AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH FORMER HEAD OF STATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001423 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/W, DRL, INR/AA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL NI SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH FORMER HEAD OF STATE BABANGIDA REF: A. ABUJA 1419 ¶B. ABUJA 1405 ¶C. ABUJA 1398 Classified By: Political Counselor James P. McAnulty for reasons 1.4 (b ) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Former Nigerian Head of State Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida met with Ambassador August 3 to share his perspectives on the recent spate of Boko Haram-led violence in the north, electoral reform, and his view that President Yar'Adua's has neither the leadership nor the experience to effectively address these issues. End Summary. ¶2. (C) When asked his views on the eruption of violence in northeast Nigeria, Babangida admitted he was shocked to see the scale and coordination of the attacks, which spanned four states. However, he held that there were serious warning signs across the region about Boko Haram,s activities and that the GON was aware of and should have taken action ahead of time, adding that the undercurrent of discontent among youths in the north made them perfect recruits for Muhammad Yusuf and Boko Haram. Babangida suggested that many of the mistakes during the conflict stemmed from the "incompetency and inexperience of the current government," explaining that Yar'Adua's advisors did not have the necessary depth of experience and sophistication to resolve such conflicts. He also predicted that "we are only seeing a temporary halt to this type of violence" given the lack of social, political, and economic development in Nigeria today. ¶3. (C) Babangida intimated that the true story behind Yusuf's death was that "the military captured Yusuf and handed him over to the police, who then killed him." He admitted the concern among authorities that Yusuf would be set free again as occurred in 2007, but asserted that any claim that the absence of anti-terrorism laws made it more difficult to prosecute radicals like Yusuf was a "lame excuse;" existing laws on disturbing the peace and other provisions can be effectively used. He did strongly abhor the extrajudicial action by the police. Babangida speculated that some government leaders may have been more complicit than others with extremist groups, including with Yusuf's movement, because they benefitted politically from these groups targeting their opponents. ¶4. (C) On electoral reform, Babangida expressed frustration and disappointment with the People's Democratic Party (PDP), specifically its inability to resolve internal conflicts democratically. He pointed out that several PDP members criticized their party for lack of inclusiveness; PDP's internal problems will get worse unless credible elections occur. Without credible electoral reform, he said he would have no confidence in the 2011 elections. ¶5. (C) Praising President Obama's Accra message that "there is no need for strong men, but rather strong institutions," he linked this theme to his own aspirations for the PDP to build up strong regional branches of the PDP, rather than one central body. He also said he was advocating for allowing regionally-based political parties to develop vice national parties; for example, have PDP only be in the North, the AC party in the Southwest, and so on. Babangida attributed PDP,s internal conflict to the party's centralized structure. He predicted that attempts from PDP opposition parties to form a megaparty will ultimately fail because it would have too many divergent ideologies and platforms. ¶6. (C) This cable was coordinated with Consulate Lagos. SANDERS