SUDANESE AMBASSADOR ON BILATERAL TALKS, REGIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001085

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2018
TAGS: PREL KPKO SU ET
SUBJECT: SUDANESE AMBASSADOR ON BILATERAL TALKS, REGIONAL
ISSUES

REF: ADDIS ABABA 805

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C/NF) Summary. On April 30, the Ambassador met with
Sudanese Ambassador to Ethiopia Mohieldin Salim and Deputy
Head of Mission Ambassador Akuei Bona Malwal as a follow-up
on their April 7 meeting (REFTEL) where Salim initiated a
discussion to explore opening a quiet, private channel of
communication with U.S. Embassy Addis Ababa intended to help
improve bilateral relations. During the April 30 meeting,
Salim again hoped that Washington would agree to establish a
dialogue in Addis Ababa, and he said he was available to meet
with U.S. officials at any time. Ambassador Yamamoto
informed Salim that Washington welcomed dialogue with
Khartoum, but that any discussions in Addis Ababa must
supplement, rather than supplant, the Sudanese government's
dealings with State officials in Washington D.C. and U.S.
Embassy Khartoum. Moving to a regional discussion, Salim
stated that Sudanese-Ethiopian relations were solid, and that
Sudan was careful not to offend Ethiopia to maintain the
relationship. On Somalia, Salim said President Bashir had
advised Eritrean President Isaias to act positively in
Somalia and allow the reconciliation process to move forward.
The Sudanese Government also thought that it was better for
Hassan Dahir Aweys to be in Somalia, opening the door for
reconciliation, rather than under Isaias' control in Asmara.
Lastly, Salim insisted that Khartoum maintained a working
relationship with Isaias because otherwise Isaias would cause
problems in Sudan by supporting various rebel movements. End
Summary.

Khartoum Still Looking for Quiet, Private Talks
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2. (C/NF) Salim opened by welcoming the Ambassador and
informing him that Khartoum had reacted positively to his
report of their discussion during the April 7 meeting. He
said Khartoum wanted to pursue this relationship further and
establish a private, quiet channel of communication that
could be used for frank and open discussions "on any issue."
Salim offered that if Washington want to "fact check" any
information about what was happening in Sudan, he was
available at any time. Salim also said if Ambassador Susan
Rice wanted to talk to him or any Sudanese official on the
margins of the May UN Security Council visit to Addis Ababa,
he would make the arrangements. Ambassador Yamamoto
responded that Washington welcomed continued dialogue with
Khartoum, but that any talks in Addis Ababa must supplement,
and not supplant, the Sudanese government's relationship with
State officials in Washington and with U.S. Embassy Khartoum.
Ambassador Yamamoto insisted that discussions in Addis Ababa
should not used to avoid dealing directly with Washington.
Salim agreed and said he hoped that the dialogue would
continue.

On the Sudanese-Ethiopian Bilateral Relationship
-------------- ---


3. (C/NF) Regarding President Bashir's April visit to Addis
Ababa, Salim said that Bashir and Meles met one-on-one for
more than two hours, but that he had been unable to get a
read-out of their discussion. The meeting took place as part
of a long established bilateral Joint Commission charged with
managing border issues. Salim said bilateral relations had
improved since the July 2008 raid into Sudan by the Ethiopian
military that killed 19 people, including a number of
Sudanese policemen. He expressed frustration with the
Ethiopian government, noting that "they often acted without
getting their facts straight," citing the July raid as an
example. (Note: The raid was carried out in reprisal for
alleged Sudanese complicity in the infiltration of
Eritrean-supported anti-Ethiopian insurgents through Sudanese
territory. At the time, the Ethiopian government publicly
denied the raid took place. End Note.) Salim said his
government was doing its best to patrol the border area, but
that the border was too long to control fully. He said the
Ethiopian government now understood that Khartoum was not
aiding or turning a blind eye to insurgent activity, and he
commented that Ethiopian CHOD General Samora had officially
apologized to the Sudanese government for the attack.


ADDIS ABAB 00001085 002 OF 002


Somalia and Hassan Dahir Aweys' Khartoum Visit
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4. (C/NF) Turning to Somalia and Aweys' April visit to
Khartoum, Salim noted that Sudan and Ethiopia had very
different views of Somalia, but he stated that Sudan was
careful not to criticize publicly Ethiopia's Somalia policies
and actions in the Arab League, the African Union, the
InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD),or the
Sanaa Forum to protect the bilateral relationship. On the
specific issue of Khartoum's relationship with Aweys, Salim
said his government felt it was better to have "contact" with
Aweys than to leave him "in the hands of others." He said
Bashir, during a recent visit to Asmara, told Isaias that it
would be better if Isaias did not stand in the way of peace
in Somalia, and that Isaias should "leave Somalia in the
hands of Somalis."


5. (C/NF) Salim emphasized that his government thought it
was better for Aweys to be in Somalia than "in the hands of
Isaias." He said his government told Aweys during his late
April visit to Khartoum that Aweys should go back to Somalia
and join the reconciliation process. Salim said if Aweys had
support on the ground, he would win. If he did not, then so
be it. Salim added that his government was surprised when
Aweys first made it known that he wanted to visit Khartoum by
applying for a visa at the Sudanese Embassy in Asmara. On
Khartoum's instructions, the embassy issued Aweys a Sudanese
visa only after Aweys had obtained a valid Eritrean exit visa
proving that Aweys had permission from Isaias to leave
Eritrea.

On the Sudanese-Eritrean Relationship
--------------


6. (C/NF) Regarding Eritrea, Salim said, "we (Sudan) are
forced to have good relations with them, but we shouldn't
have to deal with them." He explained that Eritrea, with a
population of only four million people, should not be a
priority for Khartoum, but because Eritrea "can harm us" by
supporting various Sudanese rebels factions, including the
Eastern Front, Khartoum found it necessary to placate
Eritrean President Isaias. Salim noted that the Ethiopian
government was very unhappy with Khartoum for allowing
cross-border trade from Sudan into Eritrea. Salim said he
told Ethiopian FM Seyoum that Khartoum allowed the trade out
of national interest. He said if Khartoum did not help feed
the Eritrean people, the Eritreans would have little choice
but to flee to Sudan in large numbers as refugees. Salim
said he also told the Ethiopians that they had only
themselves to blame for not removing Isaias when they had the
chance. He said some time ago, he did not specify when,
Khartoum approached Meles about removing Isaias, but Meles
opposed the action.

Comment
--------------


7. (C/NF) The Sudanese Ambassador's offer of a quiet,
private channel of communication with Embassy Addis, as well
as his insistence that this approach has the blessing of
President Bashir and FM Akol would lead one to believe that
this is part of a GOS effort to expand its dialogue with the
USG on improving bilateral relations. If that is the case,
the Sudanese Ambassador will need to be more proactive in
obtaining readouts of his President's meetings with PM Meles,
or if he knows what transpired in such meetings, then he
needs to be more forthcoming with us. We made clear that the
official conduit is through Embassy Khartoum and our
Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan, and that we would
continue to facilitate information from our end. End Comment.
YAMAMOTO