SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000747

SIPDIS
NOFORN

FOR GENERAL PETRAEUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER PARM MOPS MASS KNNP IR IZ PK AE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT

Classified by Charge d'Affairs a.i. Douglas Greene, reasons 1.4 (b,
d).


1. (U) We welcome your return to Abu Dhabi. This will be your first
visit since the change in US Administration, the election in Iran,
and falls on the heels of the Gulf Security Dialogue.


2. (C) In the past five years, the United Arab Emirates has emerged
as one of the economic powerhouses of the region (our largest export
market in the Middle East) and attained a commensurate level of
political influence. They have expanded there military engagement in
a similar fashion. No longer comfortable hiding behind Arab
consensus, or Saudi leadership, the UAE's dynamic young leadership
stakes out independent positions on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq,
and seeks a greater role on the world stage. Abu Dhabi visits are
must for regional leaders such as Abu Mazen, Karzai, and increasingly
for Western leaders as well.


3. (S) As in the past, the country continues to play a helpful role
in a number of areas within the region:

Iraq:
-- UAE continues to remain supportive of the Iraqi participation in
the GCC+3

Afghanistan:
-- UAE is deploying approximately 350 land forces to Afghanistan in
July/August 2009 to support Afghan elections (UAE designated "Task
Force 110")
-- MbZ sees the Afghan deployment as a way of transforming and
hardening his forces, but also recognizes the political imperative
for moderate Arabs to publicly support the fight against Al-Qaida and
the Taliban
-- The UAE has the intention to fully cooperate with the US on
curtailing any financing of Taliban activities that may flow through
UAE territory and is taking some steps to prevent bulk cash
transfers. Enhanced bilateral cooperation is also beginning to pay
dividends.

Pakistan:
-- UAE continues to take a leading role in the Tokyo Friends of
Pakistan initiative and is signaling it will contribute financial
support provided multilateral arrangements are put in place ($300
million pledge)
-- UAE has transferring 10 PUMA helicopters to Pakistan, will
transfer an additional 4 and is seeking to purchase and transfer 14
others.

Arabian Gulf:
-- UAE will command Maritime Task Force 152 in the Gulf starting in
November 2009


4. (S/NF) Internationally, the UAE is strategically aligned with the
US, and broadly sees the challenges of this region the way we do.
Abu Dhabi's primordial worry is Iran (especially so for MbZ)
-- MbZ is convinced that a military confrontation with Iran is near
(e.g. by year's end).
-- UAE is pressing the US for rapid delivery of an integrated air
defense system, including THAAD and Patriot, to complement their
extant F-16 wing
-- Abu Dhabi has taken quiet steps to reduce ties with Iran to
include scaling back visas to Iranians
-- Visa reduction is controversial within the UAE and pits Abu Dhabi
against the other six emirates due to resultant trade restrictions
-- Publicly, the UAE's position on Iran emphasizes non-interference
and mutual respect.
-- Gap between public rhetoric and private action creates challenges
for the US Iranian policy; additional concern is UAE's over
interpretation of the Administration's approach to engaging Iran
-- It is important to emphasize the US commitment to sanctions and
the desire to change Iranian behavior.


5. (C) The UAE is increasingly feeling the effects of the global
economic crisis:
-- Dubai was hit hard last fall when its property bubble popped and
faces a substantial debt burden that will require careful management
for years to come
-- Abu Dhabi was less affected but situation may lead to layoffs and
lower priority project cancellations
-- Rumors surfacing of a 10% cut in defense spending; likely intent
is to delay acquisition timelines not cancel major programs.
-- Abu Dhabi lacks sufficient natural gas for power generation and is
investing in renewables and nuclear power
-- US signed a 123 Agreement for US-UAE nuclear cooperation in May,
which is currently under Congressional review


6. (SBU) Human Rights issues are perhaps the one contentious area in
our otherwise excellent bilateral relationship. The leadership was

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stunned by the US decision to put the UAE on the Trafficking in
Persons Watch List in June, viewing itself as a regional leader on
this issue. The UAEG has roundly rejected Human Rights Watch's
allegations of labor abuses at one of Abu Dhabi's premier development
projects (Saadiyat Island, future home of the Guggenheim Abu Dhabi).
The UAE has indicated this week that it is proceeding with the
prosecution of Shaykh Issa, a brother of the President and MbZ, whose
2004 torture of an Afghan grain merchant recently drew international
attention.


7. (S/NF) As a reminder, the UAE provides critical (not publicized)
support for several military component commands in the CENTCOM AOR:
-- Al-Dhafra AB is the US high altitude IR hub for the AOR, and
supports 50 percent of aerial refueling in the AOR
-- Ports of Dubai and Fujairah in the Northern Emirates are the
logistics backbone for the US Fifth Fleet and commercial trade
-- Jebel Ali in Dubai is the major US military liberty port
-- Fujairah port is a major trans-shipment hub to support Afghanistan
military operations
-- UAE airport at Fujairah is a vital air hub for Coalition/ISAF
partners in Afghanistan, including the Australians, Dutch, Canadians,
Brits and Kiwis.
-- UAE Air Force base at Minhad near Dubai is also a critical hub for
Coalition/ISAF partners
-- UAE recently allowed the French to establish a naval base in Abu
Dhabi


8. (C) Security Assistance is a cornerstone of our relationship.
-- The UAE is on track to be the largest global FMS purchaser for 2009
-- UAE is a cash customer and purchases a significant amount of its
equipment and training from the US
-- FMS sales are in excess of $13.4 billion and commercial sales are
similar
-- An additional $11 billion of FMS cases are in development with DCS
cases equaling this amount
-- The UAE recently purchased nine Patriot batteries, and expects to
move forward on the purchase of THAAD soon, with the aim of
supporting the UAE's urgent desire for an integrated air defense
system
-- UAE will be the first country outside the US to purchase the THAAD
system
-- No indigenous ballistic missile defense system currently exist
-- The major US FMS/DCS systems are: Hawk, F-16, F-16 Weapons (JDAM,
Hellfire, Maverick, LGB, cluster, HARM, Harpoon),HIMARS,
AH-64,UH-60, AOC Operating System, Patriot, C-130, CH-47, Shared
Early Warning, CENTRIXS, NVGs, land vehicles, and small arms.
-- The following systems have been requested and are in various
stages of FMS and DCS development: 3 x THAAD, 24 x RQ8 Firescout, 4 x
C-17 Globemaster, 12 x C-130J (option for 4 X KC-130J),
satellites/imagery, land based Phalanx, XM-982 Excalibur, XM-1156
PGK, 5000 X GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb, E-C Hawkeye, E-2D Hawkeye,
Boeing Wedgetail, AOC system upgrade, Link-16 integration on all
appropriate platforms/ground facilities, stinger/avenger/VMSLP, MRAP,
critical national infrastructure protection, and Head of State
aircraft ASE

-- The UAE participates in 10-12 US sponsored exercises annually


9. (S/NF) Existing country vulnerabilities:
-- No ballistic missile defense beyond US deployment of Patriot and
US Naval Ships
-- Anti-mine capability from the sea
-- Integrated consequence management; government agencies react
independently in the face of a crisis or mishap
-- Little perceived collection, processing or dissemination of
actionable counter-proliferation intelligence (often reliant on US
provided targeting information)
-- The UAE appears to lack a National Defense Strategy and national
battle staff


10. (S/NF) Rapid growth is a major USG and UAE challenge
-- US Embassy already at capacity
-- New FMS programs, e.g., integrated air defense and the move from
supplemental to regular budgetary funding, will promote a plus-up in
US personnel
-- A combined DoS and DoD team has reviewed options and is
recommending a support staff operating outside the Embassy providing
services to DoD personnel in the UAE


11. (S/NF) We have been at an impasse with the UAE on the DCA since
1994, and while we have developed a variety of risk-laden
work-arounds for existing deployments, it is difficult to see great
expansion of combatant forces here absent some movement on this
issue. The UAE asserts its sovereignty at every opportunity and
direct negotiation
on the DCA may prove to be more risky than the potential rewards.


12. (S/NF) We encourage you to thank the UAE for its participation

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in OEF and OIF. In particular its efforts in AFG and taking command
of the Maritime Coalition (TF-152) in late Fall 09. Your reassurance
to the UAE of US intentions to contain Iran may be helpful.


13. (S/NF) Without directly addressing the DCA, the relationship
could be improved if the UAE were to partner with the US more closely
in a few areas.
-- Moving the US Naval forces in Fujairah onto the UAE Naval Base
would improve our force protection and lead to increased cooperation
and security on the sea and the shore.
-- Streamlined US military entry and exit with a MIL ID card at
A/SPODs would be welcomed
-- Increased access and pier space in Jebel Ali port are becoming
critical issues
-- Increased use of the Abu Dhabi port may serve to ease the pressure
at Jebel Ali and Fujairah
-- As the US reorganizes its MIL basing footprint in the region,
there may be some willingness for the UAE to allow more passive US
presence in their country.
GREENE