ETHIOPIA'S EMERGENCY FOOD NEEDS - A PERMANENT STATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001348

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM EAID EAGR PREL ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA'S EMERGENCY FOOD NEEDS - A PERMANENT STATE

REF: ADDIS 1113

INTRODUCTION
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1. (SBU) Ethiopia is in a state of chronic food insecurity.
Climatic changes with the lack of rain have reduced annual harvests
from one instead of three harvests in many areas of Ethiopia. Along
with poor agricultural practices, Ethiopia faces another severe year
of hunger with the government under reporting that 4.9 million
people face severe food needs. USAID and the donor community
believe the actual number is 6.6 million people (reftel) -- less
than last year's severe drought-induced food needs but still
millions more than the government's figure. The Ethiopian
Government (GoE) is under-estimating the number of people facing
emergency assistance needs, overestimating harvest yields, and not
reporting full emergency food distribution figures. GoE food stocks
in, and en route, to country could avoid a pipeline break, but the
GoE is unlikely to use its own emergency food stocks, currently at
around 178,000 metric tons (MT),until the donor community pledges
food to replace what may be disbursed. Annual U.S. food donations
far exceed the total amount of food donated by all other donors
combined, yet such assistance is not reversing what has become a
permanent state of chronic food shortages. Focusing U.S.
development strategy on agricultural development, which will see a
significant increase this year with a modest US$ 20 million
allotment, will be essential to reversing the trend. More
important, greater GoE transparency, land reform, and better
distribution approaches are critical in reaching their intended
beneficiaries.

TRENDS ON THE GROUND
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2. (U) On January 30, 2009, the GoE announced a humanitarian
requirement for 591,000 MT of food assistance, worth US$ 511
million, to respond to the emergency needs of 4.9 million people
through June 2009.


3. (U) The first months were covered by US$ 121 million in resources
carried over from 2008, including US$ 111 million in new USG
contributions. Thus the starting balance of the appeal was US$ 389
million.


4. (U) To date, donors collectively have provided US$ 170 million
towards that balance, which is just less than half of the total
need. The United States provided 63 percent of the US$ 170 million.
Donors note a lack of confidence that food is reaching end
beneficiaries as a major justification for not contributing.


5. (U) There is a remaining relief need of approximately 178,000 MT
of food. The GoE currently has over 118,000 MT of food in its
Strategic Food Reserve, but is unwilling to draw down from that
unless/until donors pledge new resources to backfill the amount.
The GoE's Grain Trade Enterprise has over 260,000 MT of food
scheduled to arrive in country over the coming six weeks, but the
GoE is reserving that food to dump in urban markets to suppress
urban food inflation.


6. (U) While the GoE reports that 99% and 91% of food allocations
from February and March respectively have been dispatched to their
final distribution points, to date WFP cannot confirm that more than
15% and 1% of these allocations, respectively, have actually reached
end beneficiaries.


7. (SBU) The short belg rains, which normally contribute roughly
10-15% of Ethiopia's annual food output, have largely failed
throughout the belg-dependent areas. While the GoE has begun
assessing the belg performance -- dispatching teams from June 8 --
the State Minister for Agriculture has told donors that the GoE will
stand by the figure of 4.9 million people in need through October

2009.


8. (U) WFP has roughly 11,000 MT of food sitting in Port Djibouti,
but the GoE is only allocating four (4) trucks (accommodating a
total of roughly 100 MT) per day to transport that food into
Ethiopia.


9. (U) If the needs of 6.6 million people, as projected by USAID are
realized, an additional 450,000 MT is needed for July thru October,
and at the very least, if the 4.9 million people figure remains
constant the need will be for an additional 333,000 MT.

ACTUAL NEEDS
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10. (SBU) Due to the lack of GoE reporting on emergency food
distributions, we do not know how much food remains available or the
magnitude of the actual shortfall. With the failure of the belg
rains, we can safely assume that well over 4.9 million, and possibly
as many as 6.6 million people are now at risk, and will remain at
risk until the early "green maize" harvest in September. GoE food
stocks in the Strategic Food Reserve and Grain Trade Enterprise are
adequate to meet WFP's current declared shortfall, if the GoE were
willing to use them for emergency relief. If the GoE is not willing
to do so, only donor contributions to fill the existing shortfall
would be sufficient to move the GoE to "lend" its food for relief
purposes to fill the imminent pipeline break. The USG has already
provided significant resources to the 2009 emergency appeal, and
would request additional donors to contribute to the outstanding
need.

THE LONG-TERM PICTURE
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11. (SBU) We assess that with greatly improved agricultural
techniques, and agricultural and economic reforms, Ethiopia can
eventually meet most of its food needs. Thus, the critical nature
of agricultural development assistance. Ethiopia's perennial
emergency food dependence is, de facto, a permanent condition. The
U.S. participates with eight other donors and the GoE in the
Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) which, coupled with other food
security programs, intends to graduate 8 million people into food
security by 2014. In additional to continuing support to the GoE's
multi-donor safety-net program, the USG must decide among the
following options to address remaining long-term food insecurity in
Ethiopia:

A) The USG could continue to provide massive food aid, which is
unsustainable, in meeting Ethiopia's permanent state of emergency
food need each year,

B) The USG could decide to provide significantly greater
assistance for sustainable agricultural productivity, and the
flexibility in its usage to operate within the constraints, and meet
the needs, of Ethiopia's specific environment, or

C) The USG could engage the GoE robustly to push for a shift in
economic and agricultural policies (regarding land tenure,
agricultural technologies and practices, agricultural inputs, etc.)
to increase domestic agricultural productivity.

Ultimately, only a mix of these three approaches will prove
effective. As we prepare for senior level discussions between the
U.S. and Ethiopia in the near future, we will need full interagency
support on an approach to address what has become Ethiopia's
permanent state of chronic food insecurity.

YAMAMOTO