SOMALILAND: UK EMBASSY VIEWS ON ETHIOPIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002107 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SO ET SUBJECT: SOMALILAND: UK EMBASSY VIEWS ON ETHIOPIAN INITIATIVE REF: ADDIS 2092 Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, Michael C. Gonzales for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Acting Deputy Chief of Mission met with UK Charge d'Affaires John Marshall on August 31 to cross-check the Ethiopian Government's (GoE) report on political mediation efforts in Somaliland (reftel) and discuss Marshall's August 28-29 visit to Hargeisa in support of that effort. Marshall assessed that the UK and GoE share common views of dynamics in Somaliland as well as regarding the Ethiopian mediation initiative. Marshall noted clearly that changes to the Somaliland National Election Commission (NEC) are necessary to formalize and build on the roadmap to a political solution as laid out in the Ethiopian non-paper. Marshall argued that he visited Hargeisa over the weekend to reinforce to President Riyale that the UK backs the Ethiopian approach and to stress to him the need for changes to the NEC. Marshall's visit also sought to reinforce to the Somaliland opposition that the introduction of a caretaker government is not an option. While Riyale was adamant against changes to the NEC, Finance Minister and close ruling party confidant of Riyale, Hussein Ali Duale (Awil),conceded that the UDUB party is open to changes in the NEC, but only after all parties sign a Memorandum of Understanding formalizing the Ethiopian non-paper. Other UDUB members reportedly told Marshall that changes to the NEC are possible without even being tied to timing of the MoU. ¶2. (C) Marshall did confirm that despite Ethiopian State Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Tekeda's assertion that all party leaders did endorse the non-paper's provision to defer elections until a panel of experts has been able to address problems with the voter registry, the opposition parties are not/not yet on board with this issue. He asserted that he is confident that unilateral action by President Riyale to make changes to the NEC in a credible manner would induce the opposition, under international pressure, to accept more overtly the provisions of the non-paper. At this point, the UK plans to let Marshall's push on Riyale to sink in while the GoE further adds detail to its non-paper. Marshall suggests that the U.S. defer direct engagement with Somaliland officials until it becomes clearer whether Riyale will take action on the NEC. Post reiterates reftel request for guidance on how to respond to the GoE's request for increased USG engagement. End Summary. FLESHING OUT DR. TEKEDA'S COMMENTS -------------- ¶3. (C) UK Charge John Marshall asserted that the UK and GoE share common views of dynamics in Somaliland as well as regarding the Ethiopian mediation initiative. While he noted that Dr. Tekeda may have exaggerated the collaboration behind the development of the Ethiopian non-paper, he asserted that the bulk of the substance contained therein was consistent with the UK view of what needed to be presented. He argued that the UK commented on an early draft, but only to remove overt criticism of Interpeace and of the NEC. Despite press arguments that the GoE is backing Riyale's position over the opposition, Marshall argued that the GoE is, in fact, pushing President Riyale to compromise with the opposition. In particular, Marshall argued that when Riyale pressed for another year in office, it was the GoE who reigned him in calling for a much shorter term extension only to accommodate technical issues with the NEC, election planning, and voter registry. ¶4. (C) Pressed on the degree of buy-in among the opposition parties for the Ethiopian non-paper, Marshall conceded that Dr. Tekeda's report may be a bit skewed. Tekeda was emphatic (with us as well as the UK) that the leaders of all three parties had agreed to the non-paper's provisions for deferring the elections and allowing President Riyale to remain in office until they are re-scheduled. Despite this, Marshall noted that both Kulmiye and UCID parties deny supporting such provisions. ¶5. (C) Marshall also gave insights into the administrative ADDIS ABAB 00002107 002 OF 003 challenges facing the electoral process. Specifically, he argued that the duplication of names and integrity of the information that went into the voter registry will require extensive remediation. He argued that while it is useful to retain the useful elements of the Interpeace registry effort, he admitted that once the panel of experts is in place, it is possible that they decide that starting afresh may make more sense than trying to clean a fundamentally flawed list. While he acknowledged the problem within the NEC of its slant toward the ruling party, Marshall expressed greater concern about the broader dysfunction of the NEC since its establishment. He argued that the members have failed fundamentally in making decisions or taking actions required to prepare for the national elections. Marshall emphasized that remedying this will be a key function for the panel of experts to monitor even if a new NEC is established. REFORMING THE NEC IS CRITICAL -------------- ¶6. (C) Marshall made clear that reforming the NEC -- both in its composition and its substantive preparations for the elections -- is critical for the successful implementation of the Ethiopian initiative and UK support. Marshall confided that before even disclosing his planned visit to Hargeisa to anyone but Dr. Tekeda, Somaliland Foreign Minister Abdullahi Duale called him to request that he not/not visit. After working the issue out, Marshall's first meeting upon arriving in Hargeisa was a one-on-one session with President Riyale. Marshall recounted Riyale's formality in which he remained seated at the desk in his office while Marshall was directed to a seat at the table extending perpendicularly from the desk. Marshall admitted that the objective of the one-on-one session was to privately convey to Riyale the need to change the NEC. Riyale, in turn, was emphatic that he would not move on either altering the NEC or allowing Interpeace to return to Somaliland. Despite starting the meeting with a request for another, follow-up meeting the following day, Marshall received a call the next day reporting that Riyale was ill and would not be available to meet. Marshall assessed that the move was to express Riyale's displeasure with hearing the message, but expected that it may require time and reinforcement before fully sinking in with the president. ¶7. (C) Marshall noted that he met with Somaliland Finance Minister and close ruling party confidant of Riyale, Hussein Ali Duale (Awil),after meeting with the president. Awil reportedly showed greater flexibility on the question of changing the NEC, but was adamant that such a change to the NEC could only be done after all parties have signed the Ethiopian MoU. Marshall pushed back noting that the NEC changes are a necessary -- and hopefully sufficient -- confidence building measure needed to secure the opposition parties' support for the MoU. Marshall further stressed the value of changing the NEC in 1) re-engaging the donor community, whose support has been seriously eroded by the current political crisis, 2) offering a popular gesture to an increasingly restive public, and 3) gaining the confidence of the opposition that the ruling party is prepared to engage sincerely. Despite this entreaty, Awil retained his entrenched position and theatrically accused Marshall of taking a decision that risks plunging Somaliland into chaos. The Charge reported later seeing several UDUB party members and parliamentarians who actually showed receptivity to make changes to the NEC and recognized the need to do so before signing the MoU. NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶8. (C) Marshall was clear that changing the NEC is critical to making the Ethiopian initiative work and he reported that the Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry confirmed to him on August 31 that Ethiopia shares this view. For the time being, he suggested, it is important for the UK's clear message to Riyale to sink in. Marshall admitted that the UK government has long provided assistance and support to Somaliland without conditions and even when doing so meant having to ignore problematic dynamics. He suggested that the nature and tone of the UK message to Riyale certainly must have been a surprise which will take time to internalize. ADDIS ABAB 00002107 003 OF 003 ¶9. (C) In the interim, he argued that the GoE will have to flesh out details of their non-paper to render it a much more specific MoU for eventual signature. From the UK side, the DfID office in Nairobi has begun discussing ideas for an eventual Terms of Reference for the panel of experts with counterparts from the donor community. Still, Marshall recognized that many donors have limited engagement on Somaliland in recent months in light of the poor handling of this crisis by Somaliland officials. As such, he suggested that a change of the NEC may be required to re-engage the donors adequately to produce a quality Terms of Reference and secure additional donor assistance. ¶10. (C) In response to a specific question as to how, or if, the USG should engage at this point to support efforts, Marshall's initial reaction was to urge the USG to defer direct engagement with Somaliland officials until it becomes clearer whether Riyale will take action on the NEC. Once Riyale's intentions become clearer, he suggested that a call from Assistant Secretary Carson or PDAS Yamamoto to Riyale may be of greater utility. MEECE