AU SUMMIT -- AF ACTING A/S CARTER MEETS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000270 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/C, AND IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV AU XA SU SO CG RW SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT -- AF ACTING A/S CARTER MEETS WITH UNDPKO ALAIN LE ROY AND SRSG FOR EASTERN CONGO ALAN DOSS Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: AF Acting Assistant Secretary Phillip Carter met with UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy and UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Eastern Congo Alan Doss January 31 on the margins of the AU Summit in Addis Ababa. Carter brought Le Roy up to date on AMISOM and support for the Unity Government in Somalia. On Sudan, Le Roy said the UN would accept U.S. support for a ceasefire monitoring mechanism. On the Eastern Congo, Ross expressed guarded optimism, but said it is too early to declare victory. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On Somalia, Le Roy repeated earlier assertions that an estimated USD 600 million would be needed for the first year of a UN Peacekeeping Operation in Somalia, a figure which Carter characterized as much higher than necessary, possibly by a factor of eight or nine. Carter mentioned the election of Sheikh Sharif by a large margin and said a priority of the USG is to ensure Unity Government troops are paid on time and regularly. He and Le Roy agreed to meet again to review progress in May. ¶3. (C) On Sudan, Carter expressed concern about the AU's proposal for a senior level panel of experts chaired by South African President Thabo Mbeki which would advise the Government of Sudan on the modalities of prosecuting war crimes domestically. He said AU Commissioner Jean Ping had told him that the AU perceives a clear bias against Africans within the International Criminal Court. So far, as the United States is concerned, Sudan has done little to make progress towards peace in Darfur, help UNAMID deploy or implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Le Roy responded the Sudanese and the AU both think they have done a lot. ¶4. (C) Le Roy said he understood the Sudan Peoples, Liberation Movement is making efforts to move Bashir out of the Presidency. He said he has noticed less cooperation on the ground from Sudan as the ICC arrest warrant draws near. Le Roy mentioned AU Deputy Commissioner had told him that he had nearly convinced Carter of the value of accepting a UN Security Council Article XVI deferral of the ICC indictment. Surprised by this assertion, Carter said that the opposite was true and that he had had told Lamamra, in the plainest of terms, that the US did not see any reason for a deferment. When asked if the UN would welcome U.S. support for a UN Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism in Darfur, Le Roy welcomed the support and said that all help from Security Council members is helpful. ¶5. (C) Doss said the Congolese rebel movement National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) loyalists to their former commander, Laurent Nkunda, are waiting to see what happens to their arrested leader before they agree to integrate into the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. UN Mediator Obasanjo and AU Mediator Mkapa are scheduled to meet on February 5 with DRC President Kabila and Rwandan President Kagame to work towards finding a political solution, and intend to let them jointly set the agenda. Doss said the return of Rwandan refugees is the big issue and it is still too early to declare victory. Doss plans to take advantage of the UNSC-mandated increase in force level of the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) to move more robust elements within MONUC to bolster the FARDC, which is still not ready for combat operations. ¶6. (C) Doss noted further the aim is to ensure the rebel Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda does not produce significant casualties. Rwandan forces in Eastern Congo are moving carefully, with a light footprint and no armor. They do not want to rush, but they do not want to drag out operations to further arouse the suspicions regarding Rwanda's intentions. Kabila is betting the farm on ending the war and using this success as a platform to run again in 2011. Regarding the decision of whether or not to extradite Nkunda to the DRC, Ross speculated it may be best to try him publicly in Rwanda. ¶7. (C) When asked what the United States could do to help, Doss said to get Rwanda to let MONUC into the Joint Operations Center (JOC),as they are still suspicious; to encourage them to keep operations against the FDLR short and simple in North Kivu and to proceed carefully in South Kivu, where the situation is more complex and resentment against the Rwandans is deep. Doss also said to try not to let the FARDC do any more stupid things. With further respect to the JOC, Doss said in ADDIS ABAB 00000270 002 OF 002 a subsequent conversation he has proposed that the Rwandan armed forces communicate intelligence only to him and MONUC Force Commander Babacar Gaye. ¶8. (U) Acting A/S Carter approved this message before departing Addis. YAMAMOTO