NIGERIA UPDATE: GOVT. PRACTICES: INFO COLLECTION,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000891 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/W, INR/AA BAGHDAD FOR DMCCULLOUGH DEPT FOR S/CT FOR HBJOHNSON, PSCHULTZ E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2019 TAGS: KVPR PTER PREL PGOV CVIS ASEC KHLS NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA UPDATE: GOVT. PRACTICES: INFO COLLECTION, SCREENING, SHARING REF: A. STATE 32287 ¶B. 07 ABUJA 2320 ¶C. ABUJA 600 ABUJA 00000891 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Political Counselor Walter N.S. Pflaumer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) The following are updates to Mission Nigeria's assessment of current host government practices with respect to information collection, screening and sharing per reftel ¶A. Posts original November 2007 responses are contained in reftel B. Government of Nigeria (GON) capabilities remain relatively limited by technological shortcomings and a lack of infrastructure, but also by a culture of suspicion and distrust among various GON security agencies. Also of concern is the perceived lack of political will to pursue financial crimes cases against politically influential individuals, regardless of how much information on financial crimes is shared. Border Control and Screening: ============================= ¶2. (C) Since the installation of USG funded body scanners by the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) at the four Nigerian international airports in Lagos and Abuja (March 2008); Kano and Port Harcourt (June 2008),narcotics trafficking to Europe by drug courier has noticeably shifted to the international airports in Togo and Benin. INL is currently working in partnership with UNODC to develop a comprehensive program for port security and cargo screening at Nigerian ports. In addition, the Embassy's Regional Security Office conducted Anti-Terrorism Assistance-funded courses for various Nigerian law enforcement, military and maritime agencies, including the Maritime Port and Harbor Security Management Course from September 9-26, 2008 in Abuja, as well as the Maritime Interdiction Course which is scheduled for September 14 to October 2, 2009 in Lagos. Passports and Fraud Detection ============================= ¶3. (C) The introduction of Nigerian e-chip passports including biometric fingerprints on July 27, 2007 was presumed to have been a giant step forward in the provision of more secure and verifiable documentation. However, the reality has turned out to be that this new form of identification is "technically sophisticated but functionally insecure" as the so called "breeder documents," i.e. the documents presented to substantiate an identity continue to be available by fraudulent means to those who can pay. Even the new e-passports have poor quality control, and are often laminated incorrectly, leading to a continued lack of confidence in the passport that is finally issued. ¶4. (C) The Document Security Unit of Immigration Nigeria has been extensively trained and well equipped with fraud detection equipment by the British Government, and is generally well regarded and judged to be professional by consular staff. The Special Fraud Unit of the Nigerian Police Force, nominally responsible for arrest in visa fraud cases, although responsive, has lacked prosecutorial follow-through on cases referred by the Embassy. Since the initiation of the arrest referral program in June 2008, only one prosecution has been instigated of the over 60 suspected cases of fraud detected by the Mission. Previously, when passports suspected of fraud were returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Consular and Immigration Department, there were at least two instances in which passports that were confirmed to be fraudulent and returned to MFA later showed up back in circulation when presented to third countries for visas, including to the Embassy of Switzerland. To date, Immigration Nigeria claims, incredibly, that there have been no instances of stolen e-passports, despite specific reports to the contrary to U.S. Consulate Lagos. Both Abuja and Lagos Consular Sections routinely discover ABUJA 00000891 002.2 OF 003 cases where facial recognition systems have detected imposters holding multiple identities on legitimately issued Nigerian passports, including the new e-chip series. Watchlist and Information Sharing: ================================== ¶5. (C) In April of this year, the U.S. Mission to Nigeria initiated a Database and Automated Records Working Group (DARWG) to assess the needs of Nigerian law enforcement agencies in conjunction with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's (UNODC) Information and Technology Service (ITS). UNODC has been working with Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) over the past three years to develop an IT platform that will enable the EFCC to share data between its various satellite offices around Nigeria, but also foreseeably with the international community via Interpol. The software applications involved are the GoCASE Investigation and Intelligence Case Management System, GoINTEL, GoAML, and GoIDM, which have been developed by the UN as a global standard platform for information sharing among anti-corruption and law enforcement agencies. It should be noted that this platform could eventually serve as the backbone for a networked national criminal database, and eventually be used to share data and watchlist information with the international law enforcement and intelligence communities, as well as within regional groupings with a security and law enforcement focus. Such entities include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa (French acronym GIABA). UNODC and INL report that there are strong indications that the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) is effectively using their now fully operational GoAML financial intelligence system which collects and analyzes currency transaction reports and suspicious transaction reports submitted by local financial institutions. ¶6. (C) UNODC representatives met with relevant officials from the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement's office for Asia, Africa Europe (INL/AAE) and the desk officer for Nigeria in Washington, D.C. on April 13, 2009 to discuss the expansion of the GoIDM platform to other Nigerian law enforcement agencies to improve information sharing. Representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),U.S. Africa Command, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) were also invited but did not attend. Identifying Appropriate Partners: ================================= ¶7. (C) There has been some improvement in the sharing of information between various GON entities, or at least a greater recognition and understanding of the problem, though some agencies -- primarily the Department of State Security (DSS) more commonly known as the State Security Service (SSS) -- remain reticent to share information with not only the USG, but other Nigerian security agencies as well. The National Focal Point on Terrorism (NFPT),a Nigerian interagency working group inaugurated in February 2007 specifically to address counterterrorism (CT) issues was meant to prompt more dialogue and presumably greater communication and information sharing between Nigerian federal institutions on this issue, as well as between the executive and legislative branches of government. The extent to which the NFPT has succeeded in this endeavor remains in question. As an example, at a meeting of the NFPT in February 2008 (the first such meeting attended by Poloff) much of the discussion was focused on draft counterterrorism legislation which was being worked on by the NFPT in conjunction with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Poloff pointed out, much to the astonishment of all present, that there was in fact already legislation which had not only been introduced, but had already passed a second reading in the Senate, and was being discussed by the ABUJA 00000891 003.2 OF 003 appropriate Senate committee. This revelation, while highlighting the near-total lack of communication and awareness between the Nigerian federal executive and legislative branches, prompted much greater consultation, cooperation and coordination between the two branches. UNODC and State's INL and POL sections continue to push the GON regarding CT issues and law enforcement capacity building efforts in general. ¶8. (C) Nevertheless, significant questions remain regarding the political will of the GON leadership and specifically its anti-corruption institutions to pursue high-profile cases involving "politically exposed persons". Since the recent decision by INL and AF to cease all direct assistance to the EFCC, U.S. Mission Nigeria resolved instead to focus on capacity building within other anti-corruption, law enforcement and administrative bodies, such as the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC),the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB),the Federal Inland revenue Service (FIRS),the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP),the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),the Nigeria Copyright Commission (NCC),Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) (reftel C). The GON has made a point of very publicly asking for information on Nigerian nationals implicated in the Siemens and Halliburton scandals, which they claim in the press not to have. Post, however, has evidence that the GON already has much of the information requested regarding both scandals, and commission staff have corroborated this to INL Off. (COMMENT: This causes us to wonder if the public posturing is designed to promote the public impression that a supposed lack of USG cooperation is responsible for the lack of progress and prosecutions in these cases. End comment.) ¶9. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulate Lagos. SANDERS