SOMALIA: TFG-ASWJ RELATIONS DETERIORATING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001331 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2019 TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET SUBJECT: SOMALIA: TFG-ASWJ RELATIONS DETERIORATING REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 1275 ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 1238 ¶C. ADDIS ABABA 1138 Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C/NF) Summary. Five members of the Alhu Sunnah Wal Jammah (ASWJ) leadership committee told PolOff on June 6 that they believed the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was turning against them as evidenced by recent events. They blamed their June 5 defeat at Wahbo in part on TFG Minister of Security Omar Hashi's removal of a militia at Maxaas which opened the road and allowed al-Shabaab and Hisb Islam to send reinforcements to attack ASWJ. The leaders also alleged that TFG forces in Mogadishu massacred 10 unarmed ASWJ men on June 2. They said TFG President Sheikh Sharif's much publicized meeting with ASWJ clerics in Mogadishu in early June was another attempt to undermine their organization because they said the people with whom Sharif met had no relationship with the ASWJ fighting al-Shabaab. ASWJ, they said, was now looking to "make a statement" to get the international community's attention to their cause since they had been unable to establish an alliance with the TFG or gain support. While they had not yet decided on what actions to take, one option they noted was to cease offensive military operations against al-Shabaab and instead just hold their present ground. The leaders hoped to visit Washington in the near future to make their case to senior U.S. officials in person. End Summary. ASWJ Blames TFG for Contributing to Wabho Defeat -------------- --- ¶2. (C) The leaders detailed the fighting in Wabho on June 5, calling the battle their "first defeat," and they blamed the result in part on an unwillingness by the TFG to cooperate militarily in the field. They said that a combined al-Shabaab and Hisb Islam force attacked them at least four times, resulting in heavy fighting that they claimed killed more than 100 people and destroyed part of the town. They claimed that Hassan Dahir Aweys was wounded in the fighting. By late in the day, they said, the ASWJ militia was forced to abandon the town to a position 10 kilometers away. They stated that prior to the attack their forces in Wabho had been counting on militia loyal to TFG Minister of Security Omar Hashi to control the town of Maxaas and keep additional al-Shabaab and Hisb Islam forces from coming into Galguduud. (Note. Wabho and Maxaas are on a key road linking Galguduud with Hiraan. Hashi entered Hiraan in early June to rally his militias and go on the offensive against al-Shabaab. End Note.) However, they said Hashi ordered the Maxaas militia to withdraw from the town on June 4 which left the road open for al-Shabaab and Hisb Islam reinforcements to enter Galguduud and attack ASWJ. Several members believed that the TFG had deliberately left them exposed in order to keep ASWJ from expanding its territory. ¶3. (C) In the leaders' view, the TFG was willing to engage with them before the TFG began receiving materiel and financial assistance from the international community when the TFG was more desperate. They postulated that the TFG, now bolstered, assessed it no longer needs ASWJ, and instead is actively seeking to undermine them for the TFG's own political interests. The leaders said they were prepared to cooperate militarily with the TFG now, if the TFG shared resources with them, and ASWJ would leave political power-sharing talks for down the road. Alleges TFG Massacre of ASWJ Members in Mogadishu -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) The leaders alleged that TFG forces had murdered 10 unarmed ASWJ members in the Medina District of Mogadishu on June 2. They claimed that the men were worshipping in a well-known ASWJ mosque in the "Hoos" neighborhood when militiamen commanded by Abdifatah Shaweye, the Deputy Governor of Benadir, forced the men into the street and then shot them, killing several instantly and wounding several others. During the shooting, several of the men fled and were chased, but got away. The leaders said the militiamen returned from chasing the runners and executed the wounded. They said two days later the TFG Minister of Information acknowledged that an unfortunate incident had occurred, but ADDIS ABAB 00001331 002 OF 003 the TFG took no action against the militia or its commander. Will the Real ASWJ Stand Up? -------------- ¶5. (C) PolOff inquired about the press reports from June 4 that ASWJ clerics had met with TFG President Sheikh Sharif in Mogadishu and blessed the TFG. The leaders responded that the people with whom Sharif met were ASWJ in the broad religious sense that most Somalis consider themselves ASWJ, but they had no affiliation with the ASWJ organization that was fighting al-Shabaab and Hisb Islam. On the contrary, they said, many of the people with whom Sharif met were also members of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization to which they claimed Sharif belonged. One of the leaders, a son of Sheikh Mahamoud, the chairman of the broader religious association of ASWJ clerics who resides in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, told PolOff that President Sharif himself was the son of a prominent ASWJ cleric. The leaders interpreted President Sharif's meeting as another attempt to undermine their standing in Somalia. (Note: Alhu Sunnah Wal Jammah is the name of the traditional order of Sufism in Somalia, and by tradition and religion, most Somalis consider themselves part of this community. End Note.) Considering "Making a Statement" to Get World Attention -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) The ASWJ leaders said they were looking to "make a statement" to get the world's attention, expressing their frustration that despite their months of successful fighting against al-Shabaab, they had been unable to come to any agreement with the TFG or gain the support of the international community. They reminded PolOff that they had been fighting against al-Shabaab long before President Sharif entered the TFG. They confessed that they had not yet made any decisions on what actions to take, but they laid out several options. One option, they noted, was to cease all military operations for a period of time to show the world that the TFG could not defeat al-Shabaab on its own. They assessed that their activities had kept al-Shabaab from being able to concentrate on defeating the TFG. Another option they said was to agree to a cease-fire with the extremists, an option they said would also result in increased attacks against the TFG. They said they had no plans to fight the TFG militarily, but in a worst case, they could undertake activities behind the scenes to undermine the TFG politically. They said they had refrained from doing so until now, but they thought that if the TFG continued to view them as the enemy, they may have no choice. PolOff noted that if the TFG were to collapse, then al-Shabaab would be able to concentrate on defeating them. They acknowledged the point, but underscored that they were in a difficult position with no easy way out. They said they supported the TFG as an institution and stated that the best solution was for an alliance with the TFG. Need for Humanitarian Aid -------------- ¶7. (C) Why is no humanitarian aid getting to our areas, the leaders queried. They asserted that aid was flowing to TFG and al-Shabaab areas, but not to them. They said they controlled most of Galguduud and promised to provide protection for humanitarian workers and the delivery of assistance. They also said they were willing to escort anyone into their area who wanted to see conditions on the ground first hand. Seeking a Washington Visit -------------- ¶8. (C) The leaders expressed their desire to visit Washington and meet with senior State Department officials. They said they were looking to "make their case" in person to dispel any questions as to who ASWJ was and what they stood for. PolOff responded that he would seek Washington's thoughts on a proposed visit. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C/NF) It should take little imagination to see that if ADDIS ABAB 00001331 003 OF 003 the relationship between ASWJ and the TFG continues to deteriorate, the TFG itself risks being further undermined, and therefore, we encourage Washington to reconsider its opposition to supporting reconciliation between the TFG and ASWJ. The TFG remains fragile. ASWJ is an emerging credible entity, supported by moderates, that has a strong track record of opposing extremists and defeating al-Shabaab. The cooperation of the two groups is critical to shoring up the TFG. Reconciliation is in line with Washington's broader goals for Somalia, and the history of Somalia is full of examples of what happens when parties are left out of the political process. They become spoilers. End Comment. YAMAMOTO