NIGERIA'S NON-MILITARY SECURITY CHALLENGES AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 ABUJA 000600 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/W, INR/AA, AF/RSA FOR CHRISTOPHER POMMERER, INL/C FOR DIANE KOHN, INL/AAE FOR AARON ALTON, ERIN BARCLAY, DS/T/ATA FOR TONY GONZALEZ, BAGHDAD FOR DMCULLOUGH E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2017 TAGS: PGOV SOCI KCRM SNAR KCOR KTIP KJUS KTFN KIPR XY, XI, NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA'S NON-MILITARY SECURITY CHALLENGES AND WHAT WE CAN DO REF: A. A. STATE 05448 ¶B. B. ABUJA 0309 ¶C. C. ABUJA 535 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Robin R. Sanders for reasons 1.4. (b & d). ¶1. (U) The following is U.S. Mission Nigeria's collective response to questions posed in reftel regarding the assessment of law enforcement and judicial training needs of the non-military security apparatus of the Government of Nigeria (GON). Given the poor performance of Nigeria,s top anti-graft agencies, the Mission suggests in paragraphs 5, 11, and 13 that support should be given to other agencies that play an important role in the fight against corruption and financial crimes by building their capacity to step into the void. ¶I. KEY INTERNAL AND REGIONAL CHALLENGES -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Government of Nigeria (GON) faces most of the internal and regional challenges listed in reftel A, to include higher than average local and regional crime; pervasive trafficking in persons and narcotics; massive resource theft; widespread smuggling of counterfeit goods; and illicit small and light arms shipments. While violent extremist organizations are present in Nigeria, these groups have not been effective in planning or carrying out attacks. For the purposes of this cable, the responses will address only the criminal aspects of the situation in the Niger Delta, which includes both resource theft on an industrial scale, operating in the manner of organized crime, as well as smaller scale theft. The failure of government on federal, state and local levels to invest in the Niger Delta and pollution have ravaged the environment and have made subsistence fishing and farming at best difficult. This failure has contributed to the militancy, criminality and anger among residents of the area. II. NIGERIA,S CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO THESE CHALLENGES -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The Nigerian law enforcement sector's capabilities to respond to the challenges listed above are typically limited, but in some cases improving such as recent efforts to deal with trafficking in persons and cooperating on narcotics trafficking. Primary obstacles to tackling these challenges are corruption; inadequate funding; a lack of leadership, and a reluctance to share information across relevant agencies. In some cases, willful neglect by senior management who may themselves be involved and profiting from illicit activities, such as illegal oil bunkering, greatly complicates and even precludes/prevents a coordinated and comprehensive response. The complicity and corruption of officials within the GON remains the greatest impediment to an effective response to domestic and international criminal networks. Nigeria does not adequately fund its law enforcement agencies, and many are strapped for money to fund operations, training and capacity-building and equipment. For instance, the 300,000 man strong Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is riddled with management problems that make it difficult for it to provide security to citizens (reftel B). The inability or unwillingness to share information hampers not only the effectiveness of efforts to address the aforementioned problems, but allows criminals and corrupt officials to collude and take advantage of the lack of coordination to perpetrate illicit acts. The EFCC: Where it is Now ¶4. (SBU) One of the major challenges is the ineffectiveness of the the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). The EFCC, previously the most visible Nigerian organization pursuing anti-corruption activities, has showed no interest in pursing high profile corruption cases since its leadership changed in December 2007. The replacement of Chairman Nuhu ABUJA 00000600 002 OF 007 Ribadu in late 2007, the subsequent transfer of many senior investigators, and the resignation of the head of the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) in 2008, coupled with the lack of progress on prosecuting a number of cases involving high level former officials, have all put the GON,s commitment to combat corruption in serious doubt. ¶5. (C) The EFCC has been ineffective in fulfilling its mandate on politically sensitive cases, but has made some progress with regard to its internal structure such as installin high tech information sharing systems and analytical tools to improve the detection and investigation of financial crime such as GoAML provided by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). In addition, there are also efforts in the National Assembly to pass legislation codifying the EFCC,s prosecutorial independence, which could pull it out from under the influence of the Minister of Justice who has been an obstacle to the prosecution of past and present high-level corrupt officials. ¶6. (U) In the five years of its existence, the EFCC has grown from 250 employees in 2005 to over 2000 today. Most of this new staff are detailees from other agencies primarily the NPF. This reliance on detailed staff has affected the EFCC,s institutional growth. However, the agency is now moving away from the model where its staff is dominated by seconded police officers. In fact, the EFCC,s relatively new Training and Research Institute (TRI) has graduated its 3rd class of recruits, who will form the institutional backbone of civil servants for the agency for years to come. The TRI itself is a well structured facility that can accommodate training for multiple agencies. The U.S. Mission has used the facility for training various GON law enforcement agencies and will seek to use it for subsequent training courses to be delivered by INL, FBI and DEA. ¶7. (C) Since his appointment in November 2008, the new Director of the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU), Norman Wokoma, claims to have walled off the NFIU from the EFCC and warned all GON law enforcement agencies, including the EFCC, that they are expected to report case results based on the intelligence packages that his office produces or face losing access to the data. Wokoma tells us he has strong backing in the GON to enforce this. He indicates that he is also pursuing efforts to get banks to comply with reporting requirements by threatening non-compliant banks with public rebukes which would damage their customer base, and by petitioning the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to suspend their licenses. From our meetings with the UNODC, there is a strong indication that the NFIU is effectively using their GoAML financial intelligence system which is now fully operational and capable of collecting and analyzing currency transaction reports (CTRs) and suspicious transaction reports (STRs) submitted by financial institutions. The Way Forward: Step up Activities with Other Agencies ¶8. (SBU) Although the Mission will continue to monitor developments at the EFCC, we have examined other options to still play a role in building the capacity of other agencies involved in the fight against corruption and financial crimes. The USG should expand and diversify its assistance on fighting corruption and financial crimes to include agencies such as the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), which is tasked with fighting corruption by public officials; the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB),which collects asset declaration forms from public officials; the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS),which collects tax information; the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP),which maintains data on government contracts where a significant amount of fraud takes place; the Nigeria Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); the Nigeria Copyright Commission (NCC); Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC). We believe it is in the USG,s interest to continue to build, over the long term, the capacity of theses other GON agencies ABUJA 00000600 003 OF 007 to assist in the identification, investigation and prosecution of complex financial crimes until such a time as we determine that the EFCC should return to the fold as regards to an engagement with them. III.NON-MILITARY SECURITY OR JUDICIAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS -------------- Overview: ¶9. (SBU) As a result of high level meetings last year with GON, the Ambassador initiated a working group to assess the needs of Nigerian Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs),with a focus on what automated systems and tools were needed to share information and prevent/combat fraud and corruption. The working group determined that a case management and personnel record keeping system would be most beneficial. In fact, the European Commission (EC) is already funding the installation of a case management and intelligence sharing platform called 'GoIDM'. The GoIDM platform was developed by the United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to share with member nations. The platform has several component software programs that are customizable to Nigerian agencies, needs regarding information sharing and case management from investigation to prosecution. The system is already in use at the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) locations in Abuja and Lagos. It has reduced the time for sharing case information from days to milliseconds. The system can also eventually be expanded to other Nigerian agencies and can interface with international systems such as INTERPOL databases. ¶10. (SBU) As stated earlier, even though we will not be assisting the EFCC, there are other agencies noted in para 8 that are involved in the effort to fight corruption and financial crimes that can benefit from our programs (ICPC, CCB, FIRS, BPP, SEC, NCC, CBN and CAC). All these agencies can benefit from technical assistance to expand their IT infrastructures and to provide them with training to maintain and operate their information systems through a platform such as 'GoIDM'. The U.S. Mission is exploring ways to partner with the EC and other international donors to expand the system to these other agencies. What we can do: ¶11. (SBU) In addition, we have identified the following training requirements for Nigerian law enforcement agencies such as the Nigeria Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA),the Nigeria Police Force (NPF),the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC),the Customs Services, and the Immigration Service. The following training directed at these agencies should be considered as the most likely to bear fruit over the long term: anti-corruption training to enable better investigations, case development and prosecutions; port and border security training to combat trafficking in persons, narcotics, and counterfeit pharmaceuticals; and assistance to address issues related to extraditions. Below follows more details on areas where we can assist Nigerian agencies. A) Assisting ICPC ¶12. (SBU) For instance, we recommend expanding training to include staffers at ICPC. The USG has in the past detailed an intermittent Resident Legal Advisor (RLA) to this organization and ICPC has now specifically asked for training for its Anti-corruption and Transparency Units (ACTUs) that are present in all executive branch agencies and some parastatals to investigate corruption, fraud and abuse committed by government employees. Recommended training: The training would include basic investigatory techniques; planning and budgeting; and ABUJA 00000600 004 OF 007 deploying effective anti-corruption campaigns. B) Building up TUGAR ¶13. (C) The GON has now also established a Technical Unit on Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms (TUGAR) under the Office of the President to design country specific anti-corruption and governance strategies and initiatives. Because it has cross-cutting authorities, TUGAR works with various GON agencies and the private sector to coordinate their efforts. TUGAR has reached out to the USG as a partner in pursuing its anti-corruption and governance initiatives, as well as ensuring that USG resources are not wasted and that USG concerns are taken into account at the highest levels of government. Recommended Training: As TUGAR is a relatively new agency that has yet to fully define its role, we will explore how we can support its efforts with technical assistance related to developing policies, undertaking research and assessing strategies and initiatives once its direction is clear. C) Controlling the Borders:Customs and NDLEA ¶14. (SBU) Nigeria has long and porous borders. The smuggling of drugs, counterfeit goods, guns and other contraband, and trafficking in persons are chronic problems along the borders of Nigeria with Benin, Niger and Cameroon. Customs, drug enforcement and other law enforcement agents at both land borders and seaports lack operational knowledge and the ability to work cooperatively to detect such illegal contraband. Agents are ill-informed about intellectual property laws and some are prone to turning a blind eye for the right price. The Mission also sees a synergy between its efforts to improve GON aviation security and additional efforts to improve border control (reftel C). Recommended Training: GON Customs and NDLEA drug enforcement officials would benefit from extensive training in the thorough and proper inspection of shipments (particularly via land and sea, but also by air),as well as techniques for the search and seizure of illicit goods and drugs, to ensure adequate enforcement of existing laws. The Mission believes that an assessment team from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) could come to Nigeria to determine its capacity to inspect and interdict contraband at the ports and borders and develop additional ideas for future training based on this assessment. (D) Combating Counterfeit Goods and Drugs ¶15. (SBU) Training on detecting counterfeit goods and enforcing intellectual property laws is needed at the basic and mid-levels in key GON law enforcement agencies. This training would help emphasize the economic importance of customs and drug enforcement in preventing the entry of counterfeit goods and drugs to Nigeria. GON Customs and the National Drug Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) have indicated their willingness to partner with the USG and expressed a desire for such training. Seminars involving Nigeria's National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), Customs and others to enhance interagency cooperation on investigations, product identification, and trends in counterfeiting techniques relating to pharmaceuticals would be most welcome. Nigerian health officials estimate that 70% of drugs in circulation in the country are either fake or adulterated and have led to treatment failures, damage to organs, worsening of chronic diseases, resistance to antibiotics and an overall erosion of confidence of the healthcare delivery system. NAFDAC has recently focused on port surveillance, inspections and enforcement, which has resulted in increased seizures of counterfeit drugs at the ports of entry. ABUJA 00000600 005 OF 007 Recommended Training: Training in the effective monitoring and oversight of pharmaceutical distribution networks by logistics experts would also be of great benefit. All Nigerian border control agencies would benefit from training by the Department of Homeland Security,s Immigration and Custom Enforcement agency (ICE) on Export Control and related Border Security (EXBS) Assistance Programs. E) Combating Trafficking in Persons ¶16. (SBU) The National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking In Persons (NAPTIP) has a very good reputation. Although it has a relatively sizable budget (for a Nigerian agency) of $10 million annually and receives support from many other international donors, this is not sufficient to adequately address the TIP issues that the organization faces. Non-governmental organizations working in trafficking in persons report that customs agents, immigration officials and agents of the NAPTIP are need to help identify and intercept cases of human trafficking, particularly at the Seme border station with Benin. Many of the same networks, individuals and entry/exit points involved in the trafficking of illegal arms and drugs are also used in the trafficking in persons. Recommended Training: NAPTIP could benefit from training on evidence collection, identifying victims, and dismantling trafficking networks. Although there have been TIP programs in the past from INL and with Nigeria moving to tier 1, G/TIP should consider new assistance programs to address these issues further. F) Providing Judicial Training on Extraditions ¶17. (SBU) USG has 12 pending extradition requests with the oldest request dating back to 2004. Some cases fall victim to bureaucratic inefficiencies in moving extradition paperwork from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Justice and others are delayed by recourse offered to defendants by Nigerian law. This is complicated by the fact that most Nigerian courts have only rudimentary technology. For instance, transcriptions and other case information are generally handwritten. Progress with extradition cases from Nigeria to the U.S. is currently measured in glacial terms, if at all. The Mission's Law Enforcement Working Group (LEWG) is in the process of assessing existing statutes to determine what legislative and administrative remedies may be necessary or desirable to streamline the extradition process. We are also pushing the National Assembly to pass any necessary amendments to facilitate the expedited treatment of extraditions. Recommended Training: While there is little that can likely be done to ensure that extradition requests are delivered in a timely manner from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to the Ministry of Justice (MoJ),it might be helpful to offer targeted assistance to aid judges in moving cases more quickly through the legal system. From meetings with officials at MoJ, it is apparent that there is a dire need for training in the procedural issues involving extraditions. Perhaps offering select Nigerian judges specialized training on extradition cases would enable them to assist us better in the extradition of individuals wanted by the USG, as well as expedite current and future cases. Many Nigerian judges are known to be corrupt. Training of judges on ethics and how to avoid corrupting influences could be beneficial. We could also provide training to limit interminable interlocutory appeals on procedural grounds which delay court proceedings. These procedural challenges should be reserved for the appellate level. And finally, they must be trained to effectively manage cases. G) Assisting other GON agencies ABUJA 00000600 006 OF 007 ¶18. (SBU) As noted earlier, the Mission has examined other ways to work around the EFCC by still playing a role in building the capacity of other agencies that are not necessarily law enforcement agencies but are involved in the fight against corruption and financial crimes. These include CCB, FIRS, BPP, SEC, NCC, CBN and CAC. The Mission believes that the USG should diversify its assistance on corruption and financial crimes to include these types of agencies, as well, as we believe it is in the USG,s interest to continue to build, over the long term, their capacity to assist in the identification, investigation and prosecution of complex financial crimes. These agencies could be extremely useful if their staffs are trained and understand what their role is in helping to build and prosecute solid cases. Supporting the internal development of these other anti-graft institutions, can assist USG goals until such a time that there is more political will in the EFCC to pursue high profile cases. Recommended Training: For these non-law enforcement entities, we can provide training in preparing cases; identifying fraud and financial crimes; interviewing and interrogation techniques; report writing; financial forensics; and, evidence collection, handling, and preservation. Finally, some of these agencies could benefit from mentoring and training from Treasury,s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) or Office of Technical Assistance (OTA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). IV. HOST GOVERNMENT,S WILLINGNESS TO BE AN EFFECTIVE PARTNER -------------- - ¶19. (C) The GON is typically willing to accept USG training and assistance; however, greater attention needs to be paid to accountability, as well as the retention and more effective use of trained personnel. We need to find a better way to work with the GON to ensure that individuals selected for training remain in place long enough to put into practice what they are taught and teach others as they move up the career ladder. The Mission suggests developing an MOU which would get a firm commitment from the GON to retain those civil service employees, that receive USG training and remain in good standing, for a mutually agreed period of time before there is any consideration of transferring them elsewhere. We, too, need to focus on permanent civil service employees, which has not always been our approach (particularly with the EFCC) so that we ensure our resources and training efforts are sustained. In addition, GON financial contributions should be obtained to fund training and other programs where possible to indicate GON,s cooperation and commitment to our collaborative efforts to tackle the daunting challenges that Nigeria faces. ¶V. OTHER INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS NON-MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶20. (SBU) The United Nation's Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has a large presence in Nigeria and focuses primarily on capacity building for NAPTIP, EFCC and the NDLEA. Other international donors assist in areas that affect their nationals directly such as cyber-crimes and trafficking in persons and drugs. International assistance efforts also tend to focus on the anti-graft agencies, as well as judicial and legislative capacity building. ¶21. (C) The European Commission (EC) is in the process of developing a program and framework for multilateral cooperation to counter narcotics trafficking in West Africa under the auspices of the "Instruments for Stability", which is a funding mechanism to respond urgently to the needs of countries threatened with instability both natural and man-made. The EC is looking to use stability instrument funds to coordinate efforts to suppress the drug trade in West Africa and trans-shipments to Europe and elsewhere. ¶22. (C) The Economic Community of West African States ABUJA 00000600 007 OF 007 (ECOWAS) and Groupe Inter-gouvernemental d'Action contre le Blanchiment d' Argent en Afrique de l'Ouest (GIABA) -- the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa -- have both increased efforts to deal with drug trafficking and money laundering respectively in the West African Region. ECOWAS has a Plan of Action to deal with the flow of drugs through West Africa but claims to need additional funds to implement it. It has recently annouced that it will set up a regional anti-graft body to "abolish the impediments to successful prosecution of the war against corruption" in its 14 member countries. Nigeria has been elected to be the first leader of this body and has the responsibility of ensuring interstate cooperation in the fight against corruption and building the capacity of member-state's anti-corruption institutions. Timely assistance to ECOWAS to ensure the proper establishment of this body would likely be extremely beneficial for the whole sub-region including Nigeria itself as explained in para 3, and 4. GIABA has been coordinating the development of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) to track the flow of laundered funds through the region. It also lacks funding and need support to establish and build the capacity of these FIUs. ¶23. The British Home Office (BHO) is deploying Airport Interdiction Advisors to Nigerian Airports and is developing a regional strategy to deal with the growing threat from drug trafficking on vulnerable countries in West Africa. They have requested USG support in developing such a strategy based on the success of USG donated Body Scanner Machines in apprehending and deterring drug couriers at all four Nigerian international airports. The BHO wants us to coordinate our efforts with them through the Dublin Group. VI. EXISTING OR PLANNED NON-MILITARY REGIONAL TRAINING CENTER -------------- ¶24. (SBU) Aside from the EFCC,s TRI described in para 8, there is one other non-military law enforcement training center in Nigeria -- NDLEA's training Academy in Jos, the capital of Plateau State. Although it is intended to be both a domestic and regional training center, the Academy has faced significant problems due to alleged corruption by its management and a lack of funding from the GON. USG and UNODC had previously collaborated on developing the infrastructure and training capabilities of its staff but we have put our assistance on hold until we see more clear commitment from the GON to support the institution and expand its capacity to serve as a regional training center as originally intended. ¶25. (SBU) The Embassy point of contact for future correspondence and coordination on law enforcement/non-military security sector training initiatives is Michael Makalou (INL) makaloum@state.gov. ¶26. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulate Lagos and cleared with Legatt and DEA. SANDERS