SUDANESE AMBASSADOR ON BILATERAL TALKS, REGIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001085 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2018 TAGS: PREL KPKO SU ET SUBJECT: SUDANESE AMBASSADOR ON BILATERAL TALKS, REGIONAL ISSUES REF: ADDIS ABABA 805 Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C/NF) Summary. On April 30, the Ambassador met with Sudanese Ambassador to Ethiopia Mohieldin Salim and Deputy Head of Mission Ambassador Akuei Bona Malwal as a follow-up on their April 7 meeting (REFTEL) where Salim initiated a discussion to explore opening a quiet, private channel of communication with U.S. Embassy Addis Ababa intended to help improve bilateral relations. During the April 30 meeting, Salim again hoped that Washington would agree to establish a dialogue in Addis Ababa, and he said he was available to meet with U.S. officials at any time. Ambassador Yamamoto informed Salim that Washington welcomed dialogue with Khartoum, but that any discussions in Addis Ababa must supplement, rather than supplant, the Sudanese government's dealings with State officials in Washington D.C. and U.S. Embassy Khartoum. Moving to a regional discussion, Salim stated that Sudanese-Ethiopian relations were solid, and that Sudan was careful not to offend Ethiopia to maintain the relationship. On Somalia, Salim said President Bashir had advised Eritrean President Isaias to act positively in Somalia and allow the reconciliation process to move forward. The Sudanese Government also thought that it was better for Hassan Dahir Aweys to be in Somalia, opening the door for reconciliation, rather than under Isaias' control in Asmara. Lastly, Salim insisted that Khartoum maintained a working relationship with Isaias because otherwise Isaias would cause problems in Sudan by supporting various rebel movements. End Summary. Khartoum Still Looking for Quiet, Private Talks -------------- -- ¶2. (C/NF) Salim opened by welcoming the Ambassador and informing him that Khartoum had reacted positively to his report of their discussion during the April 7 meeting. He said Khartoum wanted to pursue this relationship further and establish a private, quiet channel of communication that could be used for frank and open discussions "on any issue." Salim offered that if Washington want to "fact check" any information about what was happening in Sudan, he was available at any time. Salim also said if Ambassador Susan Rice wanted to talk to him or any Sudanese official on the margins of the May UN Security Council visit to Addis Ababa, he would make the arrangements. Ambassador Yamamoto responded that Washington welcomed continued dialogue with Khartoum, but that any talks in Addis Ababa must supplement, and not supplant, the Sudanese government's relationship with State officials in Washington and with U.S. Embassy Khartoum. Ambassador Yamamoto insisted that discussions in Addis Ababa should not used to avoid dealing directly with Washington. Salim agreed and said he hoped that the dialogue would continue. On the Sudanese-Ethiopian Bilateral Relationship -------------- --- ¶3. (C/NF) Regarding President Bashir's April visit to Addis Ababa, Salim said that Bashir and Meles met one-on-one for more than two hours, but that he had been unable to get a read-out of their discussion. The meeting took place as part of a long established bilateral Joint Commission charged with managing border issues. Salim said bilateral relations had improved since the July 2008 raid into Sudan by the Ethiopian military that killed 19 people, including a number of Sudanese policemen. He expressed frustration with the Ethiopian government, noting that "they often acted without getting their facts straight," citing the July raid as an example. (Note: The raid was carried out in reprisal for alleged Sudanese complicity in the infiltration of Eritrean-supported anti-Ethiopian insurgents through Sudanese territory. At the time, the Ethiopian government publicly denied the raid took place. End Note.) Salim said his government was doing its best to patrol the border area, but that the border was too long to control fully. He said the Ethiopian government now understood that Khartoum was not aiding or turning a blind eye to insurgent activity, and he commented that Ethiopian CHOD General Samora had officially apologized to the Sudanese government for the attack. ADDIS ABAB 00001085 002 OF 002 Somalia and Hassan Dahir Aweys' Khartoum Visit -------------- - ¶4. (C/NF) Turning to Somalia and Aweys' April visit to Khartoum, Salim noted that Sudan and Ethiopia had very different views of Somalia, but he stated that Sudan was careful not to criticize publicly Ethiopia's Somalia policies and actions in the Arab League, the African Union, the InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD),or the Sanaa Forum to protect the bilateral relationship. On the specific issue of Khartoum's relationship with Aweys, Salim said his government felt it was better to have "contact" with Aweys than to leave him "in the hands of others." He said Bashir, during a recent visit to Asmara, told Isaias that it would be better if Isaias did not stand in the way of peace in Somalia, and that Isaias should "leave Somalia in the hands of Somalis." ¶5. (C/NF) Salim emphasized that his government thought it was better for Aweys to be in Somalia than "in the hands of Isaias." He said his government told Aweys during his late April visit to Khartoum that Aweys should go back to Somalia and join the reconciliation process. Salim said if Aweys had support on the ground, he would win. If he did not, then so be it. Salim added that his government was surprised when Aweys first made it known that he wanted to visit Khartoum by applying for a visa at the Sudanese Embassy in Asmara. On Khartoum's instructions, the embassy issued Aweys a Sudanese visa only after Aweys had obtained a valid Eritrean exit visa proving that Aweys had permission from Isaias to leave Eritrea. On the Sudanese-Eritrean Relationship -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) Regarding Eritrea, Salim said, "we (Sudan) are forced to have good relations with them, but we shouldn't have to deal with them." He explained that Eritrea, with a population of only four million people, should not be a priority for Khartoum, but because Eritrea "can harm us" by supporting various Sudanese rebels factions, including the Eastern Front, Khartoum found it necessary to placate Eritrean President Isaias. Salim noted that the Ethiopian government was very unhappy with Khartoum for allowing cross-border trade from Sudan into Eritrea. Salim said he told Ethiopian FM Seyoum that Khartoum allowed the trade out of national interest. He said if Khartoum did not help feed the Eritrean people, the Eritreans would have little choice but to flee to Sudan in large numbers as refugees. Salim said he also told the Ethiopians that they had only themselves to blame for not removing Isaias when they had the chance. He said some time ago, he did not specify when, Khartoum approached Meles about removing Isaias, but Meles opposed the action. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) The Sudanese Ambassador's offer of a quiet, private channel of communication with Embassy Addis, as well as his insistence that this approach has the blessing of President Bashir and FM Akol would lead one to believe that this is part of a GOS effort to expand its dialogue with the USG on improving bilateral relations. If that is the case, the Sudanese Ambassador will need to be more proactive in obtaining readouts of his President's meetings with PM Meles, or if he knows what transpired in such meetings, then he needs to be more forthcoming with us. We made clear that the official conduit is through Embassy Khartoum and our Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan, and that we would continue to facilitate information from our end. End Comment. YAMAMOTO