NIGERIA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF THE ELECTORAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ABUJA 000445 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/W, INR/AA BAGHDAD FOR DMCCULLOUGH E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF THE ELECTORAL REFORM PROCESS REF: A. 08 ABUJA 2405 ¶B. ABUJA 10 ¶C. ABUJA 344 Classified By: Political Counselor Walter N.S. Pflaumer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Below follows the Mission's analysis of the recommendations contained in the report of the Electoral Reform Committee (ERC),and subsequent White Paper and review reports by the GON Federal Executive Council (FEC -- essentially the Cabinet) on the ERC document. As for the ERC report, about half of its recommendations are focused on transforming the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) -- whose incompetence and partisan performance are largely blamed for the "fundamentally flawed" 2007 elections -- into a genuinely independent, credible body, freed from executive control over its membership and finances, and with a permanent career staff. The report also calls for the burden of proof that elections were free and fair to be put on INEC, rather than disappointed candidates. In its other provisions, the ERC report recommends that Nigeria move away from the first-past-the-post system for legislative elections it has long used, and to one similar to that in Germany, combining both constituencies and an element of proportional representation. It also imposes strict limits on campaign donations, and bars the practice of a politician switching parties at the last minute in order to get his name on the ballot. It calls for elections to be held six months prior to the end of the current incumbent's term, and requires (without explaining how this is supposed to happen) the courts to resolve all electoral disputes within this timeframe. ¶2. (C) While there are many worthy ideas in the ERC report, what is missing is any sense of what changes are achievable in time to have an impact on the 2011 elections, and any idea of a roadmap of how to get there. Moreover, even this very slow approach to electoral reform is now being blocked by those within the executive who oppose any effort to limit the Presidency's control over the electoral process. A review committee, headed by Attorney General (AG) Michael Aondoakaa, which was established to take a look at the ERC's proposals and make recommendations to the FEC has apparently now convinced a majority of the Cabinet to reject several of the most important reforms intended to increase INEC's independence and credibility, such as the National Judicial Council's oversight of the appointment of the INEC Chair and Deputy. Mission will be following up with ERC members, particularly the Chairman, as well as donor partners and civil society on where we go next in light of this grim state of affairs on the electoral reform process. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ERC REPORT - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) The ERC submitted its six-volume report ("the report") to President Yar'Adua on December 11 (see ref A). Volume I, which contains its recommendations (the other five volumes are submissions which the ERC received during public hearings around the country),comprises 319 pages, including a 19-page draft constitutional amendment bill, and texts of draft bills to amend the electoral act and other relevant legislation. The bulk of the recommendations deal with the composition, role and responsibilities of INEC, which currently is in charge of the entire electoral process, but which has been widely criticized, incuding by the USG, for "massive fraud and serious electoral irregularities" in the conduct of the "fundamentally flawed" 2007 elections. In addition, the report proposes a major shift away from the current first-past-the-post system for legislative elections and its replacement by a mixed constituency and proportional system. It also includes measures to strengthen the internal democracy of political parties; requirements that electoral tribunals and the regular judiciary complete the evaluation of cases within six months, and that they do so before the ABUJA 00000445 002 OF 005 winner takes office; and guidance on the deployment of the police and armed forces during the electoral process. THE ROLE OF INEC -------------- ¶4. (C) Currently, INEC consists of a Chairman plus twelve other Commissioners, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The report, by contrast, calls for a Chairman, Deputy Chairman and six National Commissioners; for each of them, the National Judicial Council (NJC -- a permanent, constitutionally established body consisting of 21 serving and retired Judges, senior lawyers, plus two laymen) would choose a shortlist of three candidates which would be sent to the National Council of State (NCS -- another constitutionally established body with over 50 members including, inter alia, the President, VP, all serving Governors, all former Heads of Government, all former Chief Justices, the Senate President and House Speaker),which would choose one candidate for confirmation by the Senate. In addition, the report calls for five additional members to be chosen from three-person shortlists prepared by labor, women's groups, civil society organizations, the Nigerian Bar Association and the media. These shortlists would be screened by the NJC, then referred to the NCS, which would choose one to recommend to the Senate. (Comment: The effect of this change would be to reduce substantially the role of the President in selecting the Chairman and members of INEC, and to put that responsibility into hands considerably less likely to be narrowly partisan. End Comment.) ¶5. (C) In one of the report's most significant recommendations, the ERC proposed that the burden of proof that an election was free and fair should be placed on INEC, rather than an aggrieved defeated candidate. The current electoral law presumes that the winner, as certified by INEC, was elected fairly unless the loser can present evidence to prove to the electoral tribunal that fraudulent practices affected enough votes to have changed the election's outcome. Given the sheer quantity of such information needed to assemble such evidence, and that the petitioner would have to request most of it from INEC, this has been exceedingly difficult to do, especially in Presidential elections. Under this change, all a petitioner would have to show is that fraudulent practices occurred in some areas; the burden would then be on INEC to show that such practices did not occur in enough areas to sway the result. If it lost such a case, INEC would have no right of appeal. ¶6. (SBU) The report proposes to reduce further the chance that INEC would be subject to executive manipulation by making its budget a first charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund (which is what the GON calls its appropriation bill), and entrenching this provision in the Constitution. The report also proposes the establishment of a full-time permanent staff of almost 10,000 for the Commission, including career officials all the way down to the ward level. When ad hoc staff are needed at election time, the report calls for them to be hired from the ranks of the National Youth Service Corps and the Civil Service. The existing State level electoral commissions (SIECs -- which serve as mini-INECs in each state) would be integrated into the national INEC institution. ¶7. (C) Another proposed change in the report would "unbundle" INEC, transferring a number of its functions to three other commissions: a Political Parties Commission, an Electoral Offenses Commission and a Constituency Delimitation Commission. The three new commissions would also be selected primarily by the NJC, and would take on particular functions which the current INEC has been judged by many observers to have handled in a partisan manner. (Comment: One NGO contact remarked that, had there been an Electoral Offenses Commission in 2007, the main culprit on whom it would have focused would have been INEC Chairman Maurice Iwu. End comment.) CHANGES IN THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM ABUJA 00000445 003 OF 005 -------------- ¶8. (SBU) A large part of the report recounts Nigeria's past experience with the first-past-the-post electoral system it inherited from Britain, and argues that this system helped create the take-no-prisoners approach to elections which had led to violence and disunity. It then recommends that Nigeria adopt a mixed constituency and proportional representation system similar to that used in Germany, adding an additional 30% of seats to the House of Representatives, which would be allocated among the parties at an election so that the overall percentage of seats held by a party in the House reflected the overall share of the vote it won nationally. Similar systems would be used in state assemblies and local government councils. The ERC argues that this system would make it far easier to make sure minority views were represented. Provisions requiring parties to give a share of the higher seats in their proportional lists to women and the disabled would increase the representation of these groups in the legislatures. The report also proposes that independent candidates would be allowed to stand for election to the constituency seats. ¶9. (SBU) The report also criticizes the way parties have tried to generate a "bandwagon" effect so that the winner in most of the state elections is likely to win the national elections as well (they are currently held one week apart), and so that the winner of the Presidential election is likely to have a majority in the National Assembly too. The ERC recommends that elections for President and the 36 Governors be held on the same day nationwide, and that the date be fixed by law (they recommend a date in November). It also calls for elections for the National Assembly and the state assemblies be held on one day, and that the date be two years after the executive elections. (Comment: We recall that Presidential and Gubernatorial elections were held on the same day in 2003, but would be hard pressed to point to any benefit this had. End comment.) POLITICAL PARTIES -------------- ¶10. (SBU) In addition to recommending the creation of the Political Parties Commission (PPC),the report calls for parties which receive more than 2.5% of the vote to receive partial public funding. In order to attempt to reduce the role of "political godfathers" in the electoral process, the report proposes strict limits on donations to candidates (e.g., N20 million, approximately $135,000, from an individual donor to one Presidential candidate),and requires that the donors and amounts be published. ¶11. (SBU) Pointing to some of the more egregious situations which occurred during the nominating process prior to the 2007 elections, the report calls for the PPC to have powers to require parties to select their candidates through democratic processes, such as primaries. The PPC is also empowered to require parties to have established grievance and appeal procedures, and requires candidates to exhaust these before going to court. To prevent politicians switching parties at the last minute in order to increase their chance of getting on the ballot, the report calls for them to have been members of whatever party nominates them for a minimum of six months before they can be chosen (FYI: the current law only requires them to be members on the day of their nomination, and several elections were invalidated because politicians failed even to do that. End FYI). ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY -------------- ¶12. (C) Following both of the last two elections, the process of appeals against election results has dragged on for years. For example, while the appeals against the April, 2007 Presidential election ended last December, many cases, including in gubernatorial races, are still continuing. This situation was heavily criticized in public testimony. In order to try to prevent it in future, the ERC proposed that elections be held six months before the end of the term of the previous incumbent, so as to allow, and indeed require, ABUJA 00000445 004 OF 005 the courts to resolve all appeals before the six months are completed, making it reasonably certain that, once the winner is sworn into office, he could be reasonably certain to be there for the remainder of his term. It adds that the court should be empowered to require the filers of "frivolous" petitions bear the other sides legal costs. (Comment: It is unclear how simple insistence that the courts act swiftly will overcome the notoriously ponderous operation of the Nigerian judicial system. End comment.) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - THE REPORT, THE WHITE PAPER AND THE AONDOAKAA REVIEW - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶13. (C) After the presentation of the ERC report to the FEC on December 10 (see ref. A),a Cabinet committee headed by Defense Minister Shittima Mustapha was tasked with preparing a draft White Paper (i.e., a statement of government policy) on its recommendations. The White Paper was presented to the FEC on February 25. While it has not yet been made public, several sources who have seen it agree that it is essentially a 10-page summary of the ERC report, and a recommendation to accept the whole of the ERC's proposed reforms. Some within the FEC clearly objected to this approach, and called for a further study. As we have reported (ref. C) AG Aondoakaa and two others were given the task of preparing this second review, which was presented to the FEC on March 4. The debate on it was clearly contentious, because no decision was announced until after the March 11 FEC meeting. The Aondoakaa report will form the basis of what the executive will present to the National Assembly for further action. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ANALYSIS: WHERE WE ARE NOW - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶14. (C) On its face, there is much that is worthy in the ERC's original recommendations. Its main focus is on INEC, which was clearly culpable for the disastrous 2007 elections, and its list of things to change in order to move from the current unsatisfactory arrangement to something better is a perfectly reasonable one. The measures to make INEC independent of executive manipulation would stand a good chance of working, especially those which would reduce the President's role in selecting the members of the Commission, and which would give it a secure source of funds. The placing of the burden of proof on INEC to show that elections were free and fair is a reform which civil society groups have long sought. Much of the rest of the recommendations are, at worst, not harmful, though a passing reference to the pursuit of electronic voting (in a country without reliable electricity over most areas) drew scoffs from some of our NGO contacts. ¶15. (C) What is missing is any sense of priorities among all these recommendations, and how long it would take to bring about at least some changes so there is a chance the next elections might be better than the last ones in 2007. Because of Nigeria's history of religious and ethnic division, its 1999 constitution entrenches many details; and the process of amending it has been made exceedingly difficult (2/3 of both houses of the National Assembly, plus majority votes in 2/3 of the state assemblies). The ERC report includes a long draft bill listing all the amendments to the constitution which it is proposing (and most of the basic changes to the status and structure of INEC would indeed require amending the constitution, as would the more obvious ones changing the structure of legislative elections). The likelihood has to be small that such a bill could gather 2/3 majorities from politicians who would be voting to abolish the very system under which they were chosen. Progress is likely to be slow at best. Some from within the GON have already been hinting that little may be done before 2011, and some changes requiring constitutional amendment might take until 2015. ¶16. (C) If/if there were political will to do so, there are ABUJA 00000445 005 OF 005 things the GON could do to increase the chance of making the next election better than the last one, and some of them would not even require legislation, let alone a constitutional amendment. For example, if the politicized INEC Chairman, Maurice Iwu, could be persuaded to step down, or if an updated and more accurate electoral register could be prepared, or if the process of recruiting and training INEC's ad hoc staff could be done sufficiently in advance. If Iwu could be made to go (and, by our reading, his presence in the job is illegal, since clauses 156 and 66 of the constitution forbid persons who are dual nationals like himself, a naturalized AmCit, from serving on INEC),as well as some other members of the commission, there are lots of more capable and honest Nigerians, including many of the members of the ERC, who could do a much better job. Serious efforts to improve the quality and accuracy of the electoral register would also help as both the technology and funding for doing so are available. ¶17. (C) Unfortunately, present indicators are that the political will to carry out even the more administrative first steps toward electoral reform are simply not present. According to March 12 press reports, the FEC debate on how to respond to the ERC report (see ref. C) has come down on the side of those within the GON who wanted to strip out several of the main recommendations even before sending the report forward for further debate in the National Assembly. The review prepared by Nigeria's much ill-reputed Attorney General Aondoakaa called for the removal of many of the most important administrative reforms (particularly those limiting the President's power to pick INEC's Commissioners, and those which would put the burden of proof in electoral disputes on INEC rather than defeated candidates). In a public statement last week, Barrister Festus Okoye, Director of the NGO Human Rights Monitor and a member of the ERC, denounced what he described as this "coterie of reactionary forces, political cabals, and beneficiaries of criminal politics (who) have been working assiduously to discredit the report, and kill it before it gets to the National Assembly." He accused the critics of the report from within the FEC of seeking only "cosmetic electoral reforms." Unfortunately, it is they who have the upper hand. ¶18. (C) We will be meeting with various members of the ERC and key NGO contacts to discuss next steps on electoral reform. Mission will seek to lead dialogue on this issue with donor partners such as the UK, EC and civil society. Meanwhile, the Ambassador has asked to meet with former Chief Justice and ERC Chairman Uwais. ¶19. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulate Lagos. SANDERS