USAU: UN ASSESSMENT TEAM BRIEFS AU PARTNERS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000110 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E, AND IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2019 TAGS: PREL SO AU SUBJECT: USAU: UN ASSESSMENT TEAM BRIEFS AU PARTNERS ON SOMALIA SUPPORT REF: ADDIS ABABA 108 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN A. SIMON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (U) This cable contains an action request in paragraph 11. ¶2. (C) Summary: The United Nations Technical Assessment Team (TAM) met with the USAU, EUAU, and the Italian Ambassadors in Addis Ababa the morning of January 16. The team,s focus is on providing a short-term logistics package to support the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),the capacity of the Somalia (TFG-ARS) security forces, and rule of law in Somalia as proposed by the Secretary-General in his letter to the Security Council on 19 December 2008. The TAM indicated that if the UN proceeds with dispatch, this package could be available within 2-4 months. While TAM was presented with several immediate-term problems faced by AMISOM and the TFG-ARS forces -- such as providing food for TFG-ARS forces now moving into positions vacated by the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) -- the team made clear that addressing these is not within its mandate. End Summary ¶3. (U) The TAM scheduled a briefing with Ambassadors from countries and organizations contributing to AMISOM for the morning of January 16. The USAU, EUAU, and Italian Ambassadors, along with the Danish Defense Attache, attended the meeting. The UK Ambassador was not available. The briefing was led by Charles Petrie, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General for Somalia, Max Kerley of UN DFS, and Ray Zanunga of UN DPKO. ¶4. (U) The purpose of the TAM mission is to identify the components and modalities for the short-term logistics package the UN Secretary General suggested providing to AMISOM to buttress it while it awaits a more permanent support package that might be forthcoming through a UN peacekeeping operation (UNPKO). The Team had met with the Somali country team in Nairobi, the AMISOM commander, and AU partners in Addis Ababa. Later in the day, the team was due to see AU Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra. ¶5. (U) The primary element of the package is support for AMISOM. The package would have two parts: first, an assessed contribution financed component that would fund the commodities and services that a UN force of a similar size would require (medical, food, fuel, engineering, vehicles, tactical and strategic airlift, and tactical communications); second, a trust fund financed component that would fund troop contributing country (TCC) equipment and allowances. Additional elements include support for police, rule of law activities, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) activities, and demining. If all of these elements could come together with the reinforcement of AMISOM to its mandated size of 8,000 troops, the deployment of TFG-ARS forces, and the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU),the TAM said the stage would be set for a UNPKO that would expand beyond Mogadishu and include 22,000 or more troops. ¶6. (C) The TAM indicated that it believed the only mechanism available in the time required to deliver the AMISOM package is through contractors. Moreover, to move expeditiously, the TAM would recommend initially using existing contractors on the ground, which is basically Dyncor. Over time, it would seek to bring other contractors into the operation. For police support, the TAM said UNDP was making progress, but the TAM needed to identify ways to fill gaps in UNDP,s support, such as mentoring, infrastructure, and allowances. Military Security Sector Reform cannot be funded by the UN, but the TAM intended to identify models that had worked in the past (e.g., US support for SSR in Liberia),and ask donors to implement them. The EU said it could support SSR if the effort had strong financial management. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador asked about timeline for delivery of the package. The TAM said operationally they could be ready in a matter of weeks if the existing contracts did not have to be upgraded to UN standards, but the decision-making process would take much longer. The TAM was due to make its final report on January 30, after which it would be reviewed by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). Then the recommendations would go to the UN,s Fifth Committee, and then to the General Assembly for final approval. In an ideal situation, this could take 2-4 ADDIS ABAB 00000110 002 OF 002 months. -------------- Challenges and Questions -------------- ¶8. (C) The TAM identified a number of challenges that would need to be overcome to implement this package, which they claimed the UN had never done before. These included rationalizing the standards of the current AMISOM support to UN standards, managing discrepancies between UN rates for peacekeepers and AU rates, developing a management structure for the Trust Fund, determining ownership for equipment bought by the Trust Fund, determining the role for the AU in delivering the package, and enhancing the UN Political Office of Somalia to oversee the delivery and the contractors. The TAM said the ultimate package would be in the hundreds of millions of dollars. -------------- Immediate Needs -------------- ¶9. (C) The TAM indicated in their discussions with the AMISOM Commander several immediate needs were identified that were beyond the scope of their mission. The most pressing of these is food to support TFG-ARS troops that are moving into vacated ENDF positions. The Commander told the TAM these troops are being offered $50 a month by Al-Shabaab to cross sides. The Commander believes he can counter that offer with consistent food rations. Other immediate needs identified include small boats to patrol the harbor (the Commander has two and needs six),fuel, accommodations, and personal allowances. The TAM said the Secretary-General would seek to raise funds for these from donors, though they noted in their discussions with AU partners, the Swedes suggested they had $1.6 million in unspent funds committed to AMISOM that could support these needs. ¶10. (C) The EU Ambassador suggested the UN send a team of financial experts to support the AU financial management of AMISOM immediately, as that could help unlock funding for these needs from other donors. The Italian and US Ambassadors endorsed this suggestion. The TAM indicated this support was possible from pre-mandate authority, and asked the EU to set out the parameters of such a team. ¶11. (C) ACTION REQUEST: USAU requests Washington consider using its existing mechanisms to meet the need for food rations for TFG-ARS troops from the $5 million committed to support them. YAMAMOTO