Disrupting Taliban Financing: First Meeting of US-UAE Cash

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000890 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA, NEA/FO, NEA/ARP (MCGOVERN),S/CT AND INR E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2019 TAGS: EFIN PTER PGOV PINR PK AF AE SUBJECT: Disrupting Taliban Financing: First Meeting of US-UAE Cash Courier Task Force REFS: A) ABU DHABI 877 B) ABU DHABI 845 C) ABU DHABI 783 Classified by Charge d'Affaires Doug Greene for reasons 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY. On 7 September 2009, Embassy officials from DHS/ICE, GRPO, Treasury, and State attended the first meeting with Emirati counterparts of the US-UAE Cash Courier Task Force (Ref A) to address the interdiction of cash couriers as one method of disrupting Taliban financing. In the meeting facilitated by GRPO and led by DHS Attach Thompson, Post offered to conduct operational training and joint exercises with the relevant UAE departments in order to increase the UAE's capacity to interdict illicit funds moved by cash couriers. UAE officials reiterated their commitment to contributing positively and proactively on international security issues including illicit finance, and embraced the USG offer for training and operational engagement. UAE was represented by 13 senior working level officials representing the Federal State Security Department (SSD),Federal Customs Service, Dubai Security Services, Abu Dhabi Police and the UAE Central Bank. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S) In a candid and productive exchange, SSD and Customs officials revealed that UAE interagency coordination on cash courier interdiction was suboptimal. As a first step to the engagement with U.S. officials, SSD and Customs recommended that all relevant UAE agencies join a meeting to clearly define the roles and authorities of each agency with respect to interdiction of illicit cash courier funds. This process will require the participation of Customs, SSD/GDSS, police, Central Bank, judges and prosecutors. Each agency's role will need to be grounded in UAE laws, regulations or practices, and approved by the appropriate senior officials. ¶3. (S) An SSD official likened the situation with cash couriers to that which previously existed for transshipment - namely, the laws in the UAE are general and basic; they provide a legal basis for action, but do not spell out what each agency's role is and how such duties will be carried out. UAE asked for USG support in defining such roles, based on DHS's best practices gained from other overseas engagements, and requested USG participation in leading the initial planning session with the relevant UAE departments (Ref B). ¶4. (S) UAE officials asked for an agenda or program detailing the training mission to be led by DHS. DHS Attach provided some initial details and examples, including approximately three days of classroom training followed by onsite practical exercises, to which the UAE officials reacted positively. Once hard copies of the program are provided, each agency will obtain the necessary approvals from their respective senior leadership. ¶5. (S) DHS Attach will prepare a written training program and submit to UAE SSD and Customs for review and approval. Along with the training program, DHS will include an interpretive note proposing responsibilities for the various UAE departments with a role in the interdiction of illicit funds moved by cash courier. ¶6. (S) COMMENT. Based on the robust attendance and thoughtfulness of the dialogue, Embassy team assesses that UAE is sincere in its commitment to tackle illicit finance via cash courier. This position stands in marked contrast to several years of rebuffed overtures from U.S. officials. Post assesses that recent visits to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed by Treasury Secretary Geithner and DHS Under Secretary Beers, urging from SRAP Holbrooke, and Treasury Assistant Secretary Cohen's visit with UAE National Security Advisor Shiekh Hazza bin Zayed (Ref C),helped provide the required top down support for this engagement. END COMMENT. GREENE