USAU: SYNOPSIS OF AMISOM CONSULTATIVE MEETING WITH

UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 002642 STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, IO-UNP E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: IO PGOV PREL SO AU SUBJECT: USAU: SYNOPSIS OF AMISOM CONSULTATIVE MEETING WITH TCCS AND PARTNERS ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The November Consultative Meeting of AMISOM stakeholders reveals a precarious security situation and danger in continuing status quo support to both AMISOM and the TFG. While all stakeholders agree that AMISOM must not fail, few donors are willing to provide sufficiently flexible funding or lethal assistance to both AMISOM and the TFG. Good news includes the addition of a Djiboutian contingent to AMISOM, EU resumption of funding in December, the establishment of a TFG radio station, and the fact that the TFG has paid at least some of its soldiers. The bad news is that AMISOM still has not achieved its mandated end strength, and is still suffering from arrears in salaries, insufficient equipment, and a stalemate over reimbursement from the AU for contingent-owned equipment. Somali Police salaries remain in arrears, and both the AU and donors are concerned with the slow pace of the TFG in reconciliation and expansion of governance, as well as poorly stated needs and lack of a security framework to govern foreign assistance and security sector reform. The group revalidated AMISOM's existing mandate, but called for an adaptation of rules of engagement. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) As is customary, international partners were invited on November 2 to the culminating portion of the day's consultative meetings between African Union (AU) Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra, Ministers of Defense from AMISOM troop contributing countries (TCC),and other stakeholders. (Note: MoDs from Burundi, Djibouti, Somalia, and Uganda were in attendance.) Lamamra began by giving a synopsis of preceding closed deliberations, saying there had been no major developments since the last such gathering. He stated, however, that political reconciliation efforts by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) continue. Lamamra admonished the TFG for its lack of cohesion and encouraged it to expand its governance beyond Mogadishu. While extremist elements still dominate the media in Somalia, Lamamra praised the TFG for establishing a state radio station to counter insurgent misinformation. General Security Situation -------------- ¶3. (C) Lamamra characterized the security situation as "more mediocre" than before, with "ping-pong" control of Mogadishu between TFG/AMISOM forces and the Islamic insurgent group al-Shabaab. Lamamra laid some of the blame for this lack of capacity at the donors' door, saying that much of what had been pledged at the March Donors Conference in Brussels had yet to materialize. Friendly forces, Lamamra said, are still suffering from a lack of critical military equipment. Other noteworthy comments included: - Expansion of AMISOM with a formal contribution of troops from Djibouti; - TFG payment of salaries to 3,214 Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF); and - Non-payment of TFG police forces (more for a lack of mechanism than funding). ¶4. (C) Lamamra also made the case for additional TFG forces, saying that the government needs 8,000 military personnel and a police force of 5,000 to secure Mogadishu. He estimated that an additional 8,000 troops would be needed to secure the central and southern portions of Somalia. Lamamra ended his resume of the security situation by saying Somalia is volatile and unpredictable, and added that the status quo is untenable. AMISOM Mandate and Rules of Engagement -------------- ¶5. (U) Lamamra reported that the group had determined AMISOM's existing mandate to be sufficiently robust and flexible. However, AMISOM's rules of engagement (ROE) needed to be adapted to allow friendly forces to take preemptive military action in certain cases. Lamamra also articulated the need for improved equipment and resources to allow AMISOM to be proactive, striking "the snake amongst its eggs." (Note: Interlocutors tell us separately that a major concern with the ROE is AMISOM's limited ability to protect key installations from terrorist attacks, which is a concern both from a force protection standpoint and because these installations are key revenue earners for the TFG.) Training for TFG Forces -------------- ¶6. (C) Lamamra welcomed the many offers of training for TFG police and military forces, but entreated the TFG to provide a better framework to harmonize international support, including policies, doctrine, and a comprehensive list of needs. He asked international partners to ensure that their training packages are standardized and adapted to Somali needs, and requested that the packages include essential equipment. Lamamra stated that partners must also budget for salaries for uniformed Somali personnel, or risk losing them to the insurgents once deployed. Finally, he cautioned partners to ensure ethnic and clan balance in the units they train. The Somali MoD Weighs In -------------- ¶7. (C) In contrast to his predecessor Dr. Gandhi, newly appointed Somali Minister of Defense Abdallah Boss Ahmed was at times both defensive and accusatory. Extremists, he said, took advantage of the complete lack of support from the international community to attempt to overthrow the TFG in an offensive that lasted from May to July 2009. He claimed twice that his government had received none of the support pledged at the Brussels conference. Nonetheless, Boss reported that the parliament had resumed its work in Mogadishu and has managed to develop a work plan and budget of 9.3 million USD, of which 3.6 million USD has already been raised. The TFG is reaching out to parties outside the Djibouti Process and remains committed to dialogue and reconciliation, but insecurity remains its largest impediment. ¶8. (U) Boss claimed to have 9,800 "paramilitary" forces under his control, suggesting that if they are properly supported by partners, they will be able to dominate Mogadishu. He, too, mentioned needing an additional 8,000 troops to recapture the rest of Somalia. (Comment: Boss is probably exaggerating the number of paramilitary forces under his influence. While there may well be 9,800 clan and private sector fighters in Mogadishu, the TFG has thus far shown no ability to get them into the fight in any organized manner. It is also noteworthy that previous post-Djibouti Agreement end strength discussions called for 5,000 Somali military and 10,000 Somali Police.) ¶9. (C) Somalia is at a crossroads, said Boss, and urgently needs both political support and unfettered financial assistance from the international community. He pleaded on behalf of AMISOM for both additional peacekeepers and maritime assets. He reiterated that the international community urgently needs to find a solution for police salaries, claiming they have not been paid for 15 months, and stating that the arrears are undermining morale and the TFG's efforts to secure and stabilize Mogadishu. Boss also asked the international community to increase humanitarian support for internally displaced Somalis. United Nations Support to AMISOM -------------- ¶10. (C) Craig Boyd then briefed the group on assistance provided by the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). His staff disseminated a Consolidated Contributions Statement reflecting a total of 198.7 million USD pledged in Brussels, but only 70.2 million USD received. Boyd's salient comments included: - UNSOA's budget for the period 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010 is 225 million USD; - The SRSG and SRCC jointly determine the priorities regarding expenditures from the AMISOM Trust Fund of 25 million USD, of which 14 million USD is already committed; - Some donors to the AMISOM Trust Fund have put stringent caveats on their contributions; - No lethal equipment can be financed from the AMISOM Trust Fund, so there must be either UN or bilateral solutions; and - The Somalia Security Institutions Trust Fund has eight million USD in pledges but only 850,000 USD in actual contributions. The AU's Special Rep Ponders Reversing Donor Contributions -------------- -------------- ¶11. (U) Nicholas Bwakira, who formally announced his resignation as the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission at the end of the meeting, reported that despite 25 million USD languishing in the United Nation's bank account in New York, troop allowances have not been paid since April for one TCC, and since May for the other. Bwakira opined that donors might reverse their contributions and pay the AU Commission directly instead. In response, EU Ambassador to the AU Koen Vervacke stated that the EU's next tranche of funding would be disbursed sometime in December, and that it would cover salaries through April 2010. ¶12. (U) The UN Special Representative for the Secretary General, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, sought out USAU Ambassador Michael Battle during a break to discuss the poor funding mechanisms that delay needed disbursements. Ould-Abdallah stated that the United States was the only country that managed to provide direct support to Somalia and lamented the fact that money gets stuck in the UN system. He recommended that donors bypass the cumbersome UN, channeling funds instead through the PriceWaterhouseCoopers mechanism. Contingent-Owned Equipment Reimbursements Remain Problematic -------------- -------------- ¶13. (U) Ugandan Minister of Defense Crispus Kiyonga sounded the familiar refrain of reimbursements for contingent-owned equipment, saying that the Ugandan Parliament authorized Uganda's participation in AMISOM on the condition that it be budget neutral. He also indicated that payment of death benefits remain problematic and may impact negatively on future troop contributions. Burundian Minister of Defense Germain Niyoyankana echoed Kiyonga's criticisms. The UNSOA representative recommended that when the UN next reviews the AMISOM mandate, it consider authorizing the use of assessed contributions to reimburse for contingent-owned equipment. Kiyonga suggested that the proposed UN solution would be a half-measure since presumably it would only reimburse for equipment retroactive to UNSCR 1863 and not the beginning of the AMISOM deployment. Uganda and EU Offer to Assist in Somalia SSR -------------- ¶14. (C) Kiyonga also offered for Uganda to play a coordinating role in training the Somali Security Forces (SSF),contingent on donor support. EUAU Ambassador Vervacke mentioned that the EU is studying how it might address the SSF training shortfall, and indicated that it might be able to use its 300 million euro Peace Facility to support AMISOM's security sector reform efforts in Somalia. ¶15. (C) COMMENT: While the financial situation is not as grim as portrayed by the Somali Minister of Defense, USAU agrees that there are several causes for concern. All the stakeholders seem to agree that AMISOM cannot be allowed to fail, but only the USG appears willing to provide lethal support to the mission. The EU appears to have worked through most of the issues associated with its recovery orders; it will provide the AU with 60 million euros for the period from August 2009 to April 2010, funding troop allowances, death benefits, police and civilian salaries, civilian vehicles, medical expenses, travel, and rent. UNSOA's impressive budget of 225 million USD will be restricted to deployment and rotation costs associated with troops, police, and contingent-owned equipment, as well as rations, fuel, and accommodations. The needs are even more glaring on the TFG side of the ledger, including funding shortfalls in training, equipping, paying, and sustaining SSF, as well as a lack of a needs assessment, policy framework, and coordinating mechanism for SSR. ¶16. (C) COMMENT Continued: Technically, a TFG coordinating mechanism exists. The Joint Security Committee is codified Djibouti Agreement; it is comprised of sector working groups and has funding. Apparently, however, several key members of the TFG do not want the mechanism to work, as they would rather see support given directly to their respective ministries. END COMMENT. MUSHINGI