SOMALILAND: ETHIOPIA BROKERS ELECTION IMPASSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002092

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALILAND: ETHIOPIA BROKERS ELECTION IMPASSE
RESOLUTION PROPOSAL

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, Michael C. Gonzales for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

This is an action request, please see paras 1, 7, and 8.

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In an August 26 courtesy call with Charge, Ethiopian
State Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Tekeda Alemu discussed
his August 19-24 trip to Hargeisa, Somaliland in which he
attempted to broker a resolution to the elections impasse
between the ruling and opposition political parties. Tekeda
reported that in close coordination with the UK Embassy he
succeeded in securing all parties' agreement to task a panel
of experts to "clean up" the voter registry and, if
necessary, defer elections until a revised registry can be
put to use for more credible elections. Tekeda argued that
while the parties were agreed in principle to an
Ethiopia-developed non-paper, it remains for the UK to
continue to work with the parties on the details before the
agreement is finalized, perhaps in early-September. Tekeda
expressed significant concern that all parties in Somaliland
had shown a loss of confidence in their ability to get
through the current electoral crisis without the involvement
of outsiders, potentially rendering Somaliland less stable
and vulnerable to extremist influence. Dr. Tekeda made a
very strong push for the United States, along with the UK, to
support substantively current efforts to overcome the
Somaliland political crisis, specifically by witnessing the
signing of the agreement by the parties in Somaliland. It
appears that Tekeda presumably factored in increased
involvement by the UK and the U.S. in his efforts to secure
an agreement, although it is not clear at this point that
Tekeda's spin corresponds to the UK's view. We are seeking
the UK Embassy's own comments. Post requests guidance on how
to respond to Dr. Tekeda's clear push for an active U.S. role
in witnessing any potential signing ceremony as well as to
playing a potentially increasing role with the Somaliland
parties. End Summary.

A FLAWED VOTER REGISTRY AND AN ENTRENCHED PRESIDENT
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2. (C) Dr. Tekeda opened the discussion by noting that
Somaliland President Kahin Riyale was mistaken by thinking
that he could go forward with elections without using the
newly developed voter registry, especially given that the
parliament explicitly decided just last year that such a
registry shall be used for the next round of national
elections. The president's decision prompted significant
mistrust among the opposition in the president and seriously
politicized the issue of the registry. Tekeda argued that
while all parties agreed that the registry was faulty, the
opposition could not convince their supporters to go along
with delaying the September 27 elections. Once President
Riyale posed the options of going forward with elections on
time but without a registry, or deferring the elections and
start over in developing a new registry, the parties reached
an impasse.

ETHIOPIA'S NON-PAPER SOLUTION
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3. (C) It was against this background that the Ethiopian
Government (GoE) drafted a non-paper -- vetted through the UK
Embassy in Addis Ababa -- to propose to the Somalilanders.
Tekeda argued that neither a caretaker government or
government of national unity model would be permitted by
Somaliland's constitution or be supported by the parties. As
such, he said that the non-paper sought to depoliticize the
issue of the voter registry by subjecting the registry to a
panel of experts who would "clean" the registry. The
non-paper proposed an approach whereby the timetable for
holding the elections would be determined by the period
required by the experts to clean the registry. Tekeda
acknowledged that the opposition found it difficult to sell
this option to their supporters, but he also called the
opposition's initial disagreement with the proposal "beyond
logic." With strong UK support and engagement, Tekeda
asserted, opposition leaders were finally convinced of the
approach and agreed to it in a final meeting among the senior
leaders and deputies of each party around August 24. Tekeda

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explained that while the experts would certainly have to
address the major problems with the registry, they would also
have to be politically astute enough to do so in timely
enough manner to move forward with the elections before
opposition parties' frustration with the delays again
erupted. He explained that the non-paper permits the work of
the experts to determine the re-scheduling of the elections,
if necessary. While he suggested that an expeditious process
completed before September 27 could allow the elections to be
held on time, he made clear his doubt that such a truncated
time was realistic.

INTERPEACE AND THE NEC
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4. (C) Tekeda argued that the staff of Interpeace, the Swiss
NGO which has developed the voter registry at a cost of $10
million, were "arrogant" toward President Riyale, which
prompted the president to expel them from Somaliland. Tekeda
acknowledged that Riyale too was "emotional" in his reaction
to Interpeace and the registry it developed. Tekeda also
argued that the Somaliland National Electoral Council (NEC)
"made a fool of itself" when it supported Riyale's decision
to go forward with the elections without the registry.
Still, he argued emphatically that "the NEC is a state
institution" and it would have been "impossible" for it to
side with an NGO against a government institution. Tekeda
noted that it would be important to strengthen the NEC --
including through the consideration of all stakeholders,
including civil society representatives, the political
opposition, the House of Elders, and others. At the same
time, Tekeda was emphatic that "whatever is done with the NEC
must be in line with the constitution and should respect the
laws of the country."

MOVING FORWARD
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5. (C) Dr. Tekeda acknowledged that the non-paper to which
the parties agreed focused on principles, but still needed to
be fleshed out with details -- a task he claimed would remain
for the UK to complete over the coming two weeks. Noting the
apparent critical role of the proposed panel of experts, the
Charge asked how this body is to be chosen. Tekeda asserted
that the parties had agreed for the "Friends of Somaliland,"
in essence the UK, to identify the panel of experts who would
address the flaws in the registry. In response to an
estimate of the timeframe for completing this process, Tekeda
noted that six to eight months would not be surprising. He
recognized that the experts would have to be politically
sensitive and realistic about how tolerant the opposition
parties would be to delays of the elections. At the same
time, he argued that there were major shortcomings in the
registry that could not be left unaddressed.

CONCERNS ABOUT LOSS OF CONFIDENCE AND PUSHING FOR A U.S. ROLE
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6. (C) Dr. Tekeda reiterated at several points in the
discussion that he was greatly concerned about the loss of
confidence that the Somaliland parties expressed to him about
their ability to overcome this crisis and go through with the
electoral process on their own without the intervention of
outside supporters. Tekeda said that this is a new factor,
noting that in the last Somaliland elections each party
showed great confidence and adopted aggressive stances,
something notably absent from his just-concluded visit.
Tekeda observed that the robust presence of extremists in,
and passing through Somaliland and argued that a political
environment punctuated by a loss of confidence and distracted
by a political crisis risks presenting an opportunity for
extremists to take advantage of the situation to further
destabilize the region.


7. (C) Tekeda made a very strong and explicit push for the
United States to play an increased direct role to support the
current process until the elections are held. He argued that
"if we are serious about contributing to peace and stability
in the region, we need to be more serious about helping
them." In particular, Dr. Tekeda pushed for the United
States to witness the signing of the agreement by the
parties, presumably in Hargeisa, in September, along with the
UK. Tekeda also highlighted that the process of

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operationalizing this initial agreement into a specific
agreement to be signed, as well as the implementation of that
agreement, would likely require intensive shuttle diplomacy.

COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST
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8. (C) While the roadmap laid out in the Ethiopian non-paper
does present a potentially positive solution to a political
crisis, we are hearing suggestions that the Somaliland
opposition parties may not be fully on board even with this
framework of principles. We have also heard reports of at
lease some opposition dissatisfaction with how supportive the
non-paper and Dr. Tekeda have been of President Riyale's
position over the positions of the opposition. The
Ethiopians likely do share our interests in a peaceful
election and avoiding a crisis in Somaliland. At the same
time, they certainly also are remaining mindful of their own
domestic equities as they prepare for elections in 2010. It
appears that Tekeda factored in increased external,
specifically UK and U.S., involvement in his efforts to reach
an agreement, and of course may well have discussed this
possibility with one or all of the Somaliland parties. It is
not yet clear, however, that Dr. Tekeda's version of the
reported close UK collaboration in developing the proposed
solution, nor the specifics regarding increased UK and U.S.
involvement necessarily parallels UK views. The British
Ambassador is currently absent on leave, but we are seeking
comments from the Charge, who Tekeda asserted was in close
contact throughout his negotiations, and will report these
septel. Regardless, though, the GoE quite clearly would like
an early response regarding what role the United States is
willing to play to help resolve the current crisis in
Somaliland, and particularly whether we would witness the
formal signing of a formal agreement among the parties and
the Embassy requests guidance. End Comment.
MEECE