SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000747 SIPDIS NOFORN FOR GENERAL PETRAEUS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2019 TAGS: PREL PTER PARM MOPS MASS KNNP IR IZ PK AE SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT Classified by Charge d'Affairs a.i. Douglas Greene, reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (U) We welcome your return to Abu Dhabi. This will be your first visit since the change in US Administration, the election in Iran, and falls on the heels of the Gulf Security Dialogue. ¶2. (C) In the past five years, the United Arab Emirates has emerged as one of the economic powerhouses of the region (our largest export market in the Middle East) and attained a commensurate level of political influence. They have expanded there military engagement in a similar fashion. No longer comfortable hiding behind Arab consensus, or Saudi leadership, the UAE's dynamic young leadership stakes out independent positions on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, and seeks a greater role on the world stage. Abu Dhabi visits are must for regional leaders such as Abu Mazen, Karzai, and increasingly for Western leaders as well. ¶3. (S) As in the past, the country continues to play a helpful role in a number of areas within the region: Iraq: -- UAE continues to remain supportive of the Iraqi participation in the GCC+3 Afghanistan: -- UAE is deploying approximately 350 land forces to Afghanistan in July/August 2009 to support Afghan elections (UAE designated "Task Force 110") -- MbZ sees the Afghan deployment as a way of transforming and hardening his forces, but also recognizes the political imperative for moderate Arabs to publicly support the fight against Al-Qaida and the Taliban -- The UAE has the intention to fully cooperate with the US on curtailing any financing of Taliban activities that may flow through UAE territory and is taking some steps to prevent bulk cash transfers. Enhanced bilateral cooperation is also beginning to pay dividends. Pakistan: -- UAE continues to take a leading role in the Tokyo Friends of Pakistan initiative and is signaling it will contribute financial support provided multilateral arrangements are put in place ($300 million pledge) -- UAE has transferring 10 PUMA helicopters to Pakistan, will transfer an additional 4 and is seeking to purchase and transfer 14 others. Arabian Gulf: -- UAE will command Maritime Task Force 152 in the Gulf starting in November 2009 ¶4. (S/NF) Internationally, the UAE is strategically aligned with the US, and broadly sees the challenges of this region the way we do. Abu Dhabi's primordial worry is Iran (especially so for MbZ) -- MbZ is convinced that a military confrontation with Iran is near (e.g. by year's end). -- UAE is pressing the US for rapid delivery of an integrated air defense system, including THAAD and Patriot, to complement their extant F-16 wing -- Abu Dhabi has taken quiet steps to reduce ties with Iran to include scaling back visas to Iranians -- Visa reduction is controversial within the UAE and pits Abu Dhabi against the other six emirates due to resultant trade restrictions -- Publicly, the UAE's position on Iran emphasizes non-interference and mutual respect. -- Gap between public rhetoric and private action creates challenges for the US Iranian policy; additional concern is UAE's over interpretation of the Administration's approach to engaging Iran -- It is important to emphasize the US commitment to sanctions and the desire to change Iranian behavior. ¶5. (C) The UAE is increasingly feeling the effects of the global economic crisis: -- Dubai was hit hard last fall when its property bubble popped and faces a substantial debt burden that will require careful management for years to come -- Abu Dhabi was less affected but situation may lead to layoffs and lower priority project cancellations -- Rumors surfacing of a 10% cut in defense spending; likely intent is to delay acquisition timelines not cancel major programs. -- Abu Dhabi lacks sufficient natural gas for power generation and is investing in renewables and nuclear power -- US signed a 123 Agreement for US-UAE nuclear cooperation in May, which is currently under Congressional review ¶6. (SBU) Human Rights issues are perhaps the one contentious area in our otherwise excellent bilateral relationship. The leadership was ABU DHABI 00000747 002 OF 003 stunned by the US decision to put the UAE on the Trafficking in Persons Watch List in June, viewing itself as a regional leader on this issue. The UAEG has roundly rejected Human Rights Watch's allegations of labor abuses at one of Abu Dhabi's premier development projects (Saadiyat Island, future home of the Guggenheim Abu Dhabi). The UAE has indicated this week that it is proceeding with the prosecution of Shaykh Issa, a brother of the President and MbZ, whose 2004 torture of an Afghan grain merchant recently drew international attention. ¶7. (S/NF) As a reminder, the UAE provides critical (not publicized) support for several military component commands in the CENTCOM AOR: -- Al-Dhafra AB is the US high altitude IR hub for the AOR, and supports 50 percent of aerial refueling in the AOR -- Ports of Dubai and Fujairah in the Northern Emirates are the logistics backbone for the US Fifth Fleet and commercial trade -- Jebel Ali in Dubai is the major US military liberty port -- Fujairah port is a major trans-shipment hub to support Afghanistan military operations -- UAE airport at Fujairah is a vital air hub for Coalition/ISAF partners in Afghanistan, including the Australians, Dutch, Canadians, Brits and Kiwis. -- UAE Air Force base at Minhad near Dubai is also a critical hub for Coalition/ISAF partners -- UAE recently allowed the French to establish a naval base in Abu Dhabi ¶8. (C) Security Assistance is a cornerstone of our relationship. -- The UAE is on track to be the largest global FMS purchaser for 2009 -- UAE is a cash customer and purchases a significant amount of its equipment and training from the US -- FMS sales are in excess of $13.4 billion and commercial sales are similar -- An additional $11 billion of FMS cases are in development with DCS cases equaling this amount -- The UAE recently purchased nine Patriot batteries, and expects to move forward on the purchase of THAAD soon, with the aim of supporting the UAE's urgent desire for an integrated air defense system -- UAE will be the first country outside the US to purchase the THAAD system -- No indigenous ballistic missile defense system currently exist -- The major US FMS/DCS systems are: Hawk, F-16, F-16 Weapons (JDAM, Hellfire, Maverick, LGB, cluster, HARM, Harpoon),HIMARS, AH-64,UH-60, AOC Operating System, Patriot, C-130, CH-47, Shared Early Warning, CENTRIXS, NVGs, land vehicles, and small arms. -- The following systems have been requested and are in various stages of FMS and DCS development: 3 x THAAD, 24 x RQ8 Firescout, 4 x C-17 Globemaster, 12 x C-130J (option for 4 X KC-130J), satellites/imagery, land based Phalanx, XM-982 Excalibur, XM-1156 PGK, 5000 X GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb, E-C Hawkeye, E-2D Hawkeye, Boeing Wedgetail, AOC system upgrade, Link-16 integration on all appropriate platforms/ground facilities, stinger/avenger/VMSLP, MRAP, critical national infrastructure protection, and Head of State aircraft ASE -- The UAE participates in 10-12 US sponsored exercises annually ¶9. (S/NF) Existing country vulnerabilities: -- No ballistic missile defense beyond US deployment of Patriot and US Naval Ships -- Anti-mine capability from the sea -- Integrated consequence management; government agencies react independently in the face of a crisis or mishap -- Little perceived collection, processing or dissemination of actionable counter-proliferation intelligence (often reliant on US provided targeting information) -- The UAE appears to lack a National Defense Strategy and national battle staff ¶10. (S/NF) Rapid growth is a major USG and UAE challenge -- US Embassy already at capacity -- New FMS programs, e.g., integrated air defense and the move from supplemental to regular budgetary funding, will promote a plus-up in US personnel -- A combined DoS and DoD team has reviewed options and is recommending a support staff operating outside the Embassy providing services to DoD personnel in the UAE ¶11. (S/NF) We have been at an impasse with the UAE on the DCA since 1994, and while we have developed a variety of risk-laden work-arounds for existing deployments, it is difficult to see great expansion of combatant forces here absent some movement on this issue. The UAE asserts its sovereignty at every opportunity and direct negotiation on the DCA may prove to be more risky than the potential rewards. ¶12. (S/NF) We encourage you to thank the UAE for its participation ABU DHABI 00000747 003 OF 003 in OEF and OIF. In particular its efforts in AFG and taking command of the Maritime Coalition (TF-152) in late Fall 09. Your reassurance to the UAE of US intentions to contain Iran may be helpful. ¶13. (S/NF) Without directly addressing the DCA, the relationship could be improved if the UAE were to partner with the US more closely in a few areas. -- Moving the US Naval forces in Fujairah onto the UAE Naval Base would improve our force protection and lead to increased cooperation and security on the sea and the shore. -- Streamlined US military entry and exit with a MIL ID card at A/SPODs would be welcomed -- Increased access and pier space in Jebel Ali port are becoming critical issues -- Increased use of the Abu Dhabi port may serve to ease the pressure at Jebel Ali and Fujairah -- As the US reorganizes its MIL basing footprint in the region, there may be some willingness for the UAE to allow more passive US presence in their country. GREENE