2009-2010 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT

UNCLAS ABUJA 002351 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/W, INL/AAE, INL/C, INR/AA, SCT, EEB; DOJ for AFMLS, OIA, OPDAT; TREASURY for FINCEN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV SNAR KCRM KCOR EFIN KTFN EAID ASEC NI SUBJECT: 2009-2010 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (INCSR) NIGERIA RESPONSE REF: 114960 -------------- NIGERIA -------------- ¶1. (U) Nigeria remains a major drug trans-shipment point and a significant center for criminal financial activity. Individuals and criminal organizations have taken advantage of the country's location, porous borders, weak laws, corruption, lack of enforcement, and poor socioeconomic conditions to launder the proceeds of crime. Proceeds from drug trafficking, illegal oil bunkering, bribery and embezzlement, contraband smuggling, theft, and financial crimes, such as bank fraud, real estate fraud, and identity theft constitute major sources of illicit proceeds in Nigeria. Advance fee fraud, also known as "419" fraud in reference to the fraud section in Nigeria's criminal code, is a lucrative financial crime that generates hundreds of millions of illicit dollars annually. Money laundering in Nigeria takes many forms, including: investment in real estate; wire transfers to offshore banks; political party financing; deposits in foreign bank accounts; use of professional services, such as lawyers, accountants, and investment advisers; and cash smuggling. Nigerian criminal enterprises are adept at devising ways to subvert international and domestic law enforcement efforts and evade detection. -------------- LEGAL FRAMEWORK -------------- ¶2. (U) In December 2002, Nigeria passed an amendment to the 1995 Money Laundering Act extending the scope of the law to cover proceeds from predicate offenses other than narcotics trafficking. In 2004, the National Assembly repealed the 1995 Money Laundering Act as amended and passed the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act (MLPA),which applies to the proceeds of all financial crimes. Nigeria also passed an amendment to the 1991 Banking and Other Financial Institutions (BOFI) Act expanding coverage to stock brokerage firms and foreign currency exchange facilities, giving the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) greater power to deny bank licenses, and allowing the CBN to freeze suspicious accounts. A third piece of legislation, the 2004 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, established the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC),which investigates and prosecutes money laundering and other financial crimes, and coordinates information sharing. Violation of the EFCC Act carries penalties of up to life imprisonment. Amendments to the EFCC Act gave the EFCC the authority to investigate and prosecute money laundering, expanded the number of EFCC board members, enabled EFCC police members to bear arms, and banned interim court appeals that hinder the trial court process. MLPA and the EFCC Act also established the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU),housed within the EFCC, which serves as the central agency for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information on money laundering and terrorist financing. Nigeria also employs the 1995 Foreign Exchange (Monetary and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act. This legislation enhanced the CBN's power under the BOFI to deny bank licenses and freeze suspicious accounts. It also strengthened financial institutions by requiring more stringent monitoring of accounts, removing a minimum financial threshold for suspicious transactions, and lengthening the period for retention of records. ¶3. (U) Money laundering controls apply to banks and other financial institutions, including stock brokerages and currency exchange houses, as well as designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs). These institutions include dealers in jewelry, cars and luxury goods, chartered accountants, audit firms, tax consultants, clearing and settlement companies, legal practitioners, hotels, casinos, supermarkets and other businesses that the Federal Ministry of Commerce (FMC) designates as a money laundering risk. The Special Control Unit Against Money Laundering (SCUML) under the Ministry of Commerce monitors, supervises, and regulates the activities of DNFBPs. ¶4. (U) In May 2006, the Financial Action Task Force visited Nigeria to evaluate revisions made to the government's anti-money laundering (AML) regime. The FATF recognized that the Government of Nigeria (GON) had remedied the major deficiencies in its AML regime and removed Nigeria from its non-cooperative countries and territories (NCCT) list. ¶5. (U) Nigeria has criminalized money laundering and terrorism financing through various legal frameworks. In addition to the MLPA and the EFCC Act, Nigeria also adopted the following legislation: the Nigerian Constitution; Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) Act of 2000; Code of Conduct Bureau Act; Penal and Criminal Codes; Advanced Fee Fraud and other related offences Act of 2007; Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) Act of 2007; Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI) Act of 2007; and the National Dug Law Enforcement (NDLEA) Act. ¶6. (U) Nigeria has no bank secrecy laws that prevent the disclosure of client and ownership information by domestic financial services companies to bank regulatory and law enforcement authorities. The MLPA 2004 S12 (4) prohibits banking secrecy / customer confidentiality as it applies to AML/CTF. In addition, a proposed amendment of the MLPA 2004 contains a more comprehensive provision that prohibits client confidentiality and disclosure of ownership information by domestic and offshore financial services companies to bank supervisors and law enforcement authorities. Bearer shares are not permitted for banks and companies in Nigeria. All shares issued and allotted must be in the name of a shareholder. Banks and other financial institutions are required to identify and verify the identity of their customers before entering into relationships with them, as well as update the same periodically. This provision also applies to existing customers. Records are kept for a minimum of five years from the date of severance of the relationship. ¶7. (U) The CBN circular (BSD/13/2006) from August 2006 requires all financial institutions to forward Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) where the suspicious and unusual transactions include potential financing of terrorism to the NFIU. Nigerian financial institutions periodically receive the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list and have detected one case of terrorist financing within the banking system. Prosecution of that case is currently pending. ¶8. (U) Nigeria is a Party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and the UN Convention against Corruption. Nigeria ranked 130 out of 180 countries in Transparency International's 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index, moving down from a rank of 122 in 2008. ¶9. (U) The United States and Nigeria have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT),which entered into force in January 2003. Nigeria has signed memoranda of understanding with Russia, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Uganda to facilitate cooperation in the fight against narcotics trafficking and money laundering. Nigeria has also signed bilateral agreements for information exchange relating to money laundering with South Africa, the United Kingdom, and all Commonwealth and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries. Nigeria is a member of GIABA, a FATF-style regional body. ¶10. (U) The Nigerian Financial system does not allow favorable tax treatment or freedom from exchange control. There are no shell companies permitted in Nigeria. Paragraph 1.3 of the new CBN AML/CTF Compliance Manual 2009 states that "financial institutions are not permitted to keep anonymous accounts or accounts in fictitious names." The Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) does not license or regulate casinos or internet gaming sites. ¶11. (U) CBN licenses off-shore banks; however, it performs background checks on all applicants. Two off-shore banks operate in Nigeria: Citibank Nigeria Limited and Standard Chartered Bank Limited. Nominee/anonymous directors are not allowed in Nigeria or in Nigerian banks. Nigeria has no separate regulatory agency for off-shore banks. The Central Bank of Nigeria serves as the apex regulatory body for all banks operating in Nigeria, whether off-shore or on-shore. The same regulatory rules apply to both domestic banks and off-shore banks. However, additional regulation applied to off-shore banks in line with the Basle Core Principle of Banking Supervision in respect of consolidated supervisions. ¶12. (U) 24 Free Trade Zones (FTZs) exist in Nigeria. Eleven are operational and mostly belong to the Federal Government. The FTZs are licensed by the Nigeria Export Processing Zones Authority (NEPZA),responsible for the regulation, operation and monitoring of FTZs activities in Nigeria. Standardized procedures exist for FTZs, including a thorough registration process involving the identification of companies and individuals who want to use the zones. Nigeria has not reported any cases of misuse of the FTZs for money laundering or terrorism financing. ¶13. (U) The National Assembly is considering new legislation, including the Non-Conviction Based Asset Forfeiture Bill and the proposed Special Courts Bill for the speedy adjudication of economic and financial crimes cases. Nigeria has incorporated FATF recommendations in its domestic AML/CTF laws and regulations. The FATF 40 plus 9 Special recommendations are essential elements of Nigeria's AML/CTF strategy and implementation plans and programs. Nigeria is an active member of GIABA, a FATF-Style Regional Body. -------------- LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES -------------- ¶14. (U) Nigeria's legal framework empowers various anti-corruption and law enforcement agencies to deal with the challenges of money laundering and terrorism financing, including investigation and prosecution of money laundering and terrorism financing offenses. An apparent lack of political will to enforce the laws and continuous delays within the justice sector have hindered the progress of many prosecutions and/or investigations of perpetrators of these crimes, who are often politically influential. ¶15. (U) The primary institutions dealing with money laundering and financial crimes are the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC),the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU),the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC),and the Special Control Unit against Money Laundering (SCUML). Several other government agencies are involved in investigating financial crimes in Nigeria, including the Nigerian Police Force (NPF),the Department of State Security (DSS),and NDLEA. The EFCC is the coordinating agency. All relevant agencies are adequately staffed and trained. -------------- EFCC -------------- ¶16. (U) Since its inception in April 2004, the EFCC has held the mandate and the capacity to effectively investigate and prosecute financial crimes, including money laundering and terrorist financing. The EFCC also coordinates agencies' efforts in pursuing financial crime investigations. In its first five years of existence, the EFCC successfully seized over USD 5 billion in cash and property, and repatriated over USD 4.6 million to U.S. entities involving advanced fee fraud ("419") scams. About 3,301 petitions were received by the EFCC out of which 123 were fully investigated and taken to court for prosecution. 74 convictions were secured including the conviction and sentencing of former Governor Lucky Igbinedion for false declaration and money laundering. However, in 2009, the EFCC faced significant challenges in fulfilling its mandate to fight financial crimes and money laundering. The EFCC has not prosecuted any money laundering related case, nor secured any convictions in the past year. -------------- NFIU -------------- ¶17. (U) The Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU),established in 2005, derives its powers from the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act of 2004 and the EFCC Act. It is the central agency for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information on money laundering and terrorist financing. Nigeria has an operational FIU with full membership status in the Egmont Group. The NFIU is adequately staffed and is operationally autonomous. Housed within the EFCC, it has its own independent budget within the EFCC's budget. The NFIU has a Director as the chief accounting officer. Its core functions are the receipt and analysis of financial disclosures and the dissemination of financial intelligence on money laundering and terrorism financing to competent authorities. It is also involved in AML/CTF examination and information exchange with other FIUs. The NFIU is an administrative-type FIU with AML/CTF regulatory responsibility. Although the NFIU is a significant component of the EFCC, complementing the EFCC's Directorate of Investigations, it does not carry out its own investigations. The Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, Section 6, requires STRs to be submitted by financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions, and gives the NFIU the authority to receive them. ¶18. (U) The NFIU also receives reports involving the transfer to or from a foreign country of funds or securities exceeding U.S. USD 10,000 in value. All financial institutions and designated non-financial institutions are required by law to furnish the NFIU with details of these financial transactions. The NFIU has the responsibility to examine and supervise financial institutions for compliance with AML/CTF laws and regulations in conjunction with other regulators, including the CBN, SEC and the National Insurance Commission (NAICOM). The NFIU and other regulators are not adequately staffed and trained for this purpose. The NFIU has access to records or databases of other government agencies and reporting entities. The NFIU has formal mechanisms for sharing information locally with stakeholder agencies. Similarly, it has formal mechanisms to exchange information with international partners both at bilateral and multilateral platforms, using the instrumentality of MOUs and the Egmont Secured Web. Between January and September 2009, the NFIU received a total of 826 Suspicious Transaction ports. Fifty-five of these were developed and disseminated to relevant competent authorities for investigation. -------------- SCUML -------------- ¶19. (U) Due to Nigeria's primarily cash-based economy, 90 percent of money laundering activity reportedly takes place in the informal sector. The Special Control Unit Against Money Laundering (SCUML) is a special unit under the Ministry of Commerce which monitors, supervises, and regulates the activities of businesses and professions outside the formal financial sector that are thought to pose a money laundering risk. Oversight by the Ministry of Commerce, however, has reportedly not been rigorous or effective. Consequently, the EFCC decided to fund SCUML and second some of its employees to that agency in an effort to rapidly improve its investigative and enforcement capacity. In addition, the EFCC facilitated the inauguration of a Designated Non-Financial Institution (DNFI) Advisory Council which serves as a formal platform for partnership between SCUML as the regulator and the heads of the DNFI Self Regulatory Organizations (SROs),including some Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). The EFCC and SCUML have collaborated on efforts to strengthen the Chief Compliance Officers Forum, which EFCC/NFIU facilitated. -------------- NDLEA -------------- ¶20. (U) While the NDLEA has the authority to handle narcotics-related cases, it is reported that proceeds of illicit traffic in narcotics and psychotropic substances is one of the primary sources of money laundering. However, the agency does not have any evidence to show that such proceeds are in any way connected with financing of terrorism either locally or abroad. The proceeds of illicit drugs in Nigeria derive largely from foreign criminal activity compared to domestic activities. The generated funds are clandestinely repatriated to Nigeria through a variety of schemes. The proceeds are controlled by drug trafficking syndicates who operate in an organized manner not necessarily as criminal gangs. Nigeria is a signatory to the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. Most of the country's trade is tariff-driven which does not allow for a flourishing black market of smuggled goods. However, one of the schemes used by drug traffickers to repatriate and launder their proceeds is through the importation of various commodities, predominantly luxury cars and other items such as textiles, computers, and mobile telephone units. Nigerian financial institutions are also reportedly used for currency transactions involving US dollars derived from illicit drugs. Documented evidence reveals that cash couriers are used for smuggling dollars into the country. In addition, the non-bank financial sector was also reportedly being used as a conduit for money laundering. ¶21. (U) From January 1, 2009 to September 30, 2009, the NDLEA handled a total of 25 money laundering investigations resulting in 16 arrests. Four of these investigations involving 6 arrested persons were related to the smuggling of monetary instruments including US dollars that were suspected to be fakes. In a fifth investigation, NDLEA arrested a smuggler of a large amount of US dollars and the case was transferred to the EFCC since it did not appear to be the proceeds of illicit drug trafficking. Eight of the investigations were related to MLAT requests, two of which originated from the U.S., while the other six originated from other countries. NDLEA has responded to all MLAT requests. Eleven other investigations were found to have a drug nexus and were prosecuted. Only two suspects had charges vacated because their cases were found not to be drug-related and were released. No drug-related convictions were obtained but there are 18 pending cases in the courts. -------------- ASSET FORFEITURE -------------- ¶22. (U) Nigeria has established a legal framework and regulatory systems for identifying, tracing, freezing, seizing, and forfeiting proceeds of crime. Depending on the nature of the case, the EFCC, NDLEA, NPF, or the ICPC would conduct the tracing, seizing, and freezing of assets. ¶23. (U) The NDLEA Act made elaborate provisions for the forfeiture of a variety of assets acquired with the proceeds of illicit drugs. The NDLEA Act delineates procedures for seizing and forfeiting subject properties and enumerates the powers of the NDLEA to seize, freeze and confiscate proceeds of illicit drugs. Furthermore, under the Nigerian Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act (MPLA),assets connected to money laundering offences are also subject to forfeiture except for offences relating to the non-rendition of statutory returns by financial institutions and designated non-financial bodies and professions. These provisions cover both foreign and domestic assets derived from the proceeds of drugs, as well as instrumentalities of drug offences and the conveyance of real properties whose owners permit its use for drug cultivation, storage, and trafficking. The NDLEA Act also permits the freezing and subsequent forfeiture of funds, stocks, or other securities held in any financial institution, while the MLPA authorizes forfeiture of assets of corporate bodies involved in money laundering activities. ¶24. (U) NDLEA's authority to trace, seize, investigate, and freeze assets and accounts held by financial institutions is subject to the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation before any accounts can be frozen. The proceeds from seizures and forfeitures pass to the Federal Government of Nigeria (GON),which uses a portion of the recovered sums to provide restitution to the victims of the criminal acts. The banking community cooperates with law enforcement to trace funds and seize or freeze bank accounts. There is no period of time specified before assets must be released. Frozen assets can be confiscated by the relevant agency handling the case. Nigeria does not have an asset forfeiture fund. Consequently, seized assets remain in the custody of the seizing agency until they revert to the GON. Due to lack of proper accountability, forfeited assets are sometimes lost or stolen. ¶25. (U) The NDLEA has a separate Directorate of Assets and Financial Investigation (DAFI) dedicated to asset and money laundering investigations, as well as other AML/CTF enforcement activities. The NDLEA Act and MPLA give the agency investigative, police, and surveillance powers, including access to any computer system/database and wiretap authority. NDLEA can immediately freeze assets but has a difficult time in initially tracking them down. From January to December 2009, NDLEA reported that it seized a total USD 1,631,789 USD in currency and real estate. ¶26. (U) The EFCC Act also provides for the forfeiture of assets and properties to the GON after a money laundering conviction. Foreign assets are subject to forfeiture by both EFCC and NDLEA. The properties subject to forfeiture are listed in EFCC Act and include any real or personal property representing the gross receipts obtained directly as a result of the violation of the Act, or that is traceable to such receipts. Any property representing the proceeds of an offense committed under the laws of a foreign country, which is punishable by a sentence of more than one year, is also forfeitable under EFCC Act. All means of conveyance, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or intended to be used to transport or facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession or concealment of economic or financial crimes, are likewise subject to forfeiture. Forfeiture is possible only as part of a criminal prosecution. There is no comparable law providing for civil forfeiture independent of a criminal prosecution, but the EFCC has established a committee to draft legislation to address this deficiency. A non-conviction based forfeiture statute is now pending in the National Assembly. -------------- TERRORISM FINANCING -------------- ¶27. (U) Nigeria has attempted to criminalize the financing of terrorism through Section 15 of the EFCC Act. The EFCC has authority under the Act to identify, freeze, seize, and forfeit terrorist finance-related assets; however, implementation of the existing framework has revealed some practical challenges. The EFCC Act does not provide a comprehensive framework for criminalizing and pursuing the full range of terrorist financing as defined by international standards. The Act does not criminalize terrorist financing, nor does it reference terrorist financing as a predicate offense for money laundering. A comprehensive bill for the prevention of terrorism is currently before the National Assembly. If passed, it would be Nigeria's first autonomous anti-terrorism law. -------------- RECENT DEVELOPMENTS -------------- ¶28. (U) In 2008, the Intergovernmental Task Force against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) conducted, discussed and adopted Nigeria's mutual evaluation. According to the mutual evaluation report (MER),significant legal gaps still existed in Nigeria's AML/CTF regime. In addition, Nigerian authorities had not issued clear guidance to financial institutions, resulting in deficiencies related to customer due diligence, beneficial ownership, record keeping, and reporting requirements. The MER also noted that the NFIU's powers under the EFCC are ambiguous, and its statistics on suspicious transaction reports (STRs) and currency transaction reports (CTRs) are inconsistent. From October 2008 to September 2009, the GON's commitment to addressing the deficiencies in its framework for combating financial crime and corruption was still not clear. However, Nigerian authorities took a few practical steps to consolidate some the gains of the previous years with respect to the implementation of Nigeria's anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF) plans, programs, and timetable. These steps include: (1) Amendment of the MLPA 2004 ¶29. (U) The MLPA 2004 was amended in July 2009 by an Inter-Ministerial Committee set up by the Hon. Minister of Justice and Attorney General of the Federation. The revised MLPA 2004 addressed the legal weaknesses raised in Nigeria's AML/CTF MER. The proposed amendment bill is in the process of being transmitted to the National Assembly (NASS). (2) Anti-Terrorism Bill (ATB) ¶30. (U) The ATB was sent to the NASS as an Executive Bill on October 12, 2009 by the President. Follow-up action has been intensified by the Presidential Inter-Ministerial / Agency Committee on FATF to ensure its passage during the first quarter of 2010. (3) Constitution of Presidential Inter- Ministerial/Agency Committee on FATF ¶31. (U) This Committee was established by the President on October 15, 2009, primarily to ensure the speedy passage of the ATB, the amended MLPA 2004 and the implementation of the recommendations contained in Nigeria's AML/CTF Mutual Evaluation Report. The Committee's membership was drawn from core AML/CTF institutions including the Presidency, Office of the Head of Service, Ministries of Justice, Finance, and Commerce as well as CBN, ICPC, NDLEA, SEC, NFIU, and EFCC. (4) Joint Capacity Building ¶32. (U) Over 50 participants from stakeholder-institutions participated in AML/CTF Pre-Mutual Evaluation training programs initiated by the NFIU and supported by GIABA at the EFCC Training and Research Institute (TRI) in Abuja. Equally, over 200 participants attended the annual AML/CTF Summit spearheaded by the NFIU in April 2009. In addition, an AML/CTF training program was organized for over 500 participants drawn from other financial institutions viz. Micro-Finance Banks, Discount Houses, and Primary Mortgage Institutions. There are additional joint training programs facilitated by other local and international stakeholders. Collectively, these initiatives have greatly enhanced cooperation, professionalism, and coordination amongst stakeholder institutions. (5) GIABA AML/CTF Mutual Evaluation ¶33. (U) Consistent with the mutual evaluation process of GIABA, Nigeria successfully provided a follow-up report to GIABA Secretariat in May 2009. The report highlighted the progress made by Nigeria in the implementation of the recommendations of the country's AML/CTF Mutual Evaluation Report (MER) since its adoption in Accra, Ghana in May 2008. (6) Inter-Agency Cooperation ¶34. (U) Inter-Agency cooperation was strengthened through the platform of the AML/CTF Inter-Ministerial Committee and the Nigeria Focal Point Initiative. These platforms provided an avenue for collaboration and a coordinated national approach in the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing. Under the auspices of the Inter-Ministerial Committee and Focal Point, Nigeria now successfully coordinates its responses to the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions on arms embargos, travel bans, and assets freezes with respect to Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, and entities associated with them. (7) Regulators - Reporting Entities Relationship ¶35. (U) The DNFI Advisory Council which serves as a formal platform for partnership between SCUML and the DNFI Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) was formally launched. Similarly, efforts were made to strengthen the Chief Compliance Officers Forum. Consequently, the DNFI Advisory Council and the Chief Compliance Officers Forum have helped to improve the relationship between regulators and the reporting entities. This, in turn, has led to greater AML/CTF compliance amongst reporting entities, improvement in the quantity and quality of CTR/STR renditions and a general deepening of AML/CTF culture in the country. (8) CBN AML/CTF Compliance Manual ¶36. (U) The Nigerian authorities undertook a thorough review of the old CBN Know Your Customer Manual and added the revisions to the CBN's AML/CTF Manual 2009. The new manual is very comprehensive, meets FATF requirements, and addresses many relevant issues raised in Nigeria's AML/CTF MER. (9) Sensitization and Awareness Creation ¶37. (U) Regulators and law enforcement agencies embarked on intensive AML/CTF sensitization and awareness creation during the period under consideration. For instance, AML/CTF workshops were organized for reporting entities and stakeholders, while mass media campaigns were increased to reach the vast majority of the public, particularly through the EFCC Anti-Corruption Revolution (ANCOR) Program in order to enhance public/private sector participation and support for the GON's anti-graft program. -------------- GOING FORWARD -------------- ¶39. (U) The GON should ensure the autonomy and independence of the EFCC and NFIU from political pressure. In particular, the EFCC needs to produce more effective results through prosecutions and enforcement actions in financial crimes and corruption investigations. The GON should also strengthen SCUML's authority to supervise designated non-financial businesses and professions. Moreover, the GON should ensure that the NPF has the capacity to function as an investigative partner in financial crimes cases, as well as work to eradicate any corruption that might exist within its own ranks and in other law enforcement bodies. Nigeria should re-invigorate its anti-corruption program and support the EFCC, as well as the ICPC, in their mandates to investigate and prosecute corrupt government officials and individuals. The GON should consider establishing a special court with specific jurisdiction and trained judges to handle financial crimes. Nigeria should enact a law providing for non-conviction-based forfeiture, ensure full implementation of its AML/CTF regime, and promote respect for the rule of law. Nigerian authorities should work toward a regime capable of thwarting money laundering and terrorist financing; and work toward full compliance with all relevant international standards, eliminating its remaining AML/CTF shortcomings. Authorities should work toward the passage of the comprehensive anti-terrorism bill in the National Assembly. Finally, the GON should continue to engage with the FATF, GIABA, and other international organizations. SANDERS