NIGERIA-SOMALIA: FOREIGN MINISTER AND AMBASSADOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000473 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/W, INR/AA BAGHDAD FOR DMCCULLOUGH E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS MARR KPKO NI SO SUBJECT: NIGERIA-SOMALIA: FOREIGN MINISTER AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS AMISOM REF: A. ABUJA 417 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. BITTRICK-SANDERS 3/16/09 E-MAIL (NOTAL) ¶C. ABUJA 444 Classified By: Ambassador Robin R. Sanders for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Ambassador and Nigerian Foreign Minister Ojo Maduekwe further discussed the GON views on sending its troops to Somalia at a meeting at his residence on March 15. Maduekwe debriefed her on his latest conversation with President Yar'Adua on the issue after the last Federal Executive Council (FEC -- essentially the GON cabinet) meeting on March ¶11. The FonMin began by noting that the President had moved from a very reluctant view toward sending an AMISOM contingent to asking questions that he would like answered prior to making any decision. Ambassador asked if the Nigerian senior military leadership was still reluctant to deploy; he said "yes." He claimed that the GON military leadership has expressed to President Yar'Adua that it does not believe it has the capacity to do well in Somalia without a lot more assistance and support from its friends like the United States. Maduekwe quickly added, that he had reviewed the extensive dossier the Ambassador had sent him two weeks ago on all of the USG military-to-military assistance over the past two years which has already helped the GON improve its capacity, in addition to the proposed $3-5 million for equipment for Somalia, and the $3 million in foreign military financing that we have suggested be used for repairing their grounded C-130 aircraft. He noted his government's appreciation for the assistance to date, but apparently even with this, the GON military believes its capacity is not sufficient for what it would face in Somalia. The FonMin added, however, that if the military is directed by President Yar'Adua to go, then of course, it will comply without fuss. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador again pushed for a date certain. Maduekwe said that although he believes the position of his President was no longer negative on participating in AMISOM, and considered this a success, he claimed that Yar'Adua had several questions he would like addressed, which clearly came from the military, before he would reach a decision. The FonMin highlighted the follow points that needed answers in order to continue to move the ball forward in his government 
in getting Nigerian troops deployed to Somalia: -- Whether the request for Nigeria's participation in AMISOM is supported by the new Somali President, and if so, is there a formal public statement in that regard. -- Can the international community, through the United Nations, restate publicly its support for a Nigerian battalion to AMISOM so that Nigeria knows it is still going with the support of the international community, which would also then provide the GON the political cover it feels it needs in Nigeria to send their troops in harms way at this time? -- What support will Nigeria have in an exit strategy if this becomes necessary given the uncertain environment in Somalia? -- Would the U.S., for example, help them if they need to depart? Would we provide sea cover for their troops in the case of a need for an exit? If we would not, would any of the other troop contributing countries be able to do this? Is the USG engaging others on this type of coordination? -- What are the modalities of command and control for the AMISOM mission? ¶3. (C) In addition to the above questions, Maduekwe said that Yar'adua also asked him to engage with African Union (AU) Commissioner Ping on this issue to ensure that the AU still supports AMISOM, in the first instance, and Nigeria's participation in the second instance, given the nearly two year lapse between when Nigeria first agreed to this and now. He added that Nigeria would additionally be more comfortable with an AU statement in support of Nigeria's role in AMISOM, ABUJA 00000473 002 OF 002 which Maduekwe said he would raise with Ping. ¶4. (C) Comment: Maduekwe continues to claim he supports the GON deploying its troops to Somalia, and maintains that he is the only one in the FEC itself who strongly does so. However, we note that, although not an FEC member, GON power-broker Tanimu Yakubu, Yar'Adua's Special Economic Advisor, recently told the Ambassador that he personally supported the idea (see ref C). Whether Maduekwe has actually moved the President from being reluctant to considering the issue based on the pro-active questions listed above is not certain. But, at least it appears that the dialogue is still open within the GON, which is a better signal than we had two weeks ago. However, the Mission believes we are still a very long way from a slam dunk on this issue, and we also recognize that the GON could drag this on forever even if we were able to address and respond to the questions laid out above. This is a GON administration that is a master of saving face, and we are not optimistic -- even if Yar'Adua has moved from leaning "no" to slightly leaning "yes" -- that the Nigerians will ever come through. Overall, there remains the overriding point from the slate of GON leaders, which is that the Yar'Adua Government did not make this original commitment; the former Obasanjo Administration did. Maduekwe, Yakubu and others in the GON always make sure to point this out. There is also a huge undercurrent of opinion within the GON that believes that, if they do go, they will be doing so at our behest. The Department has already responded in part to some of Maduekwe's queries by e-mail (ref B). Post looks forward to further guidance on next steps based on the questions outlined in para 2. End comment. SANDERS