IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S CAIRO SPEECH - WE NEED TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000713

SIPDIS

FOR S, R AND M FROM AMBASSADOR

ALSO FOR NEA,CA AND S/P

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019
TAGS: PREL CASC CVIS KPAO AE
SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S CAIRO SPEECH - WE NEED TO
TACKLE THE VISA ISSUE

REFS: (A) 08 DHAKA 1201
- (B) 08 ABU DHABI 1356

ABU DHABI 00000713 001.2 OF 002


Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) The President's speech in Cairo laid out a vision of
intensive engagement with the Islamic world, and the Secretary's
subsequent memorandum to the president delineated an extensive array
of scholarships and exchange programs to implement the vision. Many
if not all of these programs depend on Muslims traveling to the
United States, which means they need visas. In the view of mission
Abu Dhabi (and the UAEG),the biggest strategic impediment to
enhanced public engagement is the broken Security Advisory Opinion
(SAO) process, which results in significant delays for many UAE
citizens. This takes on particular urgency for us as the UAE is
preparing to launch a major program of government sponsored
University education in the US. I urge that resources be made
available, on a government wide basis, to expedite the processing of
the visas.


2. (C) About one in ten Emirati visa applicants is subject to SAO
name checks, usually on the basis of the perceived similarity between
an applicant's name (and date and place of birth) and someone else
who is believed to have committed a terrorist act. While ten percent
may seem a small number, the SAO "hits" are almost entirely on males,
so for an Emirati man, the chances are about one in five that an SAO
will be needed. Once in the SAO process, opinions can take anywhere
from a day or two up to several years. Grounds for expediting are
narrow. Ironically, we rarely, if ever, deny a visa on grounds of
security. Rather we almost always issue, sometimes after a two year
delay. This suggests that the issue is more about resources and
management, and less about security per se.


3. (C) These delays come at a substantial price to our reputation
and public image. (Not least because we are required to say that the
delays are attributable to "administrative processing" - for entirely
good reasons - which means our delays make us look like
incompetents.) They also seriously impact our ability to influence
key opinion leaders. Some examples:

-- Juma Al-Majid: this Seventy-eight year old Dubai businessman is a
well known philanthropist and founder of society that restores
ancient Islamic texts throughout the Arab world. A four month delay
in processing his application meant that he missed receiving the
Khalil Gibran award from the Arab American Institute.

-- Khalid Gharib: this young Emirati university student was
enthusiastically interested in studying in the US and was selected
for a MEPI cultural exchange but missed his six month program at a US
university because of a visa delay. This delay had the perverse
effect of creating a pall over the program for the rest of the
Emirati students.

-- Foreign Minister: Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayid complained
to Acting Assistant Secretary Jeff Feltman (during his recent visit)
and Ambassador about the negative effect on the US public image of
the US denying visas for cases of Emiratis needing urgent medical
care. (Note: Expediting for humanitarian purposes is allowable, and
we noted this to AbZ, but he responded that the frequent delay for
escorts effectively cancels the travel, especially for minors.)

-- We could also list many other cases that have had a measurable
economic impact (travel of executives from the UAE's booming airline
business to buy Boeings) or an impact on our national security
(delays in training for UAE service members deploying to Afghanistan
in support of coalition efforts).


4. (C) Finally, the UAE has an active scholarship office, with
responsibility to encourage young Emiratis to seek university
education abroad. After much convincing by the Embassy, it has
decided to chance sending 300 plus students per year to American
universities. Nothing could be more in line with the President's
vision. Yet we are nervous about how the UAEG will react when
potentially 30-60 students per year face delays that prevent their
travel to the US on a timely basis.


5. (C) Recommendation: I urge two areas of focus: (1) reduce the
number of inappropriate SAOs required and (2) handle those that are
required more efficiently. The Department should work with our
partners to ensure that information in our CLASS database is useful -
entries for very common names without date or place of birth
information unnecessarily delay legitimate travelers and harm U.S.
interests. Agencies need not share entire case files, but should
provide information that helps exclude legitimate travelers from the
SAO process. As we work to reduce the number of unnecessary SAOs,

ABU DHABI 00000713 002.2 OF 002


this should allow us to more quickly clear those that are required.
While a small number of cases may require lengthy scrutiny, the great
majority should be clearable within days or weeks - not the months
that are currently required. If resources are needed to help partner
agencies clear checks quickly, they should be applied. The USG must
view this issue as our foreign interlocutors do: not as a problem
where Agency A slows down Agency B, but rather as a Government-wide
priority to protect our nation while facilitating legitimate travel.


6. (C) Finally, just to be clear, I do not challenge the need for
post 9/11 security procedures, nor do I advocate relaxing any visa
issuance standards. I am intensely aware that two of the 9/11
hijackers had visas issued at what is now my mission. I simply
advocate mobilization of resources for better management of existing
regulations.

OLSON