SOMALIA: TFG AND ASWJ EXPLORING ALLIANCE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001138

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: TFG AND ASWJ EXPLORING ALLIANCE

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (S/NF) Summary. Al Sunnah wal Jama'a (ASWJ) leadership
committee member Mahdi Dahir Sheikh Nur (Darood) told PolOff
on May 12 that the ASWJ leadership committee would be
arriving in Addis Ababa during the week of May 17 to hold
discussions with Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Deputy
Prime Minister Sharif Hassan and the Ethiopian government in
a continuation of their attempt to form an alliance. Mahdi
said the Ethiopians were supportive of an alliance, but the
TFG was resisting because it fears being "swallowed" by ASWJ.
Mahdi envisioned an arrangement with the TFG whereby central
and southern Somalia would be divided between them until they
had cleared Somalia of extremists. Then the two sides would
integrate into a formal government of some fashion. He hoped
Washington would support such an arrangement and asked for
financial and military support from the United States. Post
would welcome Washington's guidance on the issue of a
possible alliance, and what role, if any, we should play.
(Note: It is unclear whether this committee represents all
Somalia ASWJ members in East Africa, but it is clear that
they are responsible for the ASWJ militias fighting against
al-Shabaab. End Note.) End Summary.

TFG Resisting Alliance, Ethiopia Supportive
--------------


2. (S/NF) According to Mahdi, both the leadership council
of ASWJ and Sharif Hassan would be arriving in Addis Ababa
during the week of May 17 to negotiate a possible alliance.
Addis Ababa was chosen as the venue because both sides wanted
a third party arbitrator to oversee the negotiations. Mahdi
said in April he met with Hassan and TFG Minister for Post
and Telecommunications Abdirizak Osman Jirule, aka "Dr.
Jurile," to initiate serious discussions on the formation of
a secret pact which would constitute a kind of alliance
between ASWJ and the TFG. He said the Ethiopian government
was supportive on an alliance, and that Ethiopian Prime
Minister Meles told Sheikh Sharif that Sharif had no option
but to ally with ASWJ, or the TFG would not survive. He said
the TFG had been resisting because they feared that
eventually the TFG would be "swallowed" by ASWJ.
Nevertheless, he said the TFG was on the verge of collapse,
and if they wanted to survive, they might agree to a deal.
Mahdi told PolOff on May 14 that he had spoken to Hassan that
morning, and that Hassan had pledged to come to Addis with
the full power to negotiate.


3. (S/NF) Mahdi said he and Sharif Hassan were "old
friends" and had worked together on and off for years. He
said he and Hassan had helped form the Rahanweyn Resistance
Army (RRA) together, and that the name "RRA" was first
conceived in his home.

ASWJ's Terms of the Agreement
--------------


4. (S/NF) In Mahdi's view, the agreement would divide
central and southern Somalia between the TFG and ASWJ,
assigning each areas to control to rid them of the
extremists. ASWJ would assume responsibility for Gedo, Bay
and Bakool, part of Hiraan, and Galguduud, while the TFG
would take responsibility for Mogadishu and the rest while
sharing resources and intelligence. Then, in approximately
two years when the extremists have been defeated, a more
formal arrangement could be made incorporating ASWJ into the
TFG. Mahdi thought it was only natural that ASWJ would
become the dominant influence with the future Somali
government. Mahdi insisted, however, that Sheikh Sharif
would have to publicly distance himself from the extremists,
and condemn their actions to show that Sharif had taken a
stand against the extremist form of Islam. Mahdi also said
the TFG needed to be "disinfected" of extremists.

Mahdi: "The TFG Won't Survive Without Us"
--------------


5. (S/NF) Mahdi did not believe the TFG would survive
without assistance from ASWJ, but he admitted that if the TFG
fell, ASWJ would not be able hold back al-Shabaab on its own.
Therefore, in his view, it was in both the TFG's and ASWJ's
interest that they ally. He opined that it may already be
too late as the TFG appears on the brink of collapsing under

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attacks by the opposition, but he asserted that ASWJ was now
fielding 1,000 fighters and 25 technicals (pick-up trucks
with mounted heavy weapons). He said if an agreement could
be reached quickly, ASWJ could have those forces to Mogadishu
within a day. He said most of ASWJ's forces were in
Galgaduud, but there were 150 men in Dolo and 300 men in
Lower Juba.


6. (S/NF) The problem with the TFG, Mahdi said, was that
the three parts of their security forces refused to work
together or support each other. He said the former TFG
forces, Qeybdiid's police forces, and the former Islamic
Courts militias did not trust each other and would not come
to each other's aid. He thought Sheikh Sharif was too weak
to be able to force the different groups to work together.
Nor was he sure whether Minister of Interior Affairs Sheikh
Abdulkadir Ali Omar was truly loyal to Sheikh Sharif. With
the surrender of Inda Adde's and Gobale's weapons to
al-Shabaab, and the weapons al-Shabaab captured from the TFG
in the recent fighting, al-Shabaab now controlled most of the
weapons in Mogadishu and most of the city, he assessed.

Al-Shabaab's Plan for AMISOM?
--------------


7. (S/NF) Mahdi thought that al-Shabaab's primary goal was
to defeat the TFG and force Sheikh Sharif from power. Once
that was done, al-Shabaab would then open a corridor for
AMISOM to get to the port, and give AMISOM a fixed time
period in which to evacuate from Somalia, leaving their
weapons and vehicles behind.

Looking for Washington's Blessing...
--------------


8. (S/NF) Mahdi hoped that Washington would support the
alliance and pressure the TFG to come to terms. PolOff
observed that, sooner or later, the TFG and ASWJ would have
to come to terms with each other, but reminded Mahdi that
Washington's policy was to support the TFG as the government
of Somalia. PolOff said Washington probably would welcome
ASWJ support for the TFG, but he could not comment on
substance of what Mahdi was proposing. PolOff noted that
Washington would need time to consider this matter.

...And Washington's Support
--------------


9. (S/NF) Mahdi also made a pitch for financial and
military assistance from the United States. He said if the
TFG fell, and ASWJ did not get help, ASWJ would have no
choice but to retreat. He said while he only had 1,000 men,
thousands more could be recruited and armed with additional
resources. Mahdi stated that up until now, ASWJ had been
largely funding itself, with a little assistance from
Ethiopia, but that those resources were insufficient and
would run out.

ASWJ Seeking More Ethiopian Military Support
--------------


10. (S/NF) The leadership council was planning to meet with
Ethiopian FM Seyoum Mesfin on May 18 to plead for additional
support, Mahdi said. ASWJ was getting a small amount of
ammunition from the Ethiopians, he noted, but he complained
that the Ethiopians were refusing to give them the weapons
they were asking for. He hoped the Ethiopians would increase
their support.

ASWJ Reorganizing to Form a "Network"
--------------


11. (S/NF) Regarding ASWJ itself, Mahdi said the group had
split from Sheikh Mahamoud in Jeddah. He said his group did
not want a single leader, rather they had organized
themselves "like a starfish," with a flat organization
government by committee. He said if the group stayed under
one leader it would become too political. He insisted their
focus now was only on defeating al-Shabaab. Later, when
al-Shabaab was defeated they would move into formal Somali
politics. Mahdi asserted that the only two organizations in
Somalia that were not clan-based were al-Shabaab and ASWJ.


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Comment
--------------


12. (S/NF) We would welcome Washington's guidance on how to
approach this issue and whether Washington supports some type
of arrangement between the TFG and ASWJ. Certainly, at some
point the two sides will need to accommodate each other if
the TFG is to succeed. The fact that ASWJ is the only force
in Somalia that has defeated al-Shabaab, and holds territory
cleared of the extremists, gives weight to Mahdi's comments.
This is an accomplishment the TFG cannot claim. At a
minimum, we believe that the group is worth engaging with to
determine who they are, and their true intentions,
particularly if the TFG were to collapse. Although Mahdi
repeatedly insisted that his group "did not have political
intentions now," there should be no doubt that at the end of
the day, they intend to become a dominant political force
within Somalia. Given their strong objection to Wahhabism
and other forms of Islamic extremism, that may not be such a
bad thing. End Comment.
YAMAMOTO