ETHIOPIA AGOA COUNTRY ELIGIBILITY REVIEW 2009

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 ADDIS ABABA 002434 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/EPS - ABREITER AND GMALLORY; EEB/IFD/OMA - JWINKLER AND EEB/CBA - DWINSTEAD DEPARTMENT PASS TO USTR FOR PATRICK COLEMAN AND BARBARA GRYNIEWWICZ DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA MARIA RIVERO DEPT OF TREASURY FOR REBECCA KLEIN USAID FOR AFR/EA - HELLYER, DALTON AFR/SD - CURTIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ETRD ECON EFIN EINV BEXP AF ET SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA AGOA COUNTRY ELIGIBILITY REVIEW 2009 REF: STATE 97769 ADDIS ABAB 00002434 001.2 OF 009 THIS CABLE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION. BACKGROUND SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (U) After a difficult period of socialist dictatorship and civil war, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) in the early 1990s began a transition towards a more open economic system. While government and ruling party-affiliated enterprises continue to dominate the economy, the GoE has carved out some role for the private sector by liberalizing investment in some specific sectors, rationalizing foreign trade rules, and accelerating privatization. There are no special barriers to U.S. trade and investment, although a number of sectors remain closed to foreign investment. The GoE still maintains monopoly control over several key sectors, including telecommunications, power generation, and civil aviation. Ruling party-owned enterprises also enjoy de facto preferences, including duopolies with state-owned enterprises. There is no tangible indication that the GoE plans to open the state controlled sectors in the near future in spite of continued interest from private domestic and foreign investors and Ethiopia's interest in moving forward in the World Trade Organization (WTO) accession process. ¶2. (U) On the political front, since 2005 the GoE has systematically closed political space by restricting the public expression of dissent of civil society, the press, and political opposition through legislation and intimidation. Since the 2005 elections, the ruling party's engagement with the opposition has been mixed at best, oscillating between nominal concessions on power sharing and impediments to opposition leaders accessing their constituencies. Although the incarceration of journalists has ebbed, the GoE continues to retaliate against journalists in other ways for running unflattering stories, suppresses information, and restricts international journalists' access to the country. The GoE actively jams international radio signals, including Voice of America, and internet sites that are critical of the GoE. Harassment and intimidation of opposition leaders, supporters at a local level, and press continue to persist as the country prepares for the 2010 national elections. END SUMMARY. MARKET-BASED ECONOMY -------------- ¶A. Major Strengths Identified: ¶3. (U) GDP growth: The GoE has maintained double-digit Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth for six consecutive years. Reported Real GDP growth was 11.6 percent in 2007/08 and 10.1 percent in 2008/09 [Note: Ethiopia's fiscal year runs from July 8 to July 7. End Note.] The recent economic growth is primarily due to investment in infrastructure, manufacturing, and services. In addition, local governments have made available large tracts of land for commercial farms to both foreign and local investors and the GoE offers many duty-free incentives to those planning to export goods. ¶4. (U) GDP growth (cont.): Given severe power outages, poor harvests, weak export performance, and the impact of the global financial crisis, many economists question the credibility of the GoE's growth figures this year. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimate Ethiopia's 2008/09 real GDP growth at around 6.5 percent. Even if the GoE's figures are disputed, real GDP growth of six to seven percent is still quite an achievement, especially given the current global climate. ¶5. (U) WTO accession: Ethiopia's WTO accession process has been underway since 2003. Ethiopia submitted a Memorandum of Foreign Trade Regime to the WTO in December 2006, sent replies to the first round of WTO member questions in January 2007, and held its first Working Party Meeting in May 2008. Ethiopia has submitted all required documentation to date and is now waiting for the second ADDIS ABAB 00002434 002.2 OF 009 Working Party meeting to be scheduled in winter 2009. Ethiopia has made substantial progress in drafting new legislation and implementing capacity-building measures relevant to accession with the help of technical assistance from a number of donors, including the United States. The USAID WTO Accession project continues to provide technical assistance to the Ministry of Trade and Industry as it prepares for the second Working Party meeting. ¶6. (U) AGOA: Ethiopia's exports under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) were USD 18 million in 2008, doubling its 2007 exports of USD 9 million. For the first six months of 2009, Ethiopia's AGOA exports were slightly down from last year at USD 6.8 million. A significant part of Ethiopia's export growth under AGOA is due to USAID's AGOA+ program and its promotion of Ethiopian products. The GoE has stated that the textile sector is one of the key investment areas for its Industrial Development Plan and will begin trials for Bt cotton (i.e., disease-resistant cotton) to raise production levels in support of the growing sector. As a result of the GoE's push and AGOA benefits, the number of textile and apparel companies has increased to over 80 in 2009 from only 39 in 2007. Included in these numbers are several new foreign-based manufacturers (mainly Turkish). ¶B. Major Issues and Problems Identified: ¶7. (SBU) Government/ruling party companies: Ethiopia's State Owned Enterprises (SOE) and ruling party-owned companies continue to receive preference by the GoE when it comes to rewarding contracts, accessing limited foreign exchange (forex) reserves, and securing favorable loan terms from state-owned banks. These approximately 200 entities dominate the market in nearly every sector in Ethiopia and continue to take on large amounts of debt from the Chinese and Indian governments as well as private entities. For example, the Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation (ETC) signed a USD 2.4 billion vendor financing loan with Chinese-owned Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment Company Limited (ZTE). The government-owned Maritime and Transit Services Enterprise controls the overwhelming majority of clearing and forwarding operations. Private competition to state-owned Ethiopian Airlines is prohibited by law for most domestic air transport. While there is no limit in cargo flights, private competitors can only operate with planes up to 20 seats. The financial records of these public entities are not publicly available. While official GoE external debt stands at $2.7 billion, external debt accumulated by SOEs raises the GoE's de facto external debt to an estimated $6 billion. The USG granted Ethiopia a waiver from the transparency requirements of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act in fiscal year 2009 in order to continue receiving USG assistance. ¶8. (U) Investment climate: The private sector in Ethiopia finds it increasingly difficult to operate given recent GoE policies aimed at combating high inflation, poor tax compliance, and the forex crisis. GoE officials ramped up seizures of "excess" hard currency from departing air travelers and repeatedly approached businesses for tax payments they allegedly owed in an inconsistent manner. The GoE also formally instructed all banks to no longer accept many duty-free imported goods as loan collateral and to cap all lending at current outstanding loan amounts. Additionally, foreign companies face significant delay in their repatriation of profits, as the central bank is not allocating enough hard currency to this process. These GoE actions are further obstacles to private sector growth in an already tough business climate featuring an acute forex shortage, an average annual inflation rate of 24 percent, and power outages several days per week. The forex crisis has stalled business in both the private and public sectors and is hurting U.S. business interests in Ethiopia as they are unable to import inputs. While forex reserves more than doubled since a low of USD 700 million in December 2008, the IMF now predicts the forex crunch to get worse once again. ¶9. (U) Privatization: The GoE's Privatization and Public Enterprise Supervising Agency has continued efforts to transfer SOEs to the private sector; however, most deals strongly favor the GoE and many ADDIS ABAB 00002434 003.2 OF 009 businesses have to be relisted for sale due to the lack of interest in the businesses the GoE is willing to sell. The GoE continues to dominate the telecommunications and financial services sectors. ETC is a state-owned monopoly working in partnership with the Chinese-owned ZTE. The financial services sector has opened up to some local private investment, but remains dominated by state-owned banks and is closed to foreign investment. Currently, there are 14 banks, three of which are state-owned. State-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia maintained the dominate 46 percent share of total banking capital in 2008. The GoE passed an amended banking and financial sector law in July 2008 giving more regulatory power to the central bank, still prohibiting foreign investment in the sector, putting a cap on individual share holders to a mere 5 percent of the subscribed capital of a bank, and prohibiting individuals' ownership in more than one financial institution. ¶10. (U) Privatization (cont.): USAID is working within the banking sector to increase private sector investment in Ethiopia. USAID signed a loan guarantee scheme (Development Credit Authority-DCA) amounting to USD 17.2 million with two local private banks in September 2008 in order to support and encourage Ethiopian Diaspora and women entrepreneurial investments. In September 2009, USAID signed an additional DCA agreement with two local banks to expand credit guarantees of up to USD 6 million for loans to microfinance institutions and savings and credit cooperative organizations. ¶11. (SBU) Trade deficit: Ethiopia is experiencing a major balance of payments crisis, primarily due to its widening trade deficit. This crisis continues to exacerbate Ethiopia's forex crunch. Ethiopia registered a trade deficit of USD 5.3 billion in 2007/09 and estimates peg the deficit at USD 6.2 billion in 2008/09. The deficit is worsening due to flat growth in exports and Ethiopia's increasing reliance on imports such as fuel, machinery, and consumer goods. Ethiopia's imports were USD 6.8 billion and USD 7.7 billion in 2007/08 and 2008/09, respectively, while exports were only USD 1.5 billion each year. Ethiopia's exports were previously growing around 20 percent per annum; however, coffee exports fell off considerably in the past year. Coffee is Ethiopia's major export earner, but its exports dropped to an estimated USD 376 million in 2008/09, down from USD 525 million in 2007/08. The reduction in coffee exports appears to be tied to the decline in world prices as well as domestic problems associated with the new coffee marketing and control legislation and capacity constraints of the newly established Ethiopia Commodity Exchange (ECX). ¶12. (U) Trade deficit (cont.): USAID, in partnership with the GoE, is working to boost Ethiopia's exports through its USD 20 million, five-year Agribusiness Trade Expansion Program (ATEP) that was recently extended through 2011. The project is a market-led effort to increase exports in four key GoE-identified sectors: horticulture; coffee; hides, skins and leather; and oilseeds and pulses. Additionally, USAID launched a new phase of its Pastoral and Livestock Initiative (PLI II). This year, the USD 12 million effort will expand earlier efforts assisting pastoralist communities and livestock producers through diversification of markets, animal health trainings, and other income diversification activities to raise total exports, increase incomes to livestock dependent communities, and elevate the level of healthy safe products in the domestic market. ¶13. (SBU) Investment disputes: Post has received several reports of threatened, or actual, property expropriation cases and business disputes involving foreign investors and the GoE in recent years. Foreign investors have complained of government threats to, and actual, seizure of property, land and assets without explanation or recourse and government agency impediments to the finalization of the return of previously expropriated properties. Post has also heard complaints against the GoE by U.S. companies of unlawful contract termination and non-transparent tender award processes. Investors involved in disputes have expressed a lack of confidence in the judiciary to objectively assess and resolve disputes. ¶14. (U) Land ownership: All land is owned by the state and each ADDIS ABAB 00002434 004.2 OF 009 regional administration governs its own land title certification systems and lease regulations. Lease terms may extend up to 99 years. USAID is working with regional governments to improve land registration, which should increase land tenure security. ¶15. (U) Intellectual property rights: Ethiopia has yet to sign a number of major international intellectual property rights (IPR) treaties, such as: the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property; the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) copyright treaty; the Berne Convention for Literary and Artistic Works; and the Patent Cooperation Treaty. The Ethiopian Intellectual Property Rights Office (EIPO) has been tasked only to protect Ethiopian copyrighted materials and pirated software, foreign works are not considered part of their purview. Generally, EIPO has weak capacity in terms of manpower and law enforcement. In addition, a number of businesses operate in Ethiopia freely using well-known trademarked names without permission. For example, the "Mariot" hotel, the new Intercontinental hotel, the Sally Beauty Supply store, and the "Olive's" Garden restaurant are all visible establishments in the capital city. POLITICAL REFORMS, RULE OF LAW, AND ANTI-CORRUPTION -------------- -------------- ¶A. Major Strengths Identified: ¶16. (U) Anti-corruption: In 2008, Ethiopia originally improved its ranking in the annual Transparency International Corruption Perception Index from 138 to 126 out of the 180 countries. The Anti-Corruption Commission has arrested many officials on charges of corruption, including managers from the GoE's privatization and customs agencies, the central bank, the Ministry of Mines and Energy, and the state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia. The Ethics Commission reported that it arrested and conducted investigations on 203 corruption suspects from August 2008 to January 2009. ¶B. Major Problems and Issues Identified: ¶17. (U) Political space: Following the unprecedented strong showing by the opposition parties in the 2005 national elections, the government and ruling party have significantly restricted political space. Opposition party members and supporters in rural areas reported widespread harassment and intimidation by local security forces. There were credible reports of politically motivated killings, disappearances, and arrests in 2009. Most allegations of opposition party harassment and intimidation went un-pursued by electoral or law enforcement officials. ¶18. (U) Political space (cont.): Membership in the ruling Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition conferred preferential treatment in civil servant job assignment/promotion and student university assignment/post-graduation employment, and increased access to food assistance and subsidized seeds and fertilizers. The EPRDF-controlled executive branch dominates the legislature, the judiciary and "watchdog" institutions like the Human Rights Commission and the Ombudsman's Institute. ¶19. (U) Political space (cont.): The GoE continues to impede opposition leaders from accessing their constituencies and opposition parties report that a requirement that all contributors to political parties be registered has had a chilling effect on fundraising. The GoE has brought charges against private newspapers suspected of being pro-opposition, charging journalists, publishers, and editors for accurate reporting that highlights government and ruling party actions in a negative light. ¶20. (U) Local elections: In April 2008, the country conducted local elections for 3.6 million contested seats. Intimidation and administrative impediments impeded opposition parties from registering more than sixteen thousand candidates. Two major opposition political parties boycotted the election claiming harassment and intimidation by the ruling party and incomplete adherence to the electoral law. The GoE did not allow the participation of international observers and the delayed release of ADDIS ABAB 00002434 005.2 OF 009 regulations did not allow many local institutions to observe the election. Of the 3.6 million contested seats, opposition parties won only three seats amid accusations of rampant voter and candidate intimidation. ¶21. (U) Media law: Parliament endorsed a new law on Mass Media and Freedom of Information in July 2008. International and local media activists expressed their concern over the restrictive nature of the law. The law defines the defamation of government officials as a prosecutable offense of state. A law also restricts private ownership in more than one publication and a GoE regulation prohibits owners of media outlets from serving on the editorial staff. Three prominent journalists whose media companies were dissolved by the GoE in 2007, but who were acquitted of all charges again themselves, have continued to be denied the opportunity to open new media outlets. The GoE continued to exercise its monopoly printing press to raise the costs of printing newspapers over five times in the past three years. ¶22. (U) Civil society law: A Civil Society Organizations (CSO) law, adopted in February 2009, prohibits CSOs that receive more than 10 percent of their funding from foreign sources from engaging in activities that promote human rights and democracy; the rights of children and the disabled; equality among nations, nationalities, people, gender and religion; or conflict resolution or reconciliation. The GoE has stated the law aims to increase the transparency and accountability of CSOs to stakeholders and restrict foreign involvement in purely domestic advocacy, but critics of the law have expressed concern that it will prevent the capacity development of civil society and undermine CSOs' watchdog role. ¶23. (U) Antiterrorism proclamation: In 2009, the GoE passed an Antiterrorism Proclamation granting executive branch-controlled security services virtually unlimited authority to take unilateral action to disrupt suspected terrorist activities. The proclamation does not require judicial review of such activities, but does give the courts the option, ex post, to review past events. The Proclamation authorizes hearsay testimony as adequate in judicial proceedings. ¶24. (U) Judiciary system: The judiciary is weak and overburdened and remains subject to influence by the executive branch. Lengthy pretrial detention is common, closed court proceedings occur, and detainees are sometimes denied access to legal counsel and visits from family members. The federal police continue to detain thousands of citizens without adequate grounds; of the 45,000 cases brought to the courts on criminal charges, 65 percent were dismissed for an absence of evidence. The freedom of information provisions in the Media Law enacted in 2008 provides for public access to government information, but defers implementation for two years. Access to government information remains largely restricted in practice. POVERTY REDUCTION -------------- ¶A. Major Strengths Identified: ¶25. (U) Productive Safety Net: As a key intervention to decrease Ethiopia's dependency on food aid, protect household assets and improve food security of the most vulnerable populations, the GoE developed, in harmony with donors, a Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) that is working to strengthen household and community resilience to moderate shocks and protect household assets in lean times. With the support of nine international donors, the GoE provides predictable transfers of food and cash to eight million people living in 262 of the most chronically food insecure districts for up to six months a year. This program started in January 2005 and incorporates payments in exchange for labor contributing to public works activities and direct transfers to households with no excess labor. Public works are conducted according to the district development plan and community based watershed management approach emphasizing soil and water conservation, environmental protection and reclamation efforts. Examples include the construction or ADDIS ABAB 00002434 006.2 OF 009 refurbishing of medical clinics, schools, and farmer to market roads. These public works projects have the commitment of the local officials and the community for sustainability. While the ultimate goal is to graduate people from food insecurity, emergency relief will continue to be required in years of severe shocks. The next phase of the redesigned PSNP has GOE commitment and donor support through 2014. The revised program includes a Household Asset Building Program to link the PSNP farmers to markets and micro credit to diversify income sources and increasing the productive asset base of the family. ¶26. (U) Social services spending: The GoE policy since the end of the 1998-2000 war with Eritrea has been to reduce the share of the budget devoted to the military and to use the 'peace dividend' for poverty alleviation, food security, and capacity building programs. The share of government expenditure on social services is now growing at about 30 percent a year according to the World Bank. The GoE is currently implementing its second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP),known as the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP). This is a five-year (2005-2010) framework for aligning donor support for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The first PRSP--the Sustainable Development Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP)--covered the three-year period 2002-2005. Ethiopia completed a three-year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) with the IMF in 2004 and signed a $241 million Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) IMF loan agreement in August 2009. The GoE has targeted food security, agriculture-led industrialization, health, education, fiscal decentralization, infrastructure development, and capacity building down to the district level as development and poverty reduction priorities. ¶27. (U) CAADP Compact: With the August 2009 signing of Ethiopia's Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) Compact, the GoE has reconfirmed strong commitment to poverty reduction through agriculture development. The CAADP is an African Union/New Partnership for Africa's Development (AU/NEPAD) initiative endorsed by heads of state as a vision for restoration of agricultural growth, food security, and rural development. During the CAADP Ethiopia process, the GoE and development partners evaluated existing agriculture development policies and provided recommendations to accelerate Ethiopia's agriculture growth. The GoE accepted all recommendations, including harmonizing Ethiopia's seed policy with regional countries, accelerating the land registration process, and placing more focus on the livestock sector. To support the CAADP Ethiopia Compact, the GoE and development partners are collaborating through the Rural Economic Development and Food Security (RED&FS) Working Group. Under RED&FS, the three focus programs are food security, agriculture Growth and sustainable land management. In the coming months, both development partners and the GoE will develop a Policy Investment Framework based on the CAADP Ethiopia Compact. The CAADP will effectively become the agriculture/food security component of the next iteration of the PASDEP, set to begin in 2010. ¶28. (U) Targeted aid flows: After some direct budget support from donors was briefly put on hold after the 2005 election, a new mechanism for aid flows was established. The system changed from one of direct budgetary support to providing funds to local government entities through a new program, the Protection of Basic Services (PBS) grant. Under PBS, aid funds are targeted, tightly monitored, and directed at the regional and district levels. ¶B. Major Problems and Issues Identified: ¶29. (U) Food security: Ethiopia ranks among the poorest and most vulnerable countries in the world. Any major shock, natural or economic, can push millions of people into destitution very quickly. In 2008, Ethiopia experienced a complex food security shock where consecutive failed rains were compounded by rising global food and oil prices. In some areas, significant portions of the year's harvest was lost, and at the same time staple food prices doubled over last year's levels. This complex emergency proved to be a severe shock, strong enough to have the GoE call for emergency ADDIS ABAB 00002434 007.2 OF 009 assistance from the international community. PSNP donors strongly believe that if the PSNP were not in place, and functioning, the impact of this year's drought and price increase would have been more devastating to many chronically food insecure communities. ¶30. (U) Food security (cont.): The drought and high food prices have continued into 2009 with 4.9 million people receiving emergency food assistance. In July 2009, after a much below normal first season harvest and a dismal outlook that El Nino will severely reduce production in the main cropping season (to be harvested in November and December),the GoE recognized that up to 6.2 million people would need emergency assistance through the end of the year and into 2010. This figure does not include the 5.4 million PSNP beneficiaries who are also in need of an additional one to two months of assistance. Despite the clearly poor agricultural performance in 2008 and 2009, the GoE released exaggerated harvest figures and GDP growth figures, which minimized the extent of the genuine need for humanitarian assistance and inflated per capita income figures. Anecdotal reporting from the 2009 review of the largely-failed Belg rains (shorter first season rains) suggests that the GoE is under-reporting the extent of humanitarian needs in areas which have traditionally favored the political opposition. ¶31. (U) Reliance on donor funding: Achieving the Millennium Development Goal of cutting poverty in half by 2015 will require higher rates of economic growth, substantial improvements in productivity, increased foreign aid, greater private sector involvement and a more investment in infrastructure. Domestic sources of financing are inadequate for current levels of spending growth, and so the current budget calls for a sharp increase in planned external assistance. Foreign donors have indicated they will provide substantial additional aid, but Ethiopia is clearly increasingly vulnerable to donor good will, and is likely to remain heavily dependent on high levels of donor funding for some time to come. GoE progress on governance concerns will be essential in order to assure adequate levels of external assistance. WORKERS' RIGHTS, CHILD LABOR, AND HUMAN RIGHTS -------------- - ¶A. Major Strengths Identified: ¶32. (U) Workers' rights: The right to form labor associations and engage in collective bargaining is constitutionally guaranteed for many workers, but excludes managerial employees, teachers, and civil servants. Most International Labor Organization (ILO) core labor standards have been enacted into law. All eight core ILO labor standards have been ratified, including Conventions 182 and 138 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor and minimum working-age requirements. Ethiopian law provides for a 48-hour legal workweek (with a 24-hour rest period),premium pay for overtime, and prohibition of excessive compulsory overtime. The government, industry, and unions negotiate occupational health and safety standards and guidelines. ¶33. (U) Child labor: The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor of both adults and children. Children under age 14 are prohibited from being employed, and there are strict laws regulating the scope of work and work environment of children ages 14 to 18; however, these laws are often not enforced. There is no particular policy in Ethiopia designed to ensure the effective abolition of child labor or to increase the minimum working age progressively, but there are various economic and social policies that have indirectly addressed the issue. For example, the GoE initiated an education and training policy aimed at achieving universal enrollment in primary school by ¶2015. ¶34. (U) Human rights: In 2009, the GoE submitted all overdue reports to United Nations (UN) human rights treaty bodies. It also submitted its Universal Periodic Review report to the UN during the year. The GoE signed the UN convention on the rights of persons with disabilities in 2009, and is currently considering ratification. Two laws that prohibit discrimination against persons with physical and mental disabilities in employment and access to ADDIS ABAB 00002434 008.2 OF 009 buildings were passed in 2008 and 2009. Overall, the GoE respects religious freedom. ¶35. (U) Trafficking in persons: The GOE acknowledges that human trafficking is a problem in-country. In May 2005, Ethiopia enacted a penal code criminalizing most forms of human trafficking. The GoE monitors its borders for trafficking within the context of its limited capacity. Border control points have been set up in Metema, Dewele, Galafi, Dire Dawa (at the center of town),and Moyale. Border guards also seek to verify that migrant workers have proper employment contracts and have completed the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs' (MOLSA) parallel authorizing process. MOLSA counselors host pre-departure orientation sessions to streamline labor migration and enhance migration management activities. ¶B. Major Problems and Issues Identified: ¶36. (U) Human rights: Freedom House's Freedom in the World Index ranking for Ethiopia again this year was "Partly Free." GoE officials and members of the security forces harassed individuals and their families to prevent them from joining or remaining in opposition parties. The GoE also harassed some individuals who worked for domestic human rights organizations. Authorities regularly arrested individuals and entered private residences without warrants. Security forces detained family members of persons sought for questions by the government. Significant restrictions on political and civil liberties remained, including the right of assembly and the right of association. The GoE continued to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily, particularly those suspected of sympathizing with or being members of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Several hundred suspects remained in detention without charge, and lengthy pretrial detention continued to be a problem. There were also numerous reports of human rights abuses in connection with the conflict between government and insurgent forces in the Ogaden area of the Somali Region. Abuses reported include extrajudicial killings, torture, rape, abductions, and arbitrary arrest. The government partially restricted deliveries of food and medicine to the Ogaden region. ¶37. (U) Human rights (cont.): The GoE continued to prevent International Committee of the Red Cross representatives from visiting police stations and federal prisons throughout the country, including those where opposition, civil society, and media leaders were held. There were numerous credible reports that security officials tortured, beat, or mistreated detainees. Prison and pretrial detention center conditions remained harsh and in some cases life threatening due to severe overcrowding, water shortages, lack of appropriate sanitary facilities, and lack of adequate medical care. ¶38. (U) Trafficking in persons: According to the USG's 2009 Trafficking in Persons report, Ethiopia is ranked as a Tier II country. Ethiopia lacks the capacity to investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes. Interagency coordination to combat trafficking is poor; the GoE's inter-ministerial council on trafficking last met over two years ago. Trafficking reported in 2009 was primarily labor-related. Primarily young women, particularly those ages 16-30, were trafficked to "work" in Middle Eastern countries as domestic employees. A small number of children were also reportedly trafficked internationally. Internal trafficking of children and adults continues to be a serious problem. The GoE has not seriously addressed this issue, and did not prosecute any cases of internal trafficking in 2008. ¶39. (U) Press freedom: Press freedom was restricted in the wake of November 2005 post-election violence. Relations, though marginally improved during 2006, worsened in 2007, 2008, and 2009 with journalists being harassed, detained, and given jail terms. While there are independent voices in the print media, a high degree of self-censorship is practiced. The broadcast media, radio and television, are government controlled and only infrequently air opposition voices. International media, including Voice of America, and internet sites are often jammed or blocked by the GoE if perceived as being pro-opposition or anti-ruling party. ADDIS ABAB 00002434 009.2 OF 009 ¶40. (U) Workers' rights: Although the law provides for workers' rights, unions have reported that employers frequently terminate workers for union activities. Anti-union discrimination is prevalent in the workplace and workers have found it difficult to conduct strikes. The ruling party tightly controls the leadership of the Confederation of Labor Unions and often influences union elections. Unemployment is high and poses major challenges to the organization of labor. There is no national minimum wage standard and many workers find it difficult to attain a decent standard of living. ¶41. (U) Child labor: Child labor remained a serious problem, both in urban and rural settings. Children as young as five are working. Rape remains a problem for underage domestic workers. Commercial sexual exploitation of children is also a growing problem. Girls as young as 11 work in brothels and as prostitutes in bars, hotels, resort towns, and rural truck stops. Forced adult and child labor involved in factory production is poorly documented, but appears to be a serious problem. Social welfare activists and civic organizers agree that forced child labor is pervasive in agrarian production (tea, coffee, sugarcane, and cotton),weaving, and gold mining. ¶42. (U) Working conditions: MOLSA's safety and health administration lacks the capacity to conduct systematic inspections. A lack of detailed, sector specific health and safety guidelines also inhibits enforcement. In theory, workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous situations without jeopardizing their employment; however, in practice, most workers fear losing their jobs in doing so. The GoE asserts that it is coordinating closely across NGO stakeholder groups and ministries to assess and address gaps in labor policies; however, evidence of these efforts is limited. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY -------------- -------------- ¶A. Major Strengths Identified: ¶43. (U) Security cooperation: Ethiopia has been a strong supporter of mutual security and counterterrorism initiatives. There is cooperation on military, intelligence and security issues when they explicitly advance GoE or ruling party interests. ¶B. Major Problems and Issues Identified: ¶44. (U) Border vulnerabilities: Ethiopia's long, remote, and porous border with Somalia is an insufficient barrier to extremists affiliated with transnational terrorism entering Ethiopian territory, particularly in the remote Somali region. A series of unclaimed, random, deadly bombings around the capital city and rural towns poses a potential security risk to individuals in country. MUSHINGI