SOMALILAND AMBASSDOR TO ETHIOPIA LOOKS FOR U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 002168 //// C O R R E C T E D COPY, ADDED CLASSIFIED BY STATEMENT //// SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SO ET SUBJECT: SOMALILAND AMBASSDOR TO ETHIOPIA LOOKS FOR U.S. ACTIVISM ON ELECTIONS DISPUTE REF: (A) ADDIS 2107 (B) ADDIS 2092 Classified by: PolOff Kirk McBride for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY . Somaliland Ambassador to Ethiopia Hassan told Charge on September 4 that he believes the UK/Ethiopian mediation on the Somaliland elections dispute has potential, when more fully developed, to produce a government-opposition agreement that would allow the staging of elections. He urged the U.S. to also play a more active role in resolving the dispute, especially by engaging with the opposition. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Somaliland Ambassador to Ethiopia Mohammed Hassan met on September 4 at his request with Charge and Pol/Econ Counselor. Hassan urged the U.S. to play a "defusing role," along with Ethiopia and the UK, in the ongoing electoral dispute in Somaliland. He said the British and Ethiopian mediation efforts were promising, but argued that U.S. intervention alone could persuade opposition supporters not to resort to violence. ¶3. (C) Hassan said that in his "personal view," the "Somaliland government will have no problem with the UK/Ethiopian proposal," although he added that the proposal would need to be refined in order to yield compromises on three key issues -- the status of the National Elections Commission (NEC),the status of the NGO Interpeace, and the role of the proposed body of experts. He said, again qualifying his comments as "not speaking for the government," that these problems can be solved. ¶4. (C) On the NEC, Hassan thought it is "too late" to change all seven members. He said two members had become particularly problematic to the opposition --- one ironically nominated by the opposition in the first place and the other nominated by the president. He thought these two might be replaced as part of a comprehensive agreement. ¶5. (C) On Interpeace, Hassan said bringing back the NGO after the government expelled it would be delicate. He thought it could be achieved, however, if Interpeace would agree to lower its profile with its staff acting as advisors to the envisioned body of international experts rather than as a virtual NEC, as he thought they had behaved in producing the existing registration list. ¶6. (C) Hassan sees an expansive role for the proposed international body of experts. He suggests that both the government and the opposition would agree to empower the experts to name the election date. He sees the experts as otherwise advising the government on all aspects of the elections process. He believes the opposition will ultimately accept that the Riyale government would remain in office after September 27 because the election clearly will not take place as scheduled and the Somaliland Constitution does not allow for the seating of an unelected, caretaker government. ¶7. (C) Charge pressed Hassan on the sequencing of the various elements he sees coming into play -- naming of a group of international experts, revision of the NEC, return of Interpeace, and signing of a memorandum of understanding. Hassan had given little thought to this and replied only by saying that the British were pressing for a rapid return of Interpeace as a means of persuading donors to release pledged funds. Hassan did acknowledge that an understanding among all parties on at least some of these points would be needed before the memorandum of understanding could be signed. ¶8. (C) Hassan closed by saying again that "an active U.S. role would be highly desirable," specifically to include witnessing the signing of the prospective British-Ethiopian Memorandum of Understanding. MEECE