SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO NIGERIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001411 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2019 TAGS: OVIP PREL PGOV ECON NI SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO NIGERIA Classified By: Ambassador Robin R. Sanders for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) A Problematic Picture - - - - - - - - - - - ¶1. (C) Over two years in to President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua's administration, the GON is facing serious and growing problems on several fronts. While the President's election was judged largely fraudulent, his assumption of office was at least accepted by most Nigerians, and welcomed by many. His promise in his inaugural address of a broad program of reform focusing on deliverable benefits to ordinary people (the "Seven Point Agenda": electricity generation, food security, job creation, road construction, land reform, education and a restoration of security in the Niger Delta) was applauded both domestically and internationally. ¶2. (C/NF) There has, however, been little or no progress on any of these areas for promised reform, and several have seen a marked deterioration, particularly electricity generation. Moreover, while Yar'Adua also promised electoral reform in his inaugural speech, there is little or no chance of this being realized prior to the next elections scheduled for ¶2011. The report of the Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) took 20 months to produce, but only a few weeks for a Cabinet committee (headed by the execrable and notoriously venal Attorney General Aondoakaa) to gut. The remnants of the ERC's recommendations have been forwarded to the National Assembly, but the odds of anything of significance emerging seem long. The recent Ekiti State gubernatorial by-election, in which the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP),with the apparent support of the top leadership of the GON, blatantly rigged the polls in order to assure victory shows where many in the government and ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) are coming from. ¶3. (C) The prospects for progress on corruption, the area singled out by most observers as being at the heart of Nigeria's problems, also seem remote. The modest, if laudable, progress made by the EFCC under Chairman Ribadu largely ended with his removal and replacement. The EFCC continues to cooperate with us on money laundering and other suspicious financial transactions, but its own prosecutions (as well as assistance to other nations such as the UK) of Nigerian "big fish" have virtually ceased. The closeness of some of the most notable corrupt figures to senior Presidency �0A;officials (former Governor Ibori reportedly stays at Villa guest facilities when in Abuja) is the clearest indicator that progress in the fight against corruption appears unlikely. ¶4. (C) The decline in both oil production and price have had a significant impact on the government's revenue over the past year. The recent upsurge in fighting in the Niger Delta, the main cause of the fall in production, has also translated to an increase in overall insecurity, with the GON's Joint Task Force (JTF) being blamed for some "collateral damage" against civilians, and various "militant" groups being implicated in revenge attacks against oil facilities. Kidnappings of civilians, including expatriates, have been perpetrated by both "militants" and criminals. ¶5. (C) In the north, poverty and poor governance have facilitated extremist recruitment of marginalized groups, specifically disaffected youth. From July 26-29, violent clashes erupted in four northern states after supporters of an Islamic extremist group, &Boko Haram8 launched a coordinated four-state assault on police stations and other government facilities. The group states it opposes western education models but has not targeted western nationals or interests. Extremist support remains small and Nigeria,s Islamic leaders strongly condemned the attacks. Policy Positives - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) The news, however, is not all negative, and some positive signs stand out. Nigeria's promotion by G/TIP to Category 1 (countries which are doing the right things to fight human trafficking) thanks to the hard work of the Nigerian Agency for the Prevention of Trafficking in Persons ABUJA 00001411 002.2 OF 002 (NAPTIP) shows what a GON law enforcement agency can do with the right leadership and commitment. The recent decision by the Attorney General and NDLEA to allow us to second a retired DEA Agent to advise it on operational matters in the fight against drug trafficking is also a sign of improving cooperation. We have also made some modest progress in some of the long-standing extradition cases of interest to the USG. (SBU) Economically, we have been working with the GON to address key economic challenges across the board, which translated into the elimination of some import bans and lower tariffs, bringing down the cost of doing business, and reducing incentives for smuggling. We have also helped to solve regulatory and policy questions to allow increased electricity supplies, boost agricultural production and assist in the establishment of reliable regional and international markets, including through AGOA production. In addition, we have worked toward a healthy restructuring of the oil and gas sector, and toward improving aviation safety and security. ¶7. (SBU) On the military side, we have made real progress on maritime security, with the GON permitting the first ship visit in many years, and allowing the installation of two RMAC radar sites. With ACOTA training, Nigerian troops have continued to participate in peacekeeping operations in Darfur and Liberia, and the GON has made clear its continuing interest in working with ECOWAS to promote regional security where needed. We are also helping to stand up a counter-terrorism unit in the military. ¶8. (U) Underpinning all these areas of progress is the continuing strongly positive view of most Nigerians toward both the USG and the American people. While not all Nigerian officials (including some within the Villa and rulin g PDP) share this view, they are distinctly in the minority. Nigerians are very sensitive to how they are seen by Americans, and crave our approbation. They also want to be seen and acknowledged (especially by us) as the main power, economically, politically, militarily and diplomatically in this region. Policy Challenges - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) We do not propose to review here the various scenarios which have already been examined that might result should the President die or become too ill to serve, and should various forces challenge or block the Vice President's succession, but it is also important to keep our eye on what we are doing to mitigate or change the possibility of some of the negative scenarios in spite of the President's health struggles, or his possible demise. As we look ahead toward the next two years, we believe we should intensify our efforts to move the GON back onto a progressive path on the issues of democracy (especially electoral reform) and governance (especially the fight against grand corruption),encourage economic reforms that deliver benefits to ordinary Nigerians, particularly in the fields of electricity generation and agriculture, help fix problematic petroleum legislation, continue the fight against HIV/AIDS, malaria and polio, and be helpful in any way we can in addressing the problems of the Niger Delta. ¶10. (SBU) All of our efforts depend on having the resources to maintain our people (see attached "Management Issues" paper) in this difficult environment. The exorbitant cost of rental properties (most of which are poorly constructed and require major upgrades),and the shortage of both FTE and LES staff to manage our programs and resources all place significant limitations on the work which lies ahead. ¶11. (U) This cable has been coordinated with Consulate Lagos. SANDERS