Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ABUDHABI746
2009-07-22 12:59:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

(S) MBZ HOSTS GULF SECURITY DINNER WITH ISA ASD VERSHBOW AND PM A/S SHAPIRO

Tags:  PTER PGOV PREL PARM EAID MOPS IR IS AF PK SY LE SA 
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VZCZCXRO4361
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHAD #0746/01 2031259
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 221259Z JUL 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHZC/USOFFICE EACTC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 000746 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR S AND S/SRAP HOLBROOKE
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP AND SCA

E.O. 12958: 07/22/2019
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PREL, PARM, EAID, MOPS, IR, IS, AF, PK, SY, LE, SA,
QA, AE

SUBJECT: (S) MbZ HOSTS GULF SECURITY DINNER WITH ISA ASD VERSHBOW AND
PM A/S SHAPIRO

ABU DHABI 00000746 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DOUGLAS C.GREENE FOR REASONS 1.4 B
AND D.

REF A SECRETARY'S LETTER TO MBZ ON PUMA HELICOPTERS
REF B SECSTATE 76108


S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 000746



NOFORN

SIPDIS



FOR S AND S/SRAP HOLBROOKE

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP AND SCA



E.O. 12958: 07/22/2019

TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PREL, PARM, EAID, MOPS, IR, IS, AF, PK, SY, LE, SA,

QA, AE



SUBJECT: (S) MbZ HOSTS GULF SECURITY DINNER WITH ISA ASD VERSHBOW AND

PM A/S SHAPIRO



ABU DHABI 00000746 001.2 OF 004





CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DOUGLAS C.GREENE FOR REASONS 1.4 B

AND D.



REF A SECRETARY'S LETTER TO MBZ ON PUMA HELICOPTERS

REF B SECSTATE 76108





1. (S) Summary: Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ, also

Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces and de facto defense

chief) hosted a July 19 executive session of the Gulf Security

Dialogue in Abu Dhabi (July 20 plenary with UAE uniformed officers

reported septel). The U.S. delegation was led by Assistant Secretary

of Defense for International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow and

Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew

Shapiro. MbZ called for advanced U.S.-UAE joint military

coordination and faster delivery of FMS items to respond to a

worst-case scenario in Iran. As with other senior U.S. officials

(but with increasing alarm and a shortening time frame),MbZ focused

on the Iranian threat and his belief that an Israeli pre-emptive

strike on Iran is likely in a matter of months. ASD Vershbow assured

MbZ of the U.S. commitment to UAE security; A/S Shapiro relayed that

this visit was his first since taking his new position - reflecting

the importance we place on the relationship. Discussions also

centered on UAE military and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan

and Pakistan and the peace process. End summary.



2. (SBU) Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) hosted a

working dinner with U.S. Gulf Security Dialogue delegation the

evening of July 19. The U.S. Delegation was led by Assistant

Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro and

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Alexander Vershbow and included RADM William Payne, Ambassador, and

DCM. The UAE was represented by Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces

Hamad Thani al-Rumaithi, Ambassador to the U.S. Yousef al-Otaiba,

Under Secretary of the Crown Prince's Court Mohamed al-Mazrouei,

Deputy Chief of Staff Ali H
amad al-Kaabi and Air Force Chief Mohammed

Swaidan al-Qamzi.



Joint Planning for Worst-Case Scenario in Iran

-------------- -



3. (S) In a three-hour working dinner, MbZ focused primarily on his

overarching concern -- the threat from Iran, stressing as he has with

other senior U.S. officials that U.S. engagement with Iran will

ultimately fail and that he fears a surprise (Israeli pre-emptive

strike on Iran) in a shorter timeframe than USG estimates (he fears

it could happen this year). ASD Vershbow assured MbZ of the U.S.

commitment to UAE security; A/S Shapiro relayed that his trip to the

UAE was his first since taking on his new position, reflecting the

importance we place on the relationship.



4. (S/NF) MbZ reiterated his belief that an Israeli pre-emptive

strike against Iran was increasingly likely, saying he was convinced

the Netanyahu government was prepared to act against Iran, and that

he agreed with Israeli intelligence assessments regarding how close

Tehran is to achieving its nuclear ambitions. The Iranian response

to a pre-emptive strike, predicted MbZ, would be attacks on U.S.

allies in the region, foremost among them the UAE; Iran may also

unleash terrorist cells against western interests around the world.

ASD Vershbow explained that the USG assessment differed in timeframe

-- we do not anticipate military confrontation with Iran before the

end of 2009 -- stressing, however, that denying Iran's nuclear

ambitions and stemming its efforts to achieve regional hegemony were

foremost among U.S. international security concerns.



5. (S) In response to MbZ's position that ultimately engagement

efforts with Iran would fail, both ASD and A/S made clear than while

the USG continues to press for a diplomatic solution, the offer of

engagement is not opened-ended and will not come at the expense of

Gulf security.



ABU DHABI 00000746 002 OF 004







6. (S) Referring to the Iran Region Presence Office (IRPO) in Dubai,

MbZ asked "how's that office doing?" He did not demonstrate any

particular concern or sensitivity regarding IRPO activities in UAE.

MbZ said that the Iranian regime was in trouble internally and would

move swiftly to oppress post-election opposition. As for Rafsanjani,

MbZ said he was a "survivor" who would not succeed in a leadership

bid because he will not act unless he is one-hundred percent sure he

will win. Again turning to his primary security concern, MbZ

suggested that Tehran would likely accelerate its nuclear program to

draw attention away from its internal weakness and to foment

nationalism among its citizenry. "Time is not on our side", he said,

hinting that a move should be made against Iran and "the sooner the

better."



Russia

--------------



7. (C)ASD Vershbow briefed MbZ on the positive outcome of POTUS's

recent talks in Moscow. MbZ said that he had met with Putin in June

and he did not believe Russia saw a nuclearized Iran as a challenge

to its interests, nor did Putin appreciate the threat of regional

proliferation in response to an Iranian bomb. He encouraged the U.S.

to continue to press the Russians saying he believed if the Russians

came over to our side, (with regard to tougher sanctions),the

Chinese would follow. MbZ said his he would travel in late July to

Beijing, where he will surely press the Chinese on Iran. ASD

Vershbow suggested he urge the Chinese to send Iran a message by

diversifying its oil imports away from Iran.



Afghanistan - Neighbors Not Doing Enough

--------------



8. (S/NF) MbZ complained that Arab regimes are not doing enough to

help in Afghanistan. He said that as of one month ago, he surveyed

the region and found that only Oman had funded its Tokyo conference

pledge of $2 million. He singled out Saudi Arabia and Qatar in

particular for not doing their part, saying that the Saudis clearly

did not see how important it was to their own interests.



9. (S/NF) MbZ criticized other regional leaders for playing both

sides and for "dating" Iran. MbZ compared the current situation to

pre-WWII Europe saying, "Ahmedinejad is Hitler," and neighboring

capitals believe erroneously that they can prevent Iranian

retaliation by playing nice or signing agreements with Tehran. "They

think the are backing the winning horse," MbZ explained, emphasizing

that if they think that by appeasing Iran they will avoid Iranian

retaliation "then they are seriously mistaken, Sir."



National Defense Strategy

--------------



10. (S) Throughout the discussions, MbZ repeatedly called for

coordinated military planning for the worst-case scenario of an

unpredictable Iranian response to an Israeli strike, stressing that

U.S.-UAE preparations must begin now well before commencement of

hostilities. Both sides agreed that improved coordination was a good

idea, with ASD Vershbow utilizing the opportunity to push for a UAE

national defense strategy. (Note: GSD July 20 plenary meeting

reported septel. End Note.)



Pakistan - 14 Additional PUMAs

--------------



11. (C) Passing a letter from Secretary Clinton thanking the UAE for

its transfer of 14 U.S.-origin PUMA helicopters to Pakistan, A/S

Shapiro thanked MbZ for the UAEG's partnership and regional

leadership in providing assistance to Pakistan as well as its

long-term participation in the coalition in Afghanistan. MbZ updated

the delegation on delivery status, saying that 10 of the promised 14



ABU DHABI 00000746 003 OF 004





had been delivered and the remaining 4 would shortly follow. He

added that efforts were underway to find and purchase additional

helicopters, announcing (for the first time that we have heard this)

the UAE's intentions to provide Pakistan with an additional 14 PUMAs.

Humanitarian Aid for CT

--------------

12. (C) In the context of defeating AQ in Afghanistan and Pakistan,

MbZ called for Arab and Muslim regimes to do more to stem terrorist

financing, whether it means closing down charities, business

interests, "whatever is necessary." He also pointed to the

zealousness of Arab fighters vice Afghani nationals. Nine-five

percent of Arab fighters go to Afghanistan knowing they are going to

die for ideological reasons. Afghan nationals, on the other hand,

are more practical. "This makes one of them [Arabs] more valuable to

AQ than ten or more Afghan fighters." Afghanis, MbZ pointed out,

have tribes, families, homes -- therefore the best way to counter

local extremism in Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent Pakistan, is

to improve the quality of life.



13. (SBU) MbZ described UAE humanitarian commitments of $300 million

to build "model villages" in Afghanistan, complete with housing,

hospitals and schools. He invited the USG to join the UAE, Germany

and France in this effort. A/S Shapiro stressed the urgency of the

displaced persons crisis in the Swat region of Pakistan, suggesting

the UAE consider housing aid in this region. MbZ replied "Why not?

We will try to help wherever needed."



MbZ on Pakistani Leadership

--------------



14. (S/NF) MbZ shared his assessment of the current Pakistani

leadership saying President "Zardarni is dirty but not dangerous,"

while Prime Minister Sharif is "dangerous but not dirty -- this is

Pakistan. Sharif cannot be trusted to honor his promises. MbZ

continued that a new personality may emerge but for the time being

the UAE position was to play a helpful role by supporting the PM.



Lebanon - Support for LAF and PM Hariri

--------------



15. (C) ASD Vershbow reiterated our request that the UAEG assist the

Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) by funding the purchase and transfer of

some of 56 U.S.-origin tanks from Jordan to Lebanon, noting our

appreciation of the UAE's earlier funding of the first 10 tanks.

This would help capitalize on the positive outcome of the elections

and help reduce Hezbollah's (and Iran's) influence in Lebanon.

Promising to look into what the UAE could do to help with this

matter, MbZ asked if we had made the same request to Doha. ASD

replied that we had and that he would do so again when he arrived in

Qatar July 20.



16. (C) Reiterating his favored theme of the generation gap in

regional leadership (UAE having already passed the baton to the

younger generation),MbZ praised Lebanese PM Saad Hariri, saying he

was a good man. "He feels very threatened at the moment (presumably

by the Syrian regime),and it is important we do not lose him." A/S

Shapiro agreed, pointing to U.S. security assistance as proof of our

concern and suggested that the UAE support U.S. efforts to strengthen

Lebanese government institutions as the best opportunity to build GOL

stability and security.



July 18 Nasrallah Speech

--------------



17. (S) MbZ pointed to Hezbollah SYG Hassan Nasrallah's July 18

speech, saying he believed it reflected a change in Hezbollah's tone

due to calculations that its Iranian backers were currently in a

weakened state post-Presidential elections. MbZ said that Nasrallah

is likely suffering from decreased financial support, at least for

the next six months.



ABU DHABI 00000746 004 OF 004







Behavior Change in Syria - I Think Not

--------------



18. (S/NF) Vershbow pointed to recent progress with Syria on border

control issues to stem the flow of foreign fighters to Iraq as a

small step forward in effort at eliciting behavioral change from

Damascus. MbZ showed no confidence that Syria could be separated

from the Iranian camp. "If you want my opinion," replied MbZ, "I

think not." He advised that Syria had a lot of options and that,

judging from past behavior, the regime would continue hedging on key

regional issues (Iran, support for Hezbollah, peace process) for the

foreseeable future.



Praise for Bahraini Crown Prince

--------------



19. (C) MbZ said that a two-state solution was the only option for

solving the Israeli-Palestinian issue. MbZ praised the Bahraini

Crown Prince Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al Khalifa for his "courageous"

(July 17) editorial in the Washington Post (ref B),commenting that

not enough Arab countries we on the right side of this issue.



20. (U) ASD Vershbow and A/S Shapiro cleared this message.

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