Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ABUDHABI772
2009-08-02 08:56:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:
(S) COMCENTCOM PETRAEUS MEETING WITH UAE CHIEF OF STAFF
how-toO 020856Z AUG 09 FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2786 SECDEF WASHINGTON DC INFO GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE AMEMBASSY KABUL AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY TUNIS AMEMBASSY RABAT USMISSION USNATO HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC NSC WASHDC
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000772
FOR S AND S/SRAP HOLBROOKE
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP AND SCA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2019
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PARM EAID MOPS AF AE
SUBJECT: (S) COMCENTCOM PETRAEUS MEETING WITH UAE CHIEF OF STAFF
CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRS DOUGLAS C.GREENE FOR REASONS 1.4
B AND D.
Iran
-----
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000772
FOR S AND S/SRAP HOLBROOKE
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP AND SCA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2019
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PARM EAID MOPS AF AE
SUBJECT: (S) COMCENTCOM PETRAEUS MEETING WITH UAE CHIEF OF STAFF
CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRS DOUGLAS C.GREENE FOR REASONS 1.4
B AND D.
Iran
--------------
1. (S) CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus met with UAE Armed Forces
Chief of Staff (CoS) LTG Hamad Mohammed Thani al-Rumaithy on July 24.
Echoing his points on Iran with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed the
night before (septel),Petraeus told the CoS by that the USG does not
fully share the UAEG assessment of Tehran very quickly attaining a
nuclear weapons capability within a matter of months. CENTCOM
Commander added that the buildup of U.S. Patriot systems in the Gulf
region has "changed the equation;" these, he continued, along with
shared early warning, AEGIS systems in the Gulf, and numerous Gulf
countries' Patriot capabilities, combine to send a strong message to
Iran. In addition, Petraeus pointed out the capability that now
exists for defensive counter-air, noting that the UAE's 72 Block 60
F-16s could take out Iran's entire air force.
3. (S) General Petraeus asked if the CoS had made a final site
selection for the second US Patriot battery. The CoS replied that
the proposed island site was probably the best location, but that his
staff still needed to do some additional coordination work before the
UAE made the final decision.
4. (C) Alluding to UAE fears of an Iranian attack, the CoS noted
that, while past conflicts (in the region) have occurred far away
from the UAE, the proximity of Iran and the presence of "most Western
interests" in UAE is disconcerting. He pressed Petraeus for
improved coordination (e.g., combined planning) and communications
(e.g., intel. sharing) between U.S. and UAE forces.
Training Opportunities
--------------
5. (S) Based on comments made to Petraeus the previous night by MbZ
(septel),the CoS asked about the benefits of UAE personnel observing
a training rotation at the National Training Center in California.
Petraeus reiterated his views on Arab cultural concerns and losing
face in training scenarios and how thoseinhibitions have to be
overcome in order to develop a culture based on critical
self-examination and the After Action Review process used in US
training. The CoS acknowledged the truth in this, adding that the
problem exists to varying degrees among all GCC nations. "You've
come to know us too well," he noted.
National Defense Planning
--------------
6. (C) The CoS stated that UAE was trying to coordinate with its
friends in the GCC but added that he was not optimistic that this
would yield any results. Because of that assessment, General
Petraeus advocated the development of US-UAE bi-lateral plans, and
similar planning with other select partners in the region, and stated
CENTCOM could be the "integrator" between each of these bi-lateral
relationships. The CoS was lukewarm about the extent that this
integration proposal could be fully implemented across the GCC;
however, he stated that he would like to continue with initiatives
for shared planning efforts and development of common planning tools.
Leading Edge
--------------
7. (C) Petraeus thanked the UAE for hosting the Leading Edge 2010
exercise. UAE Ambassador to the U.S. Yousef al-Otaiba asked Petraeus
if CENTCOM could highlight to Congress the importance of the UAE's
role in Exercise Leading Edge (in part to garner support for the 123
agreement). The CENTCOM staff is preparing a letter for Petraeus to
send Ambassador Yousef thanking UAE for volunteering to host the
exercise.
Military Cooperation
--------------
8. (C) In response to Petraeus's question on UAE endorsement of the
Air and Missile Defense Center of Excellence concept, COS said the
UAE would be ready to move forward. Following up on recent bilateral
discussions, CENTCOM Commander reiterated USG policy on loaner NVGs
(night vision goggles) and gave history on why the policy is tight.
He explained that in U.S. forces NVGs are treated as if they were
weapons. CoS said that he understands and agrees. (Note: UAE Air
Force Commander MG Swaidan, this week, directed his team to
coordinate with the 363TG to develop a plan to start flying with the
NVGs. End Note.)
GREENE
FOR S AND S/SRAP HOLBROOKE
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP AND SCA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2019
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PARM EAID MOPS AF AE
SUBJECT: (S) COMCENTCOM PETRAEUS MEETING WITH UAE CHIEF OF STAFF
CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRS DOUGLAS C.GREENE FOR REASONS 1.4
B AND D.
Iran
--------------
1. (S) CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus met with UAE Armed Forces
Chief of Staff (CoS) LTG Hamad Mohammed Thani al-Rumaithy on July 24.
Echoing his points on Iran with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed the
night before (septel),Petraeus told the CoS by that the USG does not
fully share the UAEG assessment of Tehran very quickly attaining a
nuclear weapons capability within a matter of months. CENTCOM
Commander added that the buildup of U.S. Patriot systems in the Gulf
region has "changed the equation;" these, he continued, along with
shared early warning, AEGIS systems in the Gulf, and numerous Gulf
countries' Patriot capabilities, combine to send a strong message to
Iran. In addition, Petraeus pointed out the capability that now
exists for defensive counter-air, noting that the UAE's 72 Block 60
F-16s could take out Iran's entire air force.
3. (S) General Petraeus asked if the CoS had made a final site
selection for the second US Patriot battery. The CoS replied that
the proposed island site was probably the best location, but that his
staff still needed to do some additional coordination work before the
UAE made the final decision.
4. (C) Alluding to UAE fears of an Iranian attack, the CoS noted
that, while past conflicts (in the region) have occurred far away
from the UAE, the proximity of Iran and the presence of "most Western
interests" in UAE is disconcerting. He pressed Petraeus for
improved coordination (e.g., combined planning) and communications
(e.g., intel. sharing) between U.S. and UAE forces.
Training Opportunities
--------------
5. (S) Based on comments made to Petraeus the previous night by MbZ
(septel),the CoS asked about the benefits of UAE personnel observing
a training rotation at the National Training Center in California.
Petraeus reiterated his views on Arab cultural concerns and losing
face in training scenarios and how thoseinhibitions have to be
overcome in order to develop a culture based on critical
self-examination and the After Action Review process used in US
training. The CoS acknowledged the truth in this, adding that the
problem exists to varying degrees among all GCC nations. "You've
come to know us too well," he noted.
National Defense Planning
--------------
6. (C) The CoS stated that UAE was trying to coordinate with its
friends in the GCC but added that he was not optimistic that this
would yield any results. Because of that assessment, General
Petraeus advocated the development of US-UAE bi-lateral plans, and
similar planning with other select partners in the region, and stated
CENTCOM could be the "integrator" between each of these bi-lateral
relationships. The CoS was lukewarm about the extent that this
integration proposal could be fully implemented across the GCC;
however, he stated that he would like to continue with initiatives
for shared planning efforts and development of common planning tools.
Leading Edge
--------------
7. (C) Petraeus thanked the UAE for hosting the Leading Edge 2010
exercise. UAE Ambassador to the U.S. Yousef al-Otaiba asked Petraeus
if CENTCOM could highlight to Congress the importance of the UAE's
role in Exercise Leading Edge (in part to garner support for the 123
agreement). The CENTCOM staff is preparing a letter for Petraeus to
send Ambassador Yousef thanking UAE for volunteering to host the
exercise.
Military Cooperation
--------------
8. (C) In response to Petraeus's question on UAE endorsement of the
Air and Missile Defense Center of Excellence concept, COS said the
UAE would be ready to move forward. Following up on recent bilateral
discussions, CENTCOM Commander reiterated USG policy on loaner NVGs
(night vision goggles) and gave history on why the policy is tight.
He explained that in U.S. forces NVGs are treated as if they were
weapons. CoS said that he understands and agrees. (Note: UAE Air
Force Commander MG Swaidan, this week, directed his team to
coordinate with the 363TG to develop a plan to start flying with the
NVGs. End Note.)
GREENE