SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF AMB. RICE TO ETHIOPIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 001063

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2019
TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER SU SO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF AMB. RICE TO ETHIOPIA

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

African Union Focused on Somalia and Sudan
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1. (C) At the African Union, we expect your principal
interlocutors will be Commission Chairperson Jean Ping,
Deputy Chairperson Erastus Mwencha, and Peace and Security
Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra. They have welcomed cooperation
from international partners on peace and security issues,
especially technical advice, and financial and in-kind
support for AMISOM. The AU wants to strengthen AMISOM by
securing more pledges of troops from AU member states,
advance the political process, and mobilize further support
from the international community, in particular the UN. AU
also has requested the UN lift the arms embargo on Somalia,s
government to allow it to equip the Somali Joint Security
Forces. Of concern, the relationship between the UN and the
AU special envoys is failing and is becoming a major obstacle
in supporting AMISOM. Despite UNSCR 1863 providing for the
support to AMISOM, the UN opposes supporting the AMISOM
civilian management staff. The AU reluctantly accepted to
seek funds independent of the UN, but UN treatment of AU has
not been well received by the AU leadership. Getting AU/UN
cooperation back on track will require a clarification of
each organization's roles and responsibilities, as well as
short-, medium-, and long-term objectives in Somalia.


2. (C) On Sudan, the AU has resisted Western pressure and
has argued for an Article 16 deferral of the ICC arrest
warrant for Sudanese President Omar El-Bashir. The AU
leadership makes the case that the ICC controversy imperils
both the Darfur peace process and the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement because the GOS will cease cooperation with various
partners. "Give peace a chance," is the AU,s refrain. The
AU appears to be banking on its High-Level Panel on Darfur to
bring about change in Sudan, but you will want to inquire
with the AU leadership about whether they actually believe
that the GOS will implement the Panel's eventual
recommendations. If the AU fails in this regard, we would
expect most member states will regroup and the AU will resume
its search for justice in Darfur by some other means.
Whether the AU is as cohesive then as it is now remains to be
seen.


3. (C) The humanitarian consequences of the GOS decision to
expel several NGOs from Darfur are of great concern to the AU
leadership. In March, when AU Chairperson Jean Ping received
representatives from humanitarian assistance
organizations, such as Save the Children, he reportedly said
he was preoccupied by the gaps in humanitarian service
delivery. The AU leadership should be able to brief you on
what the AU has done concretely to address the expulsion of
NGOs.

AU Standing Against Coup d'Etat
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4. (C) The AU leadership has also welcomed international
endorsement of the AU,s principled stand against coups
d,etat. There are now international contact groups for
Mauritania, Guinea, and Madagascar, but AU officials and the
partners realize that our collective call for restoring
constitutional order in these countries may only be respected
when sanctions with a truly international character are
adopted (i.e. UNSC-approved).

Meles Seeking International Support for the TFG/Somalia
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5. (C) Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles believes that the
international community is not doing enough to support the
fledgling Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG),and
he will most likely press for increased support. Meles is
highly supportive of a UN peacekeeping mission for Somalia,
and he believes that Washington waited too long to support
such a mission. Meles will certainly press for your current
view of the UN's future role in Somalia. Although Meles has
little faith that the TFG under President Sheikh Sharif will
succeed, Meles is cautiously supporting the TFG and trying to
avoid directly undermining the government. Ethiopian troops
completely withdrew from Somalia in February 2009, but the
Ethiopian government is providing intelligence and military
support to Somali groups committed to fighting al-Shabaab
including the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA),and Al Sunnah
Wal Jamah (ASWJ).

Meles Opposed to ICC Indictment Against Bashir
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6. (C) Meles is opposed to the ICC indictment against
Bashir because he believes that it will fuel instability in
Sudan by weakening the regime, an issue that he may raise
with you. Meles may also fear that the indictment sets a
precedent that opens the door for similar action against
himself arising from allegations of Ethiopian ethnic
cleansing against its Somali population. Ethiopia is not a
signatory to the Rome Statute and the Ethiopian government
has publicly declared that they will not act on the ICC
warrant. Meles and Bashir last met during the week of April
19 when Bashir visited Addis Ababa as part of a bilateral
dialogue. Meles views stability in Sudan to be critical for
Ethiopia's national security, and he fears that the
side-effects from renewed civil war in Sudan will spill into
Ethiopia as a result of a collapse of the CPA. As Meles will
tell you, Ethiopia is the only country to border both north
and south Sudan, putting Ethiopia in the position of having
to balance direct relationships with both Khartoum and Juba.
Meles has friendly relationships with Bashir and Salva Kiir,
but is personally closer to Bashir to whom he speaks on a
regular basis. Because Eritrean President Isaias has a
demonstrated record of negatively intervening in regional
dynamics to undermine Ethiopia's position, Meles prefers to
play a very quiet, behind-the-scenes role on Sudan.

Meles Comfortable with Status Quo on Eritrean Border
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7. (C) Meles appears content to allow the status quo with
Eritrea continue with no resolution of the border impasse,
and he would not welcome any new attempt by the UNSC to
engage on this issue. For Meles, the Algiers Agreements and
the EEBC decision are "dead," having expired when President
Isaias ejected UNMEE from Eritrea in 2008. He is
disappointed that the UNSC did not take action against Asmara
over its unprecedented expulsion of the UN peacekeeping
force. Meles has repeatedly told U.S. officials that the
issue can be revisited when there is a new government in
Asmara, possibly under a new mechanism to demarcate the
border. He believes that he "can wait Isaias out," and that
sooner or later, the Eritrean people will rise up and depose
Isaias.

Meles Looking for UNSC Action Regarding ER-DJ Border
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8. (C) Meles believes that the UNSC has not adequately
punished Isaias over his actions regarding the
Eritrea-Djibouti border issue. Both Meles and the AU are
supportive of UNSCR 1862, but both are opposed to any attempt
by the UNSC to link resolution of the ER-DJ border issue to
the ET-ER border impasse.
YAMAMOTO