PRIME MINISTER MELES AND THE UNSC DISCUSS SOMALIA,

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001149 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO SU ET SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER MELES AND THE UNSC DISCUSS SOMALIA, SUDAN, AND ERITREA ¶1. (SBU) Summary. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles on May 16 provided visiting Ambassador Susan Rice and delegates from the United Nations Security Council his analysis of ongoing issues of mutual interest regarding Somalia, Sudan, and Eritrea. On Somalia, Meles assessed that the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was wasting valuable time by failing to capitalize on the good will of the Somali people which was creating opportunities for al-Shabaab and other opposition groups to exploit. Meles suggested that the international community, if it had the political will, could stem the flow of weapons and foreign fighters to Somalia. On Sudan, Meles said action was needed now to ensure that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) would be implemented by 2011, but he believed that the ICC indictment against President Bashir only made a political solution in Darfur more difficult to find. Meles was also worried that southern Sudan was becoming increasingly unstable. Meles advised the UNSC to take action against Eritrea only if they had the political will to follow through, otherwise they should ignore Eritrea's provocations. Meles told the UNSC that instead they had taken the worst of all possible paths by threatening to take action, and then failing to act, showing President Isaias that there were no international repercussions to his destabilizing activities. End Summary. The TFG Wasting Opportunities, but Support Needed -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Regarding Somalia, Prime Minister Meles assessed that the TFG under President Sheikh Sharif had more legitimacy and support from Somalis, particularly in Mogadishu, than the previous government of Abdallahi Yusuf. Unfortunately, he said, the TFG was wasting its initial support by failing "to get its act together." He thought that the recent violence in Mogadishu had demonstrated how little the government had done the in previous three months to establish its institutions and security apparatus. This failure, he said, had created an opening for al-Shabaab and the other opposition groups to exploit. Meles did not think that "all was lost," but he warned that significant support from the international community was needed if the TFG was to survive. Meles stated that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had proved its mettle by standing firm against attacks, but he hoped that AMISOM would be strengthened in the coming weeks. ¶3. (SBU) In response to the question of what the UNSC could do to improve the situation, Meles responded that the international community, if it had the political will, could stop the flow of weapons and foreign fighters into Somalia. He suggested that the UNSC "knew where the support to al-Shabaab was coming from," and that actions could be taken to interdict those flows. Meles added that because of the increased naval presence off the coast of Somalia to combat piracy, most of the support was moving by air. He suggested that those powers with the capabilities track the support flights. CPA Lagging, South Sudan Unstable, ICC Unhelpful -------------- --- ¶4. (SBU) "Unless action is taken now, it is unlikely that all of the elements of the CPA will be implemented by 2011," Meles said. He thought that both parties, the North and South, were postponing key issues. Part of the problem, according to Meles, was that both sides feared what would happen after 2011. Meles advised the UNSC to take a closer look at the destabilization of South Sudan, noting that this issue would also jeopardize implementation of the CPA. Referring to recent fighting in the south where hundreds of people had been killed, he said former enemies were proving unable to live together peacefully. He stated that groups in the north were unsure what was going to happen after 2011 and were using ties with former allies in the south to cause problems for the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). He anticipated that support to anti-SPLM factions would only increase as 2011 approached. Meles criticized the SPLM for failing utilize its resources adequately to improve the lives of the people, but he added that the south had not received all the resources it should have from the North. Meles judged that neither the North nor the South had done ADDIS ABAB 00001149 002 OF 002 enough to make unity attractive to the people of southern Sudan. ¶5. (SBU) Meles said Ethiopia's position on the ICC indictment against President Bashir was in step with the African Union's position that the indictment would only make a political solution to Darfur more difficult to find. He noted that Darfur was a Sudanese problem requiring a political solution before "legal issues" could be addressed. On the broader issue of peace in Darfur, Meles questioned whether the parties involved, particularly the rebels, were genuinely interested in peace. Meles emphasized that the problems in Sudan had regional implications as well that should be factored in, most obviously with Chad, but also "with other countries, in a clear reference to Ethiopia. Meles Critical of the UNSC on Eritrea -------------- ¶6. (SBU) On the question of how Meles saw Eritrea's role in the region, Meles responded that the source of the problem in Eritrea was a conflict between the people of Eritrea and their leadership. He said Eritrean President Isaias blamed the Eritrean youth and the international community for Eritrea's problems. Meles thought that Isaias viewed today's Eritrean youth as "soft and spineless" unable to "stoically" suffer as the older generation had. Because of this, Isaias sought to "shape" the youth in a certain way, but the youth were resisting "being shaped" and were fleeing Eritrea. According to Meles, the flight of the youth only reinforced Isaias' view that the youth were unwilling "to endure hardship." Isaias, Meles said, blamed the international community, and particularly the United States, for failing to shape Ethiopia following the end of the 1998-2000 Border war with Eritrea. As a result, Isaias was "punishing" the youth, Ethiopia, and the international community by causing as much pain and irritation as he could, Meles concluded. ¶7. (SBU) Meles' advice to the UNSC for dealing with Eritrea was to take one of two responses. He stated that if the international community had the power and political will to force change in Eritrea, then "do it." If not, then Eritrea should simply be ignored and "put up with the pain." Ethiopia, he made clear, had chosen to follow the latter course. But, Meles insisted, the UNSC had taken the worst of all possible actions. Using the recent border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti as an example, he said the UNSC had issued an ultimatum to Eritrea that it did not follow through on. He stated that both Asmara and Addis Ababa saw the ultimatum as "toothless," and a demonstration to other nations in the region that one can defy the UNSC without any repercussions. Meles underscored that if the UNSC sought to take action against Eritrea for its destabilizing role in Somalia, the UNSC must do so only if they have the political will to follow through. Meles assessed that Isaias was a "rational, sober, and logical" leader who was "playing another game," with a very high threshold for pain. He advised that Isaias did have a threshold, and if pressured hard enough, Isaias would modify his actions. ¶8. (U) Ambassador Rice cleared this cable. YAMAMOTO