and we believe
it accurately reflects Ethiopia's position that as long as
Sharif does not support anti-Ethiopian activities, Meles will
tolerate Sharif. Our recent conversations with senior
Ethiopian officials also suggest that the Ethiopians are not
optimistic that Sharif will be able to deliver on his
promises. State Minister for Foreign Affairs Tekeda told
EmbOffs on February 19 that he feared Sharif would eventually
have no choice but to "go over to those on the other side of
the barricade." Post will make it clear to interlocutors we
meet in Addis Ababa that Washington does not want to see a
Union of Islamic Courts II under the banner of the TFG. End
Comment.
YAMAMOTO