UAE HOSTS COUNTER-PROLIFERATION EXPERTS

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000716 E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2019 TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC KNNP ETTC AE SUBJECT: UAE HOSTS COUNTER-PROLIFERATION EXPERTS Classified by DCM Doug Greene, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). REFS: ABU DHABI 375 ¶1. (C) The UAEG clarified its evolving institutional structure to deal more effectively with export control in a June 24 Working Group of experts affiliated with the Counter-proliferation Task Force (CTF),which most recently met on March 19. The U.S. delegation was led by Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce (Bureau of Industry and Security) Matthew Borman; the UAE was under the leadership of UAE CTF chair MG Mohammed al-Qemzi (head of Dubai General Directorate of State Security). In response to a series of topics proposed in advance by the U.S. side, the UAE delegation made two presentations: 1) status of the export control law, and 2) the executive office charged to coordinate the law's implementation. Legal Text Stirs Productive Dialogue -------------- ¶2. (C) In a methodical presentation of the August 2007 law (law #13 of 2007),with emphasis on amendments made in September 2008 (law #12 of 2008),the MFA spelled out the parameters of the authorities in the law. Taking questions as they went along, the UAE team clarified a number of points of prior concern to the U.S. experts. By the end of this straightforward discussion, scope of the amended law and degree of related implementation was reasonably clear - but not ideal by any means. The CTF members on the UAE side need to accelerate the implementation of their system beginning with full staffing of the Executive Committee. ¶3. (C) Issues explained during the discussion include the fact that implementers take policy guidance from the Cabinet level committee "UAE Committee on Commodities Subject to Import and Export Control" headed by Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Dr. Anwar Gargash (which first met May 10 and again June 18). For example, the UAE will not be able to expand its control list beyond that adopted when the law was published in September 2007 until that expanded list has been proposed to and approved by the Committee. Nevertheless, implementation of new UNSCR's or other urgent issues occurs immediately without awaiting Committee intervention. Additionally, the law reportedly covers items in Free Zones and re-exports, but does not extend to transiting items which are never off-loaded on UAE territory (short of prior suspicion of a UNSCR or other violation which leads to their inspection or seizure). Controlled items are inspected based on intelligence sources or monitoring of companies on watch lists, according to al-Qemzi. If prosecutors assess a low probability of a successful court case in the UAE, he said they may inquire with the sending country to see if there is a higher probability of prosecution there. Citing 1,000 screenings daily at one port, with a handful (five to ten) identified for additional scrutiny, al-Qemzi cited the need for ongoing training of personnel involved at various stages of the process. Al-Qemzi also noted that they screen incoming cargo based on a number of factors, including items on all four international control lists, end-users, shippers, Harmonized System (HS) codes, and the UNSCRs. The U.S. delegation asked if enforcement procedure and training are applied to all emirates or only in Dubai. Al-Qemzi said that the screening procedures and training of personnel is the same in all Emirates. He also indicated that the UAE has provided information to the U.S. on the items it has stopped based on its screening process, but the U.S. has no record of receiving such information in diplomatic channels. We will want to follow-up on this and set up a process by which they notify us of such actions. ¶4. (C) Commenting on the zirconium case that was tried but dismissed under the Export Control Law, al-Qemzi said the case was still being appealed and revealed some confusion by expert witnesses whose testimony may have misled the court. Experts, he said, can focus on the benign uses of dual use items when in fact a more sinister use may be likely. He related that the judge raised critical questions as to the items technical specifications: i.e., Zirconium rods are controlled but the item was a zirconium pipe. Al Qemzi noted that the case highlighted the need for training of judges and prosecutors. Executive Office to be Established in Dubai -------------- ¶5. (C) Much of the institutional uncertainty associated with implementation of the Export Control Law pertains to the "authority" designed to execute it. The new Committee noted above (and discussed reftel),is the senior body commissioned to ensure implementation. Most of the participants in the June 24 talks are members of the Committee, which has representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Economy, as well as from the Federal Customs Authority, Preventive Security (of MoI),State Security, Armed Forces Chemical Defense, and Civil Defense (also MoI). The Committee meets on a periodic basis (Dr. Gargash once suggested they would meet monthly but al-Qemzi noted "five or six times" annually) to make inter-agency decisions and give policy guidance. ¶6. (C) Supporting the deliberations of the Committee, and critical to the day-to-day implementation effort, will be the Executive Office which was described to us on June 24 as still taking shape. The newly assigned head of that office attended the meeting, but had little to add -- Saeed al-Teneiji hails from the MFA and told us he envisions an initial cadre of 20 or so staff organizing the effort. Working temporarily out of MFA headquarters in Abu Dhabi, the office is slated to be set up more permanently in Dubai. (Note: It is unrealistic to assume a functioning office much earlier than October given the summer leave season and the August 20 advent of Ramadan, although Teneiji indicated that it would begin work in July. End note.) Al-Qemzi noted that they had yet to draft implementing regulations or to set up a licensing authority and processes. The U.S. noted the importance of such regulations and urged the UAE to ensure that their development and the expansion of the control list be the highest priorities for the new Executive Office. Al-Qemzi noted that the UAE is also working with the U.K., Germany, and other friendly countries regarding the drafting of its implementing regulations. ¶7. (C) The structure of the office was identified as having a secretariat with legal and administrative support units and four substantive sub-sections: 1) Permits and Authorization (to track items on watch lists and coordinate licensing),2) Monitoring and Verification (quality control of customs and other operations),3) Commodities Control Unit, and 4) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Unit. Al-Qemzi suggested that an investigative unit could be added at a later date and hopes to have satellite offices around the country in the future. The office will borrow expertise from relevant agencies and ministries; it is unclear how staffing might evolve. ¶8. (C) In a sidebar conversation, Riyadh al Balhoul, representing Dubai Police, expressed concern about the UAE's capacity to independently monitor and interdict items given the high volumes of trade and transshipment through the UAE. He mentioned that advance notice of controlled dual use items being shipped through the UAE from the origin countries' dual use licensing authority would be helpful. An electronic system that would allow for advance registration of licensed dual use items by shippers, freight forwarders and the like with the UAE authorities was discussed as well as linking such a system to UAE customs inspectors at the borders. Disposition -------------- ¶9. (S) Al-Qemzi noted that this issue remained a concern for them and provided an update on his efforts with China. Noting that China's MFA seemed more concerned with protecting Chinese trade, he said he had made some progress with his Chinese intelligence counterparts. He said they have agreed to take back some of the shipments that the UAE had previously stopped. The U.S. noted its concern that Chinese companies may resend the returned goods to them and asked if al-Qemzi had raised this issue with the Chinese. He asked for any information we had which demonstrated cases where goods had been reshipped once returned to the country of origin. As for a follow-on discussion, specifically on this issue, he said he preferred to wait until the Executive Office was up and running since he hoped it would have the authority to deal with this issue. The U.S. reiterated its willingness to help once the UAE had identified the appropriate legal authorities and suggested that the UAE consider adding language to the implementing regulations it is drafting that would provide for such authority. Al-Qemzi said they might be able to meet on this issue in the September-October timeframe. Administrative Enforcement -------------- ¶10. (C) The U.S. highlighted the importance of providing for the administrative enforcement of the law, noting the deterrent effect that administrative penalties can have. The UAE viewed administrative action as a mechanism "outside" the export control law and indicated that it might consider administrative fines or penalties in the future. The U.S. clarified that in U.S. law, there is an explicit legal basis for administrative enforcement. The U.S. also noted the advantages of publicizing export control prosecutions to promote compliance through the deterrent effect such prosecutions produce. The UAE expressed concern that such publicity could be detrimental to their relationships with other countries in the region. Next steps -------------- ¶11. (C) The establishment of a regular Committee and permanent secretariat should help identify appropriate candidates for training as we seek to enhance UAE capacity in the export control field. A training program for judicial officials, coordinated by the U.S. Department of Justice and MoI, took place on July 6-7; other training programs will hopefully follow later in the year but were not discussed in specific detail. Capacity building through training -- optimally coordinated with other countries offering related capacity-building programs -- is a vital (and ongoing) next step. The UAE delegation also endorsed programs to educate businessmen and academics that are on the list of expert witnesses called upon for counter-proliferation related testimony in court. The recognition that a broad array of training is vital to UAE export control goals was clearly acknowledged. ¶12. (C) Speeding up the tempo of UAE efforts to set up the executive office, drafting and approving implementing regulations, updating its control lists, and sorting out disposition authorities are also key next steps. Progress clarified in this working group is notable, but a higher level political push is necessary to ensure that counter-proliferation programs get priority attention at the Cabinet and Supreme Council levels. The U.S. delegation offered to provide the UAE with of the key elements of implementing regulations and a summary of statutes and regulations allowing the USG to seize and dispose of property related to a violation of export control laws and regulations (these will be sent to Post via email). ¶13. (C) Senior U.S. officials should stress in upcoming trips to the region the following: -- Appreciate progress to institutionalize a strong CP effort through formation of the Committee and Executive Office, need to maintain tempo and fully staff the effort; -- Need to promptly adopt full control lists and publish these for businesses to be aware; -- Need to identify training needs and facilitate programs to build capacity; -- Implementing regulations are urgently needed and these regulations must include authorities for disposition of seized cargo. Keeping up Progress -------------- ¶14. (C) The June 24 session was encouraging while also emphasizing the capacity gaps that the UAE still needs to fill. If we can encourage the Cabinet to maintain the tempo of institution-building (including staffing the Executive Office robustly),and facilitate needed training targeted to key implementers, we should be able to deepen this vital and productive partnership. ¶15. (C) Key UAE participants included: --- Mohammed al-Qemzi, Dubai State Security --- Mansour Abdullah al-Bastaki, Dubai State Security (and al-Qemzi right-hand man on details) --- Abdallah Hamdan al-Naqbi, MFA (Deputy Director of Legal Affairs and apparent point person for MFA policy issues as well as urgent interdiction requests) --- Saeed al-Teneiji, MFA (slated to head the new office in Dubai) --- Dr. Riyadh Balhoul, Dubai Police (said he spent more time on money laundering issues) --- Ahmed Salem al-Jabri (not further identified) --- Hind al-Owais, MFA (recently returned from UN Mission, the only female on UAE side) --- unidentified individual in uniform. U.S. delegation consisted of: Matthew Borman (Commerce, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Industry and Security); Caroline Russell (State, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation); Barbara Masilko (State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs); Vennie Psaros-Pikoulas(State, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation); Ted Curtin (Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security); Parvin Huda (Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security); Brooke Smith (Nuclear Regulatory Commission); Todd Perry (Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration); and Robert Hessler (DHS, Customs and Border Protection). OLSON