NIGERIA: CHIEF OF DEFENSE STAFF DIKE ON AMISOM,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000135 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/W, INR/AA DOE FOR GEORGE PERSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2019 TAGS: PGOV MASS MARR SO NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA: CHIEF OF DEFENSE STAFF DIKE ON AMISOM, OTHER ISSUES Classified By: Political Counselor Walter Pflaumer for reasons 1.4. (b & d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 21, Poloff, DATT, and OSC Chief met with Nigerian Chief of Defense Staff Paul Dike and his staff to discuss the current status of various programs pending between the U.S. and Nigeria. Of greatest interest, Dike clarified the Nigerian Military's AMISOM deployment timetable, saying that Nigeria's deployment of its Somalia-bound troops would occur only when the Executive Branch had signed off on, and made provision for, a presumably long list of necessary equipment. This contradicts Defense Headquarters' earlier statements that deployment would occur as soon as $3 million in USG-supplied equipment arrived. He also noted the need to have rules of engagement and a coherent exit strategy in place prior to deployment, and seemed to leave open the possibility of more than one Nigerian battalion for AMISOM. Dike also indicated assent to the creation of a USG-funded civil-military unit, and ordered his staff to meet monthly with Post reps to ensure smooth planning and execution of U.S./Nigerian mil-to-mil projects. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On January 21, Embassy reps met with Nigerian Chief of Defense Staff Paul Dike to discuss the status of U.S./Nigerian military-to-military cooperation. In explaining the continued delays in deploying Nigeria's long-awaited AMISOM battalion, Director of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Major General Osukugu made the oft-mentioned claim that the main obstacle to the long-awaited deployment of Nigerian troops was the delays in the USG making good on its pledge of $3 million in equipment. Dike interrupted him, saying there was a "slight misconception," and went on to say that the delivery of the current list of USG-supplied items did NOT guarantee deployment. For deployment to happen Nigeria would require the provision of a substantially longer list of equipment, request for which was pending with the President's Office. Pending also with the President is a draft set of Nigeria's rules of engagement for the Somali theater. The President's Office and the Federal Executive Council must approve the documents, and only then could Nigeria consider deployment, he said. (Note: The Federal Executive Council consists of the President's Cabinet, and meets weekly. End note.) He did not say when they might come before the Council for approval. ¶3. (C) Dike also said he had just returned from Darfur, where he spoke to Ethiopian troops having recently vacated Somalia. Admitting that Mogadishu was more dangerous than Defense Headquarters originally thought, he pointed out that Ugandan troops have T-55 tanks and that patrolling in soft-skin vehicles was "suicidal." Asking "How do we exit quickly if possible?" and citing the likelihood of Nigerian casualties, he wondered aloud if one battalion was sufficient, and in doing so seemed to be putting to his staff the possibility of having one or two battalions in reserve. ¶4. (C) The rest of the meeting covered a wide range of issues, including Africa Partnership Station, C-130 maintenance, Foreign Military Financing and Sales, and the State National Guard Partnership Program. Dike was engaged, and indicated interest in moving forward on a number of pending projects, such as the creation of a USG-funded civil-military unit. He ended the meeting by sincerely thanking the U.S. for our support of the Nigerian Armed Forces, promising that "we would see a change in 2009" in the quality of his troops. He closed by ordering the six staff members present, which included the Chief of Training and Operations, the Director of Finance and Accounting, and the already-mentioned DPKO, to meet monthly with the DATT and OSC Chief, every second Monday at noon, to ensure that the partnership stays on track. ¶5. (C) COMMENT: Dike's clarification, while not good news, was welcome candor after months of unconvincing assurances that the troops would deploy "as soon as the U.S. makes good ABUJA 00000135 002 OF 002 on its pledge" to supply equipment. Dike's demeanor during the meeting, and his order that his staff meet regularly with the DATT and OSC Chief, indicated a straighforwardness that was often noticeably absent during the tenure of his predecessor, General Owoye Andrew Azazi. It is also worth mentioning that only now, some two years after the initial commitment to send troops to AMISOM, the GON seems to be addressing essential deployment-related matters -- such as requisitioning equipment, rethinking the Somali threat environment, determining rules of engagement, and the formulation of an exit strategy -- in a serious way. END COMMENT. ¶6. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulate Lagos. SANDERS