USAU: AMISOM EXPERTS MEET FOLLOWING AUC MINISTERIAL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 002959 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E, AND IO/UNP E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: AU MASS PREL SO SUBJECT: USAU: AMISOM EXPERTS MEET FOLLOWING AUC MINISTERIAL REF: ADDIS ABABA 002946 THIS MESSAGE IS FROM USAU AMBASSADOR MICHAEL A. BATTLE. ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: At a December 15 meeting of experts focusing on Somalia, the Force Commander advocated for an increase in AMISOM's troop strength in order to help the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) stabilize Mogadishu, as well as an internatQally supported program to encourage defection from insurgent groups. Experts called on the TFG President to formally approve a three-phase training plan for Somali forces, and to provide strategic vision to guide partner assistance. The TFG was also encouraged to step up information operations with its newly installed radio transmitter. END SUMMARY. General Situation -------------- ¶2. (SBU) AMISOM Force Commander Major General Nathan Mugisha characterized the security situation as volatile, with al-Shabaab having reinforced Mogadishu and engaged in a new offensive on AMISOM. He said the TFG is endeavoring to reorganize and bring cohesion to its coalition. He clarified that President Sheikh Sharif and his cabinet are putting priority on the security sector, as evidenced by new high-level appointments in the Somali Police and the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF). Operational Realities -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Mugisha stated that the TFG must secure Mogadishu. Without Mogadishu, the TFG is negotiating from a position of weakness, and until Mogadishu is taken all of the other things the TFG is trying to achieve are of marginal utility. Mugisha insisted that his primary role as Force Commander was to enable the TFG to stabilize Mogadishu. He suggested for the first time that AMISOM's originally planned end strength of 8,000 troops is insufficient for today's realities, and called for an increase to 12,000 peace-keepers. With 12,000 AMISOM troops and 20,000 Somali Security Forces, Mugisha claimed he could pacify Mogadishu and possibly seize Kismayo. (NOTE: UNSOA's 2010-2011 budget assumes an 8,000-man force.) ¶4. (SBU) On support to TFG forces, Mugisha reported that AMISOM is working with ex-Somali servicemen from the Siad Barre era and new troops recently trained in Djibouti to transform them into three "fighting units." Once formed, the units would undergo one month of refresher training from AMISOM before being deployed. Mugisha stated that he is preparing Somali troops for platoon-level combat, and that his biggest challenge is developing capable and loyal small unit leaders (NCOs, lieutenants, and captains). ¶5. (SBU) Regarding new training initiatives to build the SNAF, Head of the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) Sivuyile Bam confirmed that Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra has approved a three-phased process consisting of induction in Mogadishu, training abroad, and reintegration in Mogadishu. Per Lamamra's instruction, PSOD is now clarifying roles and modalities, as well as standing up an AMISOM training cell to assist in this training initiative. The SRCC's office insisted that partners' offers of future training support would be accepted only on the condition that 12-18 months of stipends are included in the package. ¶6. (SBU) Mugisha identified another challenge in that there is reportedly no program that caters to defectors from the various insurgent groups. He suggested that more would join ranks with TFG if there were an organized and attractive program that was properly publicized. Why defect to the TFG if it cannot feed its own troops, Mugisha asked rhetorically. The Information War -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Mugisha noted that al-Shabaab is seen by Somalis as the most unpopular force on the ground, yet the TFG does not seem to be exploiting this weakness. Several experts ADDIS ABAB 00002959 002 OF 002 reinforced Mugisha's statement with calls for the TFG to use the recent suicide bombing at a graduation of medical students which killed four Somali ministers and at least 18 others to drive a wedge between Shabaab and the Somali populace, as well as exploit Somali xenophobia with constant reminders of Shabaab's foreign elements and ideology. The TFG's Radio Mogadishu is being used to inform the public, but is not yet being used offensively against Shabaab. The TFG's lack of information operations sophistication was evident in the immediate aftermath of the December 3 suicide attack on the medical graduation ceremony when Radio Mogadishu staff contemplated going off the air for three days of mourning. The SRCC's office reportedly convinced them that this was precisely the time to remain on the air, but conceded that more should be done to take the initiative away from the extremists who dominate the media. Strategic Imperatives -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Several interlocutors implored the TFG to provide more strategic vision to guide partner assistance. Mr. Bam called on President Sharif to address the AU's Peace and Security Council in January, and maybe even the UNSC, to provide clarity for international partners. He noted, for example, that the TFG has yet to formally approve the aforementioned three-phased training initiative. The Military Advisor to the SRCC stated that the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and the Force Commander would press the TFG at the meeting of the International Contact Group in Jeddah on December 16-17 to approve the concept. He also announced that following the meeting in Jeddah, the Joint Security Committee would produce a short paper outlining priorities and required resources for prospective donors. The UNPOS representative expounded, saying that in Jeddah the TFG will present four papers and lead discussions on coordination mechanisms, security, reconciliation, and recovery. The UNPOS representative also anticipated a surprise announcement in Jeddah, with TFG bringing Al Sunnah wa Al Jammah (ASWJ) into the political process. ¶9. (SBU) Mr. Bam reported that he anticipates no fundamental change in AMISOM's mandate, which is set to expire in mid-January. Bam predicted that the mandate would be extended for at least six months, if not through the end of the mandated life of the TFG (i.e. August 2011). Bam cautioned the experts group against a "Christmas tree mandate" like MONUC, advocating instead that AMISOM be limited to a few, achievable tasks. ¶10. (SBU) COMMENT: One important sentiment throughout the meeting was that time is not working in AMISOM's favor. Given that AMISOM's mandate is to support the TFG, and that the transitional period expires in August 2011, the AU views the next 18 months as critical. While the AU welcomes newfound offers of support from the international community, it questions whether the United Nations and other partners can react quickly enough to make a difference in the life of the TFG. The EU's training of Somali forces, for example, will only begin in May 2010 and will last 9-12 months, producing a maximum of 2,000 troops. END COMMENT. MUSHINGI