SOMALIA: WHERE TO GO WITH ASWJ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001275 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2019 TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET SUBJECT: SOMALIA: WHERE TO GO WITH ASWJ Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C/NF) Summary. In the view of Embassy Addis Ababa, U.S. pressure is needed if an alliance is to be formed between the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Alhu Sunnah Wal Jammah (ASWJ). We believe that an alliance would be a natural progression of the TFG's ongoing reconciliation efforts with various Somali entities, and would have the potential to broaden popular support for the government, increase its legitimacy in the eyes of the Somali people, and expand the government's military capability to fight the extremists. We recommend that any U.S. support for ASWJ be given only if the group joins the TFG, otherwise direct support would undermine the already fragile political state of the government. End Summary. Background on ASWJ -------------- ¶2. (SBU) ASWJ, in the context of the group now negotiating with the TFG for an alliance, is a relatively new phenomenon evolving since 1991 from a gathering of Sufi religious scholars into an emerging political and military force after the rise of the Islamic Courts in 2006 fighting to preserve its traditions and beliefs against al-Shabaab,s imposition of radical Islam. The group takes it names from the traditional order of Sufism in Somalia, but until the last few years, the broader network of ASWJ sheikhs and clerics refrained from politics or military activities as an organization. By tradition and religion, most Somalis consider themselves part of the broader ASWJ religious community. The emerging political ASWJ arose to combat al-Shabaab,s attack on Sufism including, for example, the closing of traditional Sufi schools and mosques and desecration of the graves of revered Sufi religious clerics. The leadership committee members of the ASWJ now fighting al-Shabaab are primarily the sons of prominent Sufi sheikhs who live in Somalia, and they were organized and tasked by their fathers to defend their people and beliefs. The al-Shabaab threat showed ASWJ that they needed to move into the political and military arena out of self-preservation. There is no doubt that some of the leaders of ASWJ are taking advantage of the situation to advance their self-interest, nevertheless, the group appears fully committed to fighting Islamic extremism because it has become such a threat to their way of life that it can no longer be ignored. The leadership committee is cross-clan, and they claim that their militias are as well, although their claims of not suffering from clan divisions almost certainly are overstated. We have no way to verify the composition of their militias, but we have noted Dir commanders leading Hawiye militias, and ASWJ has militias in Hawiye, Darood, and Rahanweyn-dominated areas suggesting at least a minimal level of multi-clan support. TFG-ASWJ Alliance Needed -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) In our view, it is in the U.S. interest that the TFG and ASWJ ally together against al-Shabaab and the other extremists elements within Somalia. Inclusion of ASWJ has the potential to broaden popular support for the TFG, increasing its legitimacy, and providing it with needed military capability to help fight the extremists. ASWJ demonstrated in central Somalia, where it probably has the most support, that it can defeat al-Shabaab and clear territory of extremists. Furthermore, if the TFG is to succeed and expand its influence, it will need to accommodate ASWJ sooner or later because of ASWJ,s growing influence. While impossible to conclude with certainty, there is considerable strength to the argument that the emergence of ASWJ has forced al-Shabaab to divide its forces and kept it from being able to concentrate on toppling the TFG. Beyond military support, the emergence of an alliance will give the perception that the TFG is becoming more powerful, and that perception, all important in Somali politics because Somalis support whoever they think is on top, could push fence sitters to commit to the TFG. Where Negotiations Stand -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) The TFG leadership and ASWJ remain strongly distrustful of each other, but both recognize the value of an ADDIS ABAB 00001275 002 OF 002 alliance providing they can come to mutually acceptable terms. The TFG fears ASWJ will rise to overshadow the TFG and render it increasingly irrelevant within Somali politics because of ASWJ,s military success and more broad based religious appeal. In our view, this fear is well founded because of the apparent inability of the TFG to function and because of its dominance by former Islamic Courts officials, many of whom were former allies of al-Shabaab. As a result, the TFG wants to incorporate ASWJ now, before it becomes too powerful, and by incorporation dilute its status as a separate identity. The TFG has offered ASWJ deputy minister positions and sharing of resources for military operations. The TFG also wants to break-up ASWJ militias and put them under TFG commanders, a feat it has yet to accomplish with its own former TFG and ICU militias. The TFG has been more willing to accommodate former warlords and proven extremists within its ranks who are seen as less of a threat. ¶5. (C/NF) ASWJ distrusts the TFG because it remains uncertain whether Sheikh Sharif and his leadership have abandoned their radical past, or remain, in their view, Wahhabi. ASWJ leaders want to join the TFG, and eventually become the dominant power within it. They value order and have pledged to never take up arms against the TFG, although politically they may continue to ignore it if an alliance is not possible. They fear being used by the TFG to defeat al-Shabaab and then be cast away, thus losing the ability to protect themselves politically from a TFG they inherently distrust as hostile to their Sufi beliefs. ASWJ needs resources to fight the extremists, and they insist that they must be allowed to maintain their separate identity in the not unreasonable conclusion that their identity has been the key to their success against the extremists. Nevertheless, both sides continue to try to manipulate the other. U.S. Pressure Needed to Form Alliance -------------- -- ¶6. (C/NF) We believe that U.S. pressure is needed if an alliance is to be made, and we think support, lethal or non-lethal, should be provided to ASWJ only as part of the TFG. Providing support to ASWJ independent of the TFG will undermine it politically, and be counterproductive. Based on our judgment of where things stand, we think the best option is for the two sides to agree to share military resources now to fight al-Shabaab and the extremists, and agree to postpone political power sharing negotiations until a later date (as we have explained to ASWJ, this is only an unproven transitional government, and it may not be in their interest to take high profile positions in it now). To make this happen, we suggest that the U.S. inform the TFG that unless they come to an agreement with ASWJ, the U.S. will explore providing direct assistance to ASWJ (again we think direct support is not a good idea, but it should be a threat sufficient enough to motivate the TFG). The U.S. should also inform ASWJ that there will be no support of any kind if they do not come to terms with the TFG. ASWJ claims they would agree to such a pact if the U.S. is involved. Obviously, the U.S. cannot be a guarantor of such an agreement, but we can facilitate it, and assure both sides we will pressure the other to abide by it. YAMAMOTO