Disrupting Taliban Financing: First Meeting of US-UAE Cash

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000890

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA, NEA/FO, NEA/ARP (MCGOVERN),S/CT AND INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2019
TAGS: EFIN PTER PGOV PINR PK AF AE
SUBJECT: Disrupting Taliban Financing: First Meeting of US-UAE Cash
Courier Task Force

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 877
B) ABU DHABI 845
C) ABU DHABI 783

Classified by Charge d'Affaires Doug Greene for reasons 1.4 (b and d).


1. (S) SUMMARY. On 7 September 2009, Embassy officials from DHS/ICE,
GRPO, Treasury, and State attended the first meeting with Emirati
counterparts of the US-UAE Cash Courier Task Force (Ref A) to address
the interdiction of cash couriers as one method of disrupting Taliban
financing. In the meeting facilitated by GRPO and led by DHS Attach
Thompson, Post offered to conduct operational training and joint
exercises with the relevant UAE departments in order to increase the
UAE's capacity to interdict illicit funds moved by cash couriers.
UAE officials reiterated their commitment to contributing positively
and proactively on international security issues including illicit
finance, and embraced the USG offer for training and operational
engagement. UAE was represented by 13 senior working level officials
representing the Federal State Security Department (SSD),Federal
Customs Service, Dubai Security Services, Abu Dhabi Police and the
UAE Central Bank. END SUMMARY.


2. (S) In a candid and productive exchange, SSD and Customs officials
revealed that UAE interagency coordination on cash courier
interdiction was suboptimal. As a first step to the engagement with
U.S. officials, SSD and Customs recommended that all relevant UAE
agencies join a meeting to clearly define the roles and authorities
of each agency with respect to interdiction of illicit cash courier
funds. This process will require the participation of Customs,
SSD/GDSS, police, Central Bank, judges and prosecutors. Each
agency's role will need to be grounded in UAE laws, regulations or
practices, and approved by the appropriate senior officials.


3. (S) An SSD official likened the situation with cash couriers to
that which previously existed for transshipment - namely, the laws in
the UAE are general and basic; they provide a legal basis for action,
but do not spell out what each agency's role is and how such duties
will be carried out. UAE asked for USG support in defining such
roles, based on DHS's best practices gained from other overseas
engagements, and requested USG participation in leading the initial
planning session with the relevant UAE departments (Ref B).


4. (S) UAE officials asked for an agenda or program detailing the
training mission to be led by DHS. DHS Attach provided some initial
details and examples, including approximately three days of classroom
training followed by onsite practical exercises, to which the UAE
officials reacted positively. Once hard copies of the program are
provided, each agency will obtain the necessary approvals from their
respective senior leadership.


5. (S) DHS Attach will prepare a written training program and submit
to UAE SSD and Customs for review and approval. Along with the
training program, DHS will include an interpretive note proposing
responsibilities for the various UAE departments with a role in the
interdiction of illicit funds moved by cash courier.


6. (S) COMMENT. Based on the robust attendance and thoughtfulness of
the dialogue, Embassy team assesses that UAE is sincere in its
commitment to tackle illicit finance via cash courier. This position
stands in marked contrast to several years of rebuffed overtures from
U.S. officials. Post assesses that recent visits to Abu Dhabi Crown
Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed by Treasury Secretary Geithner and
DHS Under Secretary Beers, urging from SRAP Holbrooke, and Treasury
Assistant Secretary Cohen's visit with UAE National Security Advisor
Shiekh Hazza bin Zayed (Ref C),helped provide the required top down
support for this engagement. END COMMENT.
GREENE