UAE HOSTS COUNTER-PROLIFERATION EXPERTS

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000716


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC KNNP ETTC AE
SUBJECT: UAE HOSTS COUNTER-PROLIFERATION EXPERTS

Classified by DCM Doug Greene, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

REFS: ABU DHABI 375


1. (C) The UAEG clarified its evolving institutional structure to
deal more effectively with export control in a June 24 Working Group
of experts affiliated with the Counter-proliferation Task Force
(CTF),which most recently met on March 19. The U.S. delegation was
led by Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce (Bureau of Industry and
Security) Matthew Borman; the UAE was under the leadership of UAE CTF
chair MG Mohammed al-Qemzi (head of Dubai General Directorate of
State Security). In response to a series of topics proposed in
advance by the U.S. side, the UAE delegation made two presentations:
1) status of the export control law, and 2) the executive office
charged to coordinate the law's implementation.

Legal Text Stirs Productive Dialogue
--------------


2. (C) In a methodical presentation of the August 2007 law (law #13
of 2007),with emphasis on amendments made in September 2008 (law #12
of 2008),the MFA spelled out the parameters of the authorities in
the law. Taking questions as they went along, the UAE team clarified
a number of points of prior concern to the U.S. experts. By the end
of this straightforward discussion, scope of the amended law and
degree of related implementation was reasonably clear - but not ideal
by any means. The CTF members on the UAE side need to accelerate the
implementation of their system beginning with full staffing of the
Executive Committee.


3. (C) Issues explained during the discussion include the fact that
implementers take policy guidance from the Cabinet level committee
"UAE Committee on Commodities Subject to Import and Export Control"
headed by Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Dr. Anwar Gargash
(which first met May 10 and again June 18). For example, the UAE
will not be able to expand its control list beyond that adopted when
the law was published in September 2007 until that expanded list has
been proposed to and approved by the Committee. Nevertheless,
implementation of new UNSCR's or other urgent issues occurs
immediately without awaiting Committee intervention. Additionally,
the law reportedly covers items in Free Zones and re-exports, but
does not extend to transiting items which are never off-loaded on UAE
territory (short of prior suspicion of a UNSCR or other violation
which leads to their inspection or seizure). Controlled items are
inspected based on intelligence sources or monitoring of companies on
watch lists, according to al-Qemzi. If prosecutors assess a low
probability of a successful court case in the UAE, he said they may
inquire with the sending country to see if there is a higher
probability of prosecution there. Citing 1,000 screenings daily at
one port, with a handful (five to ten) identified for additional
scrutiny, al-Qemzi cited the need for ongoing training of personnel
involved at various stages of the process. Al-Qemzi also noted that
they screen incoming cargo based on a number of factors, including
items on all four international control lists, end-users, shippers,
Harmonized System (HS) codes, and the UNSCRs. The U.S. delegation
asked if enforcement procedure and training are applied to all
emirates or only in Dubai. Al-Qemzi said that the screening
procedures and training of personnel is the same in all Emirates. He
also indicated that the UAE has provided information to the U.S. on
the items it has stopped based on its screening process, but the U.S.
has no record of receiving such information in diplomatic channels.
We will want to follow-up on this and set up a process by which they
notify us of such actions.


4. (C) Commenting on the zirconium case that was tried but dismissed
under the Export Control Law, al-Qemzi said the case was still being
appealed and revealed some confusion by expert witnesses whose
testimony may have misled the court. Experts, he said, can focus on
the benign uses of dual use items when in fact a more sinister use
may be likely. He related that the judge raised critical questions as
to the items technical specifications: i.e., Zirconium rods are
controlled but the item was a zirconium pipe. Al Qemzi noted that
the case highlighted the need for training of judges and prosecutors.

Executive Office to be Established in Dubai
--------------


5. (C) Much of the institutional uncertainty associated with
implementation of the Export Control Law pertains to the "authority"
designed to execute it. The new Committee noted above (and discussed
reftel),is the senior body commissioned to ensure implementation.
Most of the participants in the June 24 talks are members of the
Committee, which has representatives from the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs, Interior, and Economy, as well as from the Federal Customs
Authority, Preventive Security (of MoI),State Security, Armed Forces
Chemical Defense, and Civil Defense (also MoI). The Committee meets
on a periodic basis (Dr. Gargash once suggested they would meet
monthly but al-Qemzi noted "five or six times" annually) to make
inter-agency decisions and give policy guidance.


6. (C) Supporting the deliberations of the Committee, and critical
to the day-to-day implementation effort, will be the Executive Office
which was described to us on June 24 as still taking shape. The
newly assigned head of that office attended the meeting, but had
little to add -- Saeed al-Teneiji hails from the MFA and told us he
envisions an initial cadre of 20 or so staff organizing the effort.
Working temporarily out of MFA headquarters in Abu Dhabi, the office
is slated to be set up more permanently in Dubai. (Note: It is
unrealistic to assume a functioning office much earlier than October
given the summer leave season and the August 20 advent of Ramadan,
although Teneiji indicated that it would begin work in July. End
note.) Al-Qemzi noted that they had yet to draft implementing
regulations or to set up a licensing authority and processes. The
U.S. noted the importance of such regulations and urged the UAE to
ensure that their development and the expansion of the control list
be the highest priorities for the new Executive Office. Al-Qemzi
noted that the UAE is also working with the U.K., Germany, and other
friendly countries regarding the drafting of its implementing
regulations.


7. (C) The structure of the office was identified as having a
secretariat with legal and administrative support units and four
substantive sub-sections: 1) Permits and Authorization (to track
items on watch lists and coordinate licensing),2) Monitoring and
Verification (quality control of customs and other operations),3)
Commodities Control Unit, and 4) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Unit. Al-Qemzi suggested that an investigative unit could be added
at a later date and hopes to have satellite offices around the
country in the future. The office will borrow expertise from
relevant agencies and ministries; it is unclear how staffing might
evolve.


8. (C) In a sidebar conversation, Riyadh al Balhoul, representing
Dubai Police, expressed concern about the UAE's capacity to
independently monitor and interdict items given the high volumes of
trade and transshipment through the UAE. He mentioned that advance
notice of controlled dual use items being shipped through the UAE
from the origin countries' dual use licensing authority would be
helpful. An electronic system that would allow for advance
registration of licensed dual use items by shippers, freight
forwarders and the like with the UAE authorities was discussed as
well as linking such a system to UAE customs inspectors at the
borders.

Disposition
--------------


9. (S) Al-Qemzi noted that this issue remained a concern for them
and provided an update on his efforts with China. Noting that
China's MFA seemed more concerned with protecting Chinese trade, he
said he had made some progress with his Chinese intelligence
counterparts. He said they have agreed to take back some of the
shipments that the UAE had previously stopped. The U.S. noted its
concern that Chinese companies may resend the returned goods to them
and asked if al-Qemzi had raised this issue with the Chinese. He
asked for any information we had which demonstrated cases where goods
had been reshipped once returned to the country of origin. As for a
follow-on discussion, specifically on this issue, he said he
preferred to wait until the Executive Office was up and running since
he hoped it would have the authority to deal with this issue. The
U.S. reiterated its willingness to help once the UAE had identified
the appropriate legal authorities and suggested that the UAE consider
adding language to the implementing regulations it is drafting that
would provide for such authority. Al-Qemzi said they might be able
to meet on this issue in the September-October timeframe.

Administrative Enforcement
--------------


10. (C) The U.S. highlighted the importance of providing for the
administrative enforcement of the law, noting the deterrent effect
that administrative penalties can have. The UAE viewed
administrative action as a mechanism "outside" the export control law
and indicated that it might consider administrative fines or
penalties in the future. The U.S. clarified that in U.S. law, there
is an explicit legal basis for administrative enforcement. The U.S.
also noted the advantages of publicizing export control prosecutions
to promote compliance through the deterrent effect such prosecutions
produce. The UAE expressed concern that such publicity could be
detrimental to their relationships with other countries in the
region.

Next steps
--------------


11. (C) The establishment of a regular Committee and permanent
secretariat should help identify appropriate candidates for training
as we seek to enhance UAE capacity in the export control field. A
training program for judicial officials, coordinated by the U.S.
Department of Justice and MoI, took place on July 6-7; other training
programs will hopefully follow later in the year but were not
discussed in specific detail. Capacity building through training --
optimally coordinated with other countries offering related
capacity-building programs -- is a vital (and ongoing) next step.

The UAE delegation also endorsed programs to educate businessmen and
academics that are on the list of expert witnesses called upon for
counter-proliferation related testimony in court. The recognition
that a broad array of training is vital to UAE export control goals
was clearly acknowledged.


12. (C) Speeding up the tempo of UAE efforts to set up the executive
office, drafting and approving implementing regulations, updating its
control lists, and sorting out disposition authorities are also key
next steps. Progress clarified in this working group is notable, but
a higher level political push is necessary to ensure that
counter-proliferation programs get priority attention at the Cabinet
and Supreme Council levels. The U.S. delegation offered to provide
the UAE with of the key elements of implementing regulations and a
summary of statutes and regulations allowing the USG to seize and
dispose of property related to a violation of export control laws and
regulations (these will be sent to Post via email).


13. (C) Senior U.S. officials should stress in upcoming trips to
the region the following:

-- Appreciate progress to institutionalize a strong CP effort through
formation of the Committee and Executive Office, need to maintain
tempo and fully staff the effort;

-- Need to promptly adopt full control lists and publish these for
businesses to be aware;

-- Need to identify training needs and facilitate programs to build
capacity;

-- Implementing regulations are urgently needed and these regulations
must include authorities for disposition of seized cargo.

Keeping up Progress
--------------


14. (C) The June 24 session was encouraging while also emphasizing
the capacity gaps that the UAE still needs to fill. If we can
encourage the Cabinet to maintain the tempo of institution-building
(including staffing the Executive Office robustly),and facilitate
needed training targeted to key implementers, we should be able to
deepen this vital and productive partnership.


15. (C) Key UAE participants included:

--- Mohammed al-Qemzi, Dubai State Security

--- Mansour Abdullah al-Bastaki, Dubai State Security (and al-Qemzi
right-hand man on details)

--- Abdallah Hamdan al-Naqbi, MFA (Deputy Director of Legal Affairs
and apparent point person for MFA policy issues as well as urgent
interdiction requests)

--- Saeed al-Teneiji, MFA (slated to head the new office in Dubai)

--- Dr. Riyadh Balhoul, Dubai Police (said he spent more time on
money laundering issues)

--- Ahmed Salem al-Jabri (not further identified)

--- Hind al-Owais, MFA (recently returned from UN Mission, the only
female on UAE side)

--- unidentified individual in uniform.

U.S. delegation consisted of:

Matthew Borman (Commerce, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Industry and Security); Caroline Russell (State, Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation); Barbara Masilko (State,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs); Vennie Psaros-Pikoulas(State, Bureau
of International Security and Nonproliferation); Ted Curtin
(Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security); Parvin Huda (Commerce,
Bureau of Industry and Security); Brooke Smith (Nuclear Regulatory
Commission); Todd Perry (Energy, National Nuclear Security
Administration); and Robert Hessler (DHS, Customs and Border
Protection).


OLSON