SOMALIA: TIME FOR PLAN B

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 001490

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: TIME FOR PLAN B

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Ted Harkema. Reason: 1.4 (B)
.

Introduction
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1. (S/NF) As Washington reviews U.S. policy towards
Somalia, particularly in light of the current crisis, we
offer our thoughts on how to sustain the TFG while ensuring
that core U.S. interests are protected. The TFG is in the
most severe crisis of its short life, and we have no
guarantees that it will survive, let alone succeed, to
establish a viable national government. As a result, we
cannot afford to wait to see what happens. As we continue to
support the TFG, we should take steps now, i.e. a Plan B, to
protect American interests.

Seeking a U.S. Objective in Somalia
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2. (S/NF) From our vantage point, the U.S. objective in
Somalia should be to facilitate the emergence of a strong
national democratic federal government, recognized as
legitimate by the majority of Somalis, that is capable of
policing its territory to such an extent that it can reduce,
and eventually, eliminate transnational threats from its
territory, and live in peace with its neighbors. However, we
must be realistic and understand that the TFG may not be the
vehicle for change we had hoped for, and that despite our
best efforts, the experiment may not work.

U.S. Ability to Save the TFG Limited
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3. (S/NF) Unfortunately, the window of opportunity to see
the TFG emerge as a national government is closing fast, if
it is not already shut, as the TFG is fighting for its life,
leaving us with few options, and even less ability to impact
the outcome of the current crisis. Washington's support for
AMISOM is the TFG's lifeline, and AMISOM is giving the TFG
the opportunity to get its house in order, if they decide to
take it. We cannot do it for them. At the end of the day,
the Somalis themselves are responsible for what happens in
their country. Should the TFG fall, the Somalis must accept
responsibility. U.S. policy has weighed both positive and
negative on Somalia in recent years, but Washington and the
international community has given the Somalis the opportunity
to change their fortune through the institutions of the TFG,
and it is up to the Somalis to decide to accept or reject it.
We cannot expect the Somali experiment to work when it
appears that we want to see a strong national government in
Somalia more than the Somalis, including some members of the
TFG itself, appear to want it.


4. (S/NF) Sending more weapons to Somalia is not the
answer. We have no mechanism to track the use and further
transfer of the weapons, and anecdotal reporting indicates
that some TFG forces are monetizing their weapons for various
ends, including to purchase khat, making the weapons
available for purchase by the insurgents. Frankly, we
question whether on any given day the TFG itself knows how
many troops it can reliably call on given the number of
defections and the shifting alliances. Analysis suggests
that the TFG's true problem is a lack of a unified command
and control over a force of divided and questionable
loyalties, a problem more weapons cannot fix. What the TFG
needs is soldiers who are willing to use the weapons they
have to defend the TFG. The fact that the TFG has constantly
to purchase loyalty to motivate militias to fight in its
defense suggests that there is a much deeper fundamental
problem within the TFG that is beyond the international
community's ability to address in the short-term, if at all.


5. (S/NF) Over the medium term, Washington, with support
from the international community, can take steps to disrupt
support to al-Shabaab and Hisb Islam, particularly from
Eritrea. It may be too optimistic to think that if we just
give President Isaias one more chance for dialogue, he will
amend his ways and cease being the single greatest source of
instability in the Horn of Africa. Washington can also
pursue other diplomatic initiatives, and press for support
from international partners, but there is little that the
U.S. can do to impact the course of the daily fighting on the

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ground in Mogadishu. That outcome is up to the Somalis to
decide.

For the Longer-Term, TFG Legitimacy is the Key
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6. (S/NF) Assuming the TFG survives the current crisis and
is able to find some breathing room, the focus of U.S.
efforts in Somalia should be to help the TFG establish
legitimacy in the minds of the Somali people. While the TFG
is fighting for its life, it is unreasonable to expect that
any progress can be made on long-term goals. Legitimacy, and
the resulting increase in popular support, will magnify the
TFG's influence in Mogadishu, and eventually other regions,
in a sustainable fashion that military force alone cannot.
In order to develop legitimacy, the TFG needs to provide
basic services to the population, something they have thus
far failed to do, partly because their priorities have been
elsewhere, and partly because of a lack of resources. This
is where Washington and the international community can
assist by providing programs to help the TFG build the
institutions of governance, and thereby demonstrate to the
Somali people that the TFG is a benefit to them. To date,
the vast majority of U.S. assistance to Somalia has been to
provide humanitarian relief and to support AMISOM, rather
than for capacity-building (The only financial assistance we
have given to the TFG was for the purchase of weapons and to
buy militia loyalty). Support for humanitarian aid and
AMISOM are important, but does not directly help the TFG
build a government. By not assisting the TFG directly, we
are again applying medicine to the symptoms, rather than the
root cause.


7. (S/NF) Legitimacy is also critical because it is
unrealistic to expect that the TFG is capable of defeating
its enemies militarily. The TFG relies on AMISOM to maintain
its presence in Mogadishu (In fact, AMISOM has become a
combatant by providing daily fire support to TFG forces),and
certainly, a government that cannot defend itself is in no
position to defeat a determined enemy. Furthermore, there
are no signs that al Shabaab and Hisb Islam, despite their
uneasy and fractured alliance, have been mortally wounded or
are near defeat. To the contrary, it is a far easier task
for the anti-TFG forces to bring down the TFG, than it is for
the TFG to defeat them because the TFG has an identifiable
and singular center of gravity, the presidency, whereas the
extremist network has multiple nodes from which to operate
and continue the war.


8. (S/NF) Steps that Washington can take directly, or in
coordination with the international community, to help the
TFG establish its legitimacy and capacity in the longer-term
include the following:

--Direct conditioned programmatic support to the TFG to build
capacity in the civil and security sectors (starting with a
Security Sector Reform assessment).

--Explicit insistence, backed by financial assistance and
conditionalities, that the TFG get on with governance and
service delivery.

--A regional diplomatic approach that seeks alignment of
regional activities (particularly Ethiopia and Eritrea) with
that of the international community.

--Continued support to AMISOM and contingency planning to
prepare for the possibility that the force may have to depart
Mogadishu quickly in a worst case scenario.

--A coordinated public diplomacy campaign that helps
highlight the service delivery of the TFG, and

--Provision of continued humanitarian and development
assistance.

Don't Wait, Implement Plan B Now
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9. (S/NF) Whatever happens with the TFG, there are steps
that Washington can and should take now. Time is running
out. The assassination of TFG Minister of Security Omar
Hashi and TFG Ambassador Abdi Karin Farah effectively

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neutralized any TFG counteroffensive in central Somalia, and
al-Shabaab is moving forward to establish competing local
governments throughout the central and southern regions with
ample financing and arms. No one can guarantee that the TFG
will survive, let alone succeed, and therefore, the U.S.
needs a Plan B that will limit the regional effects of
instability in Somalia as a backstop to ensure core U.S.
interests are protected. Waiting to draft and implement a
contingency plan until after the TFG falls does not serve
U.S. security interests. Even if the TFG survives, at best
it will be years before it might be in a position to
eliminate terrorism and piracy from Somalia. Plan B does not
preclude Plan A, the two should be complementary, and Plan B
has the potential to help create the necessary space for Plan
A to work.

--A regional diplomatic approach that is focused on
facilitating coordination among the "front-line" governments
to work together against a common threat.

--Increased support to Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Yemen
to amplify their counterterrorism capabilities.

--U.S. and UN sanctions against individuals and entities
supporting extremists in Somalia, with a particular focus on
Eritrean actors.

--A substantial increase in political, technical,
development, and CT support to Somaliland and Puntland who
need capacity to control their own territories and fight
against extremism and piracy.

--Increased intelligence collection on Somalia political and
security developments, and

--A comprehensive strategy to target high value targets,
their finances, movements, and weapons acquisition.

Kinetic Strikes Should Be Limited
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10. (S/NF) Kinetic strikes should be limited to high-value
targets (HVTs) who are a clear threat to the United States.
The elimination of HVTs who are also providing expertise and
assistance to al Shabaab would have an added benefit of
degrading the insurgent's capabilities. Ad hoc strikes
against non-HVTs in the name of "relieving the pressure" on
the TFG escalates our involvement in a civil war in the name
of counterterrorism, with no clear objectives, guidelines or
identifiable endstate, in a situation in which we have no
control. This also assumes that the TFG is in a position to
take advantage of any "space" that might result. At the same
time, there is no concrete evidence that periodic U.S.
strikes in Somalia are an effective deterrent, and al Shabaab
has demonstrated that it has been able to recover and replace
losses from occasional strikes, even if the insurgents were
temporarily disorganized. Strikes in defense of the TFG also
would reinforce the perception that the TFG is a puppet
government of the United States, and certainly result in
political backlash against President Sharif, who would be
forced to condemn publicly the attack. While TFG officials
may be in favor of U.S. military action in private, this is a
sign of weakness and desperation on their part. A Somali
government that was truly confident and secure would not
request foreign intervention because of the inevitable
domestic backlash from a Somali population that resents all
external interference.

A Note on Support to Somaliland and Puntland
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11. (S/NF) Should the TFG fall, there is no doubt that
Somaliland and Puntland will be the next targets of
al-Shabaab, and we note that if we wait until these two
governments are under direct sustained attack, it will be too
late to help them. The argument that U.S. support to
Somaliland would undermine the TFG politically ignores the
reality of the relationship between Mogadishu and Hargeysa,
and should not stand in the way of support to Somaliland to
prevent it from falling to al-Shabaab. Within the context of
Somali politics, it is difficult to imagine any scenario
whereby Somaliland would willingly surrender its independence
to a government in Mogadishu, and so Washington should

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recognize that southern Somalia and Somaliland will never
again be part of one unified state. We also would suggest
that in terms of U.S. interests, increased support to
Somaliland, short of recognition, may well be sufficient for
the time being. Puntland lacks the political institutions of
Somaliland, and would require more creativity in the
provision of support.

AMISOM Contingency Planning Still Needed
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12. (S/NF) AMISOM remains vulnerable to asymmetric attacks
and indirect fire, although it is unlikely that the entire
force would be overrun as long as it is supplied with
ammunition, but there is a significant risk that all or part
of the force could be cut off from the port or airfield.
AMISOM's battalions are spread out in central and southern
Mogadishu, making it more difficult for the battalions to
support each other, and putting some contingents at greater
risk. Furthermore, anti-TFG forces in the late June fighting
made territorial gains in the Karan district, putting them
within reach of the port. Politically, AMISOM could find
itself in Mogadishu without a TFG to support, a scenario also
requiring an evacuation from Somalia. Neither the AU nor
AMISOM have yet to develop contingency plans for evacuation,
and we continue to anticipate that the AU will look to
Washington for help in the event AMISOM has to depart
Mogadishu.
YAMAMOTO