ETHIOPIA, SOMALIA, AMISOM, AND THE WAY FORWARD

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001186

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA, SOMALIA, AMISOM, AND THE WAY FORWARD

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (S/NF) Summary. Embassy Addis Ababa avails itself of
the opportunity to provide our analysis of the current
situation in Somalia, particularly as it relates to Ethiopia
and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),and
suggest options for the United States on a way forward. As
conditions currently stand, there are no indications that the
Ethiopian government intends to intervene militarily should
the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) fall.
Prime Minister Meles believes that the fate of the TFG rests
with the international community. However, the recent
fighting in Mogadishu demonstrated that the African Union
(AU) has no contingency plans in the event an evacuation of
AMISOM is required. Recognizing that providing direct
military support to the TFG raises the stakes in Somalia, and
if Washington wants to continue pursuing this policy, we
encourage Washington to expand support to the TFG to enable
it be able to provide governance and services to the Somali
people to enhance its legitimacy within Somalia. We believe
establishing the legitimacy of the TFG is critical if it is
to survive, and military support alone will not be sufficient
to make this happen. End Summary.

Ethiopia Unlikely to Intervene
--------------


2. (S/NF) There are no indications that Ethiopia will
intervene in Somalia now, or if the TFG falls. The
Ethiopians want to see the TFG succeed, but they have no
faith that it will do so barring significant assistance from
the international community, far more assistance than is
currently being given. The Ethiopians are not concerned with
Somali infighting, but they would be concerned with the
emergence of a unified Somalia that is hostile to Ethiopia (a
decidedly unlikely prospect for the near term). Ethiopia's
plan is to support proxies along their border areas like the
Rahanweyn Resistance Army and al Sunnah Wal Jammah.
Ethiopian troops in small numbers probably will move in and
out of Somalia along the border areas to collect intelligence
and to support their proxies, but there are no indications
that any large-scale military incursion is in the offing.
Prime Minister Meles told the UN Security Council on May 16
that the current level of fighting in Somalia was at an
acceptable level and he did not see the emergence of a
unified threat to Ethiopia any time soon as occurred in 2005
with the rise of the Islamic Courts.

Contingency Planning for AMISOM Needed
--------------


3. (S/NF) The May crisis demonstrated that the AU has no
contingency plans should AMISOM be compelled to leave
Mogadishu, and we anticipate that if evacuation is needed the
AU will ask Washington for rescue. The AU leadership is
unwilling seriously to consider contingency planning because
it might be perceived by the donors as a lack of intestinal
fortitude on the part of the AU, and prompt the donors to
cease support. The AU leadership is conflating the
international community's concerns of the stability of the
TFG with a perceived lack of confidence in AMISOM. As a
result, AU leaders are unwilling to be seen admitting
publicly that the TFG may fail. However in private, they
have expressed to us strong concerns that the TFG may falter
and that the AU would be blamed.


4. (S/NF) We judge that the most likely scenario for an
AMISOM evacuation is that a TFG collapse would leave the
peacekeepers in Mogadishu without a government to support.
We think it is likely that if Mogadishu falls, the extremists
would give AMISOM a fixed time period to leave, presumably
without their vehicles and weapons. The idea that the entire
force would be over-run seems unlikely, although AMISOM's
current configuration on the ground exposes a part of the
force to assault more than others. In particular, the
Burundi contingent garrisoned at the Siad Barre Military
Academy is in the most danger of being cut off from the port
and airfield should conditions in Mogadishu deteriorate
further. We continue to urge the AU to consider redeploying
its forces into a more defensible position.

Suggestions for the Way Forward
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ADDIS ABAB 00001186 002 OF 002




5. (S/NF) We recognize that there are no good options for a
way forward in Somalia given the circumstances.
Nevertheless, it is our view that while military support to
the TFG may get the government through the current crisis, it
commits the United States to backing overtly and militarily a
paper government that is not yet seen as legitimate by the
Somali people, and raises U.S. involvement in the morass of
a Somali civil war in the name of counterterrorism. As
Ethiopia and Embassy Addis Ababa most certainly will be
impacted by this course of action, we strongly encourage
Washington to review this policy carefully. If Washington is
committed to pursuing this policy, we caution that military
support and support for AMISOM is not enough to change the
situation on the ground in Somalia. For the TFG to become
acceptable and legitimate in the eyes of the majority of
Somalis, the TFG must begin to govern and provide basic
services to the people. As U.S. military doctrine teaches,
establishing the legitimacy of the national government is
fundamental to defeating an insurgency such as al-Shabaab.
The TFG needs resources, support, and strong prodding to move
in this direction, and if we wait for the international
community to fill this gap, it probably will be too late.


6. (S/NF) Continued commitment to the TFG should include
the following elements. Some of these elements are being
pursued, but we believe that there is considerable room for
increased coordination and intensification of efforts:

--Direct conditioned support to the TFG to build capacity in
the civil and security sectors.

--Explicit insistence, backed by financial assistance and
conditionalities that the TFG get on with governance and
service delivery.

--A regional diplomatic approach that seeks alignment of
regional activities (particularly Ethiopia and Eritrea) with
that of the international community.

--Continued support to AMISOM and contingency planning to
prepare for the possibility that the force may have to depart
Mogadishu quickly in a worst case scenario.

--A coordinated public diplomacy campaign that helps
highlight the service delivery of the TFG, and

--Provision of continued humanitarian and development
assistance.


7. (S/NF) As we all recognize that there is a significant
risk that the TFG may not survive in the coming weeks or
months, we encourage Washington to implement additional steps
that would still work in support of the TFG, but also ensure
that core U.S. interests are protected. These steps would
include:

--A regional diplomatic approach that is focused on
facilitating coordination among the "front-line" governments
to work together against a common threat.

--Increased support to Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Yemen
to amplify their counterterrorism capabilities.

--A substantial increase in political, technical,
development, and CT support to Somaliland and Puntland who
need capacity to control their own territories and fight
against extremism and piracy.

--Increased intelligence collection on Somalia political and
security developments, and

--A comprehensive strategy to target high value targets,
their finances, movements, and weapons acquisition that
includes guidelines for kinetic strikes that minimizes the
potential for military action to undermine broader U.S.
engagement efforts.
YAMAMOTO